How local factors shape Libya’s security sector, and what this means for disarmament, demobilization and reintegration
In the absence of durable political and security institutions at national level, there can be no ‘one size fits all’ approach to disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR) across Libya. But as the country’s sprawling security sector continues to grow, with fresh recruits signing up to join the many state-affiliated and non-state-affiliated armed groups, it is clear that planning for DDR cannot wait for a ‘post-conflict’ situation.
Drawing on a set of interviews with key figures with close knowledge of Libya’s security landscape, along with in-depth interviews with residents of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan, this research paper explores how the security apparatus of each of these three cities has evolved since the overthrow of Muammar Gaddafi in 2011. The case studies highlight that significant variation exists in each city’s security dynamics, reflecting its social composition; its experience of conflict; the structure of the local economy and economic opportunity; and relations with neighbouring locations as well as with the state’s formal institutions.
Such highly localized factors underscore the scale of the challenges to be overcome in efforts to reform Libya’s security sector. Even so, with the country’s armed groups mainly operating in the areas where they originated, the local characteristics identified in the paper bring a degree of social accountability that should not be underestimated – including for its potential to check the behaviour of the armed groups within their local communities, and to provide a foundation, where conditions allow, for DDR planning in line with specific local contexts.
Summary
Libya’s armed groups predominantly operate in the areas where they originated. This means that the security sector has developed since 2011 in accordance with distinctly local dynamics: the social composition of the area; the experience of conflict; the structure of the local economy and economic opportunity; and relations with neighbouring localities and the state’s formal institutions. This local factor is critical to understanding the country’s security sector, and the challenges for security sector reform (SSR) and disarmament, demobilization and reintegration (DDR), but has been relatively underexplored.
This research paper attempts to address this gap, through a close study of the development of the security apparatuses of Misrata, Zawiya and Zintan. It draws on a set of interviews with key figures with close knowledge of the security landscape, along with in-depth interviews with residents of th e three cities.
Charting the evolving relationship of Libya’s armed groups to state authority must be done in the context of the developing political, economic and security landscape in the country. Misratan, Zawiyan and Zintani armed groups have obtained state affiliation through various routes and institutions, but these different affiliations have in most cases proved weak and sub ject to change.
Armed groups from the three cities, at their core, remain based on social networks. Focusing on the positioning of key social constituencies and commanders reveals that the formal structures of the security sector reflect local conditions, rather than being shaped by the centra l Libyan state.
SSR has remained the primary focus of policy efforts for Libyan and international policymakers, but – beyond cosmetic changes – there has been limited progress. State-led DDR has been largely dormant since 2015. Given Libya’s ongoing governance crisis, illustrated by the continuing existence of rival political institutions and a competitive and divided security sector, DDR has often been viewed as premature – but lessons from other contexts caution again st such a view.
Policymakers considering action to support DDR in Libya should seek to calibrate efforts to local contexts and to mobilize resources into a flexible programme that might be replicated in other locations and eventually expanded to the national level. This will require concerted coordination and dialogue between the Libyan authorities, which remain focused on national-level programming, and international donors, who seem to broadly acknowledge that localized approaches are the most feasible interventions.
In cities like Misrata and Zintan, where most armed groups are not permanently mobilized, dialogue should seek to improve the management of weapons and ammunition as well as put in place measures to limit their use. The creation of committees that provide an interface between citizens and armed groups to mediate such discussions could be beneficial.
Programming efforts should seek to directly enhance local social accountability in accordance with a shared set of principles and rules. One way of achieving this is to pursue the agreement of a ‘core’ code of conduct that can be applied across Libya’s territories and that aims to provide citizens of any area with equal treatment, setting a common baseline for nation al SSR efforts.
A more ambitious route to pursue progress would be to provide economic incentives to local communities, via municipal councils, in return for progress on issues such as demobilization, weapons management and reducing comm unity violence.
Training opportunities for members of armed factions should be based on assessments of the local context, rather than in accordance with a ‘one size fits all’ national programme. The creation of local units that are afforded a degree of autonomy to develop context-specific initiatives may be the most effective way of doing this.