Ukraine Isn’t the Only Place Where America Must Counter Russia’s Mercenaries
Russia’s infamous Wagner paramilitary company may be headed for defeat in Ukraine. The group has sustained enormous losses in the last five months, and its leader, Yevgeny Prigozhin, is embroiled in a high-stakes feud with Russia’s top military brass, who have accused him of indirectly aiding Ukraine by “sowing rifts” among Russian forces. Late last week, Prigozhin publicly castigated Russia’s senior military leadership for not supplying Wagner with enough ammunition and threatened to withdraw his forces from the city of Bakhmut. According to the British Ministry of Defense, the Kremlin may be looking to replace the Wagner contingent in Ukraine with forces from another private military company—one that it can more tightly control.
But even if it is sidelined in Ukraine, Wagner is unlikely to fade into obscurity. The group has demonstrated global ambitions—and much closer to American shores than many realize. It has considered working in Haiti and sought to purchase weapons from Turkey, a NATO ally. But the region where Wagner has made the deepest inroads—and where it is likely to refocus its efforts in the event of a setback in Ukraine—is Africa.
The group is probably already playing a role behind the scenes in the crisis in Sudan, where it has forged links with paramilitary leader Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also known as Hemedti) and his Rapid Support Forces, one of the two main factions in the brewing civil war. Wagner has also entrenched itself in the Central African Republic and Mali, two former French colonies where it has largely filled the void left by departing French and international forces. And it has sent fighters to Libya and Mozambique, among other fragile states where governments and infrastructure need protecting.
Wagner’s growing presence in Africa poses a difficult challenge for the United States. Not only does the group bolster autocratic forces, stoke instability, and generally disregard human rights; it also acts as an agent of the Kremlin and helps reinforce its narrative. Yet thanks in part to an aggressive Kremlin-backed disinformation campaign, Russia and its mercenary proxies remain popular in Africa (and much of the global South) even as most Western populations have turned against Moscow.
The challenges for the United States and its allies include countering Wagner in the countries where it operates, denying Russia access to new clients in the form of military juntas, and puncturing the narrative of authoritarian stability that has elevated Russia’s standing in Africa. Washington has long struggled to respond effectively to Russian propaganda, but the Biden administration’s strategy of “pre-bunking” the Kremlin’s lies by declassifying intelligence has been a rare success. The United States should continue to seek new and innovative ways to proactively counter Russian disinformation, denying Moscow the opportunity to win hearts and minds with its fire hose of falsehoods.
THE AFRICA MODEL
Wagner has enjoyed considerable success in Africa since its mercenaries first deployed to Libya and Sudan sometime between 2015 and 2017. (Experts disagree about the exact time and location of the group’s first African mission, in part because it initially kept a low profile.) Since then, Wagner has set up shop in more than a dozen African countries, destabilizing French and U.S. interests along the way. If Prigozhin faces additional setbacks in Ukraine, he will likely pivot back to the kinds of missions in which Wagner enjoys a comparative advantage: conducting expeditionary operations and supplying muscle to fragile states in exchange for access to valuable resources.
Nowhere is that model more appealing than in Africa. The continent faces a new wave of jihadi and insurgent activity, stretching from the Sahel to parts of the Horn of Africa to Mozambique. Wagner offers a Faustian bargain to those in need of security assistance: it will protect regimes and fight insurgents but demands its pound of flesh in return. Wagner kills civilians, operates exploitative business networks, exacerbates grievances between groups and among citizens, and ultimately leaves countries worse off than before its fighters arrived.
Africa is home to a variety of insurgencies and terrorist threats. The most dangerous are affiliates of al Qaeda and the Islamic State (also known as ISIS), but groups seeking national power or autonomy—such as various Tuareg organizations in the tri-border region of Burkina Faso, Mali, and Niger and the antigovernment Seleka coalition in the Central African Republic—have also sown chaos across much of the continent. Many of these groups feed off popular grievances—whether ethnic, religious, political, or economic—and all of them thrive where governments are weak.
Wagner’s campaigns in Africa aren’t built for enduring success.
France’s decision to draw down several of its military operations in Francophone Africa, especially in the Central African Republic and Mali, has left a security vacuum that Wagner has ably exploited. But the broader limits of Western security assistance in Africa have also benefited Wagner, which has built close relationships with governments and factions in Burkina Faso, Libya, and Sudan and is in discussions to provide training and equipment to Eritrea and information operations support to Zimbabwe, according to leaked U.S. intelligence documents reported on by The Washington Post. The organization often protects coup leaders and fights insurgents in exchange for resource-extraction deals, acting as a conduit for Russian arms sales, military training, and investments, usually through shell companies.
But for all the mystery surrounding Wagner, its counterinsurgency operations in the Central African Republic and Mali have been far from clandestine. Its soldiers have taken part in raids and ambushes, as well as other offensive combat operations. This has cut both ways: African governments and citizens alike have touted security improvements, especially in the Central African Republic, but Wagner’s approach of shooting first and asking questions later has also angered civilians. (In Mali, the group stands accused of participating in a massacre of more than 300 people in March 2022, among other atrocities.) Yet the hunger of many African leaders for tangible security gains, a top priority for obvious reasons, has often led them to look the other way in the hope of gaining short-term payoffs from Wagner.
But short-term solutions rarely work out in the long run. And Wagner’s campaigns in Africa aren’t built for enduring success. Its fighters were routed in Mozambique, where jihadis belonging to the local ISIS affiliate killed at least seven Wagner soldiers and forced the group to withdraw after just a few months. In Libya, Wagner fighters failed to turn the tide in Tripoli, where they were deployed to support the warlord Khalifa Haftar and his Libyan National Army. Even in the Central African Republic and Mali, Wagner fighters have contributed to the growth of jihadi groups by committing wanton violence against civilians and thereby helping al Qaeda affiliates such as Jamaat Nusrat al-Islam wal-Muslimin recruit.
TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE?
Potential avenues for countering Moscow’s influence in Africa are limited by the choice of available partners, many of which are illiberal regimes with a track record of human rights violations. The United States and its partners must strike a balance between countering violent extremism and avoiding the optics of empowering autocrats. Moreover, efforts to fight terrorism must be clearly separated from efforts to counter Russia’s malign activities, so that the Kremlin cannot claim credit for the positive results of Western counterterrorism efforts in areas where Russian forces, including Wagner, are colocated.
The United States should start by publicly articulating its objectives in Africa. Although certain goals, such as the deterrence of terrorist attacks on American and European soil, should remain central to U.S. policy in Africa, Washington needs to show African states that it is serious about investing in nonmilitary solutions that can materially improve people’s lives. This means increasing development and humanitarian aid that can strengthen governments and civil society and thereby diminish the appeal and legitimacy of militant groups.
Washington should also signal that its commitment to the region will outlast any individual presidential administration. Democracies, especially those racked by hyperpartisanship, can suffer paralysis in the realm of foreign policy. They often switch strategies between administrations or in response to shifts in public opinion. By contrast, authoritarian regimes, whose leaders need worry about appeasing only a small subset of elites, are better at sticking to strategies, even in the face of public opposition. The United States and its partners need to find ways around this stumbling block in order to forge productive long-term relationships with African partners.
Although the United States is now paying more attention to Africa—as evidenced by its efforts to strengthen fragile states, including Burkina Faso, Libya, Mali, and Mozambique—these efforts may be too little, too late. Russian mercenary forces have already embedded themselves in many of these countries and are rapidly working to expand their influence. Yet Wagner is not even mentioned by name in the U.S. Strategy Toward Sub-Saharan Africa, published by the White House in August 2022, and Russian private military companies receive only a single mention.
HIT THEM WHERE IT HURTS
The United States must prevent Wagner from further destabilizing African states, since prevention is easier than rehabilitation. Doing so will require identifying and capitalizing on the group’s vulnerabilities. Although Wagner has benefited from its position at the nexus of military and business, its economic relationships can also be weaknesses. Since it does not operate as a traditional military outfit, Wagner has a specialized logistics network that includes a variety of shell companies supporting its business and resource-extraction activities. These are soft points that can be targeted by Western sanctions. Washington has already hit some Wagner subsidiaries, such as Lobaye Invest and Meroe Gold, with U.S. sanctions, but it should take action against others, including those involved in the group’s forestry operations in the Central African Republic. Sanctioning each new Wagner shell company as it is discovered may seem like a game of Whac-a-Mole, but it is the only way to weaken Prigozhin’s criminal network.
Knocking out these predatory businesses may also help build goodwill in central and western Africa, where many entrepreneurs are concerned about Wagner affiliates pushing them out of business. Beyond naming and sanctioning the companies themselves, U.S. and European authorities should work together to identify the end users of Wagner’s exports. Many of these exports—such as gold, diamonds, and timber—may be infiltrating American and European markets. Western governments must prioritize blocking such shipments, punishing actors that willfully work with Wagner, and deterring exports that benefit the group.
The United States should publicly articulate its objectives in Africa.
In addition to targeting Wagner’s business empire, Washington should deepen its relationships with African countries so they have less need of the Russian mercenary outfit. The U.S. partnership with Niger offers a promising model, but Washington must refrain from recycling the same overly securitized approach that seeks to build military capabilities without tailoring them to the local environment. Furthermore, the United States needs to train some of its military partners to a higher standard, working to ensure that their soldiers do not go on to abuse civilians or attempt to overthrow governments. As the scholar Joseph Sany has argued, “For many Africans, Wagner is a choice not of preference but of desperation following years of failed international efforts to help end violent crises.” The group is also the choice of expediency, since Russia offers troops, weapons, and training with no strings attached. Washington’s selling point is quality. Unfortunately, however, African leaders often prefer an inferior product with few limitations to a superior one that is heavily restricted.
In addition to strengthening its security partnerships with African countries, the United States must increase its support for civilian government institutions. Depriving jihadi groups of manpower requires long-term investments in addressing the issues that help them recruit: corruption, lack of accountability, and unequal delivery of basic services—especially along ethnic, religious, or regional lines.
Tackling the nonmilitary challenges that plague African governments will set the United States apart from its rivals in the region. Doing so will not come at the expense of U.S. military objectives, and it will thwart Russia’s significantly easier and more limited goals, which include gaining access to resources, building connections with elites, and competing against Western countries for influence. State building and long-term partnerships are not Russian priorities.
This is not a call for nation building to counter Russian influence in Africa. Rather, it is a call for an incremental, long-term effort to strengthen African institutions and address social, environmental, political, and economic challenges that destabilize countries and provide openings for actors such as Wagner to exploit. In the absence of such an effort, Wagner’s failures in Ukraine may be a prelude to additional successes in Africa.