Maps
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.
Iran Update, January 14, 2025
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Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS) is confronting small pockets of locally organized fighter cells in areas under its control. Some of these groups are led by known Assad regime officials who have military experience and control pre-existing militias.[i] HTS-led forces have successfully confronted and suppressed these isolated incidents of resistance in a way that mirrors the Assad regime’s counter-revolutionary approach at the start of the Syrian Civil War in 2011-2012.[ii] The HTS-led forces have deployed tanks and used attack helicopters and drones to target pro-regime forces in coastal Syria.[iii] These deployments have enabled HTS-led forces to swiftly confront small groups of regime remnants.[iv] The organization, coordination, size, and spread of these opposition groups do not currently appear to strain HTS-led forces‘ bandwidth. An increase in pro-Assad activity coupled with an ISIS resurgence in HTS-held areas would very likely present HTS with a bandwidth problem, however, and thus impede future efforts to suppress dissent.[v]
A pro-Assad group is attempting to coordinate and expand attacks targeting HTS-led forces but has yet to demonstrate any ability to do so. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” announced in late December 2024 the launch of armed resistance against the HTS-led interim government.[vi] The group has since claimed on multiple occasions that its fighters have attacked and killed interim government forces. It remains unclear whether the group has had any real involvement in these attacks, however.[vii] The “Syrian Popular Resistance” claimed on January 13 that it killed over 35 HTS-led forces in western Homs near the Lebanon-Syria border in coordination with fighters from Hermel, Lebanon.[viii] Some security analysts attributed the clashes to Lebanese Hezbollah or smugglers, omitting mention of the ”Syrian Popular Resistance.”[ix] The interim government gave no comment on the clashes, which would be surprising if opposition fighters had indeed killed 35 HTS-led fighters. The “Syrian Popular Resistance” also claimed to be affiliated with a former Syrian regime officer who led an attack taking interim government forces hostage in Latakia on January 14.[x] The militia leader did not mention the ”Syrian Popular Resistance” in a video he posted shortly after the attack.[xi] That the perpetrators of these attacks do not independently acknowledge any affiliation with the “Syrian Popular Resistance” suggests that this coordinating body is largely aspirational at this time. The formation of an opposition group that operates under the Syrian Popular Resistance would likely strain the interim government’s bandwidth and make them less effective in responding to anti-HTS resistance.
A likely Islamist HTS splinter group announced its opposition to the HTS-led interim government on January 11. The group, which calls itself the “Sayf al Bahr Battalion,” reportedly formed on January 3 after defecting from HTS.[xii] The group’s spokesperson, Abu Khaled al Shami, accused HTS leader Ahmed al Shara of stripping HTS of its “Islamic character and working to dissolve it in the name of the secular civil state.”[xiii] Shami announced the “start of the fighting” against HTS-led forces in a statement on January 11.[xiv] Shami called on Syrians to prevent their sons from joining the new Syrian army and to reject nationalism and secularism.[xv] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion claimed to fire on HTS military vehicles at an unspecified town in Rif Dimashq on January 11.[xvi] CTP-ISW cannot confirm that this attack took place or verify the exact nature and origin of the group. CTP-ISW has observed the formation of nascent opposition against HTS, particularly along the Syrian coast.[xvii] The Sayf al Bahr Battalion appears to be the first organized opposition faction that has defected from HTS. Armed opposition from this group could encourage more extreme jihadist elements in HTS’s coalition to revolt against its rule.
Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians in Baghdad on January 13, which is consistent with previous indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the October 2025 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[xviii] Barzani held separate meetings with Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, Sovereignty Alliance leader Khamis al Khanjar, and Azm Alliance leader Muthanna al Samarrai. Barzani emphasized the role of Parliament in “strengthening national dialogue” in his meeting with Mashhadani.[xix] Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians recently called in mid-December 2024 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[xx] It is unclear where Barzani was referring to these politicians’ call when he mentioned ”national dialogue.”
Barzani also discussed the 2025 Iraqi budget with Iraqi political officials on January 13. Barzani called on the Iraqi judiciary to “guarantee the [KRG’s] financial rights” during a meeting with Iraqi Supreme Judicial Council President Faiq Zaidan. Barzani and former interim Parliament Speaker Mohsen al Mandalawi reportedly agreed to amend the 2025 budget to guarantee the salaries of [KRG] employees.”[xxi] The KRG recently threatened on January 8 to withdraw from the Iraqi government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[xxii]
A source close to nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Muqtada al Sadr separately claimed on January 13 that Sadr opposes the return of his political bloc—the Shia National Movement—to politics. The Sadrist political bloc withdrew from Parliament in 2022, enabling the Iranian-backed Shia Coordination Framework to gain a majority in parliament. Sadr’s reported opposition to his political bloc reentering politics is noteworthy given that some Sunni politicians have recently aligned with Sadr on some issues. CTP-ISW previously noted that the alignment of Sadr’s and Sunni positions could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections.
Israel and Hamas have reportedly made progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement but have yet to solve a key outstanding issue.[xxiii] An unspecified Palestinian official told the BBC on January 14 that the final draft of the ceasefire agreement allows Israel to maintain an 800-meter-long buffer zone along the Gaza Strip’s eastern and northern boundaries.[xxiv] Israel’s ability to establish such a buffer zone was reportedly a significant point of disagreement between Israel and Hamas.[xxv] Israel and Hamas have yet to solve another key outstanding issue–the withdrawal of the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors–however.[xxvi]
Unspecified Arab officials told the Wall Street Journal on January 14 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip, Mohammad Sinwar, has “agreed in principle” to the terms of the final ceasefire draft.[xxvii] Sinwar may be making autonomous decisions about the ceasefire agreement without consulting Hamas central leadership.[xxviii] The Wall Street Journal reported on January 13 that Sinwar has begun operating autonomously and ignoring the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. It is unclear how Sinwar would implement the terms of a ceasefire agreement given that he lacks sufficient command-and-control across the northern and southern halves of the Gaza Strip.[xxix]
US Secretary of State Antony Blinken warned Israel on January 14 that Hamas has recruited “almost as many new militants as it has lost.”[xxx] Blinken stated that Hamas’ new recruitment effort is a “recipe for an enduring insurgency and perpetual war.” The Wall Street Journal similarly reported on January 13 that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xxxi] These new recruits are not capable of successfully operating in organized military units given that Hamas has lost adequate safe areas to train new recruits.[xxxii] Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas the sanctuary to conduct training programs, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them safe areas there by conducting repeated raids.[xxxiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train new recruits in a way that would make them competent and capable of fighting against the IDF.
The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization.[xxxiv] Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xxxv]
Key Takeaways:
Syria: Small pockets of locally organized, armed resistance against HTS have emerged in Syria. The expansion of such resistance would strain the bandwidth of HTS-led forces and impede any efforts to suppress this resistance.
Iraq: KRG President Nechirvan Barzani met with prominent Sunni politicians in Baghdad, which is consistent with early indications that Kurdish and Sunni parties are trying to build a political coalition ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025.
Gaza Strip: Israel and Hamas made significant progress toward a ceasefire-hostage agreement. They appear to have yet to resolve disagreement over whether the IDF would withdraw from the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, however.
Iran Update, January 13, 2025
Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a “breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Israel and Hamas have yet to solve at least two outstanding issues, however.[i] Two Israeli officials told Axios that mediators from Qatar, the US, and Egypt presented Hamas with a “final draft” of the agreement.[ii] The draft stipulates that Hamas must release 33 hostages during a 42-day ceasefire in the Gaza Strip. Israel will begin negotiations on the 16th day of the ceasefire to secure the release of the remaining hostages in exchange for “high-profile” Hamas members, according to details shared by an Israeli military correspondent.[iii]
Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.[iv] Israeli officials told an Israeli military correspondent that the IDF will maintain its presence in the Netzarim and Philadelphi corridors, which are two operationally significant IDF-held areas, between the first and second phase of the ceasefire agreement.[v] Another presumably separate Israeli official told Axios that the IDF will “gradually withdraw” to a buffer zone along the border and that the IDF will withdraw from the corridors.[vi] The official did not make clear when the IDF would withdraw from the corridors. A Hamas official told CNN that negotiations regarding the buffer zone and a permanent ceasefire are ongoing and remain “sticking points.”[vii] Hamas demands the buffer zone return to its pre-war width of 300-500 meters, while Israel insists on a two-kilometer-wide zone along Gaza’s eastern and northern boundaries.[viii] The IDF intends to use this buffer zone to protect Israeli communities in southern Israel. Israel will not completely withdraw from the Gaza Strip until its war objectives are achieved, among them the return of all the hostages, according to Israeli officials speaking to an Israeli military correspondent.[ix]
Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council.[x] Sinwar has begun recruiting Gazans by targeting funerals and prayer gatherings and offering food, aid, and medical assistance in return for service.[xi] Hamas has obtained some of these resources by hijacking aid convoys. The Wall Street Journal also reported that Hamas is using unexploded ordinance to build new improvised explosive devices.[xii] New recruits are not capable of successfully disassembling and reassembling unexploded ordinance to build improvised explosive devices. Such efforts require relatively experienced explosives experts. The loss of those experts due to Israeli military action would likely have outsized effects on the nascent reconstructed Hamas military organization, which will already need substantial time and space to reconstitute itself.
Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip. The IDF has successfully achieved two key operational-level objectives: the isolation of Hamas military forces in the northern Strip and the destruction of Hamas’ military organization. Hamas fighters are now operating as small fighting cells and not organized military units that Hamas had in the early days of the war. Military units have institutionalized command, recruitment, and replenishment functions that make them resilient in the face of casualties and degradation. Individual cells of fighters lack this institutionalization and are relatively easy to destroy. A decentralized, guerrilla force like the one Hamas employs can “wait out” the Israelis and prepare to rebuild, however. The IDF is preventing the reconstitution of Hamas units by isolating Hamas’ forces in the north and denying them sanctuary there by repeatedly raiding areas where Hamas is strong.[xiii] These raids gradually attrit Hamas fighters and make it impossible for Hamas to train their new recruits to make them competent and capable against the IDF.[xiv]
Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad, as CTP-ISW has previously assessed.[xv] The successful IDF effort to isolate the northern Gaza Strip both above and below ground means that it is highly unlikely that Sinwar is capable of communicating with forces in the north by runner or other physical means. Sinwar or someone close to him could presumably communicate electronically, but the use of electronic communications would be extremely risky and therefore unlikely to enable Sinwar to exert day-to-day control over Hamas’ military organization in the northern Strip. Sinwar likely retains significant control over Hamas forces in the central Gaza Strip and in Khan Younis, however.[xvi] The IDF raids these areas only rarely and it is not permanently present close to many of the major Gazan towns and cities in the Central Camps or Khan Younis areas.
The IDF’s operational success in the Gaza Strip obscures the strategic insufficiency of IDF operations if the Israeli government desires to destroy Hamas fully. Sinwar and his close commanders will almost certainly begin to rebuild Hamas after any IDF withdrawal, though such an effort will take years of patient reconstitution.[xvii] It is also far from clear that Sinwar would decide to rebuild Hamas in the same way Hamas built itself from the 1990s to 2023, given the obvious failure of Hamas’ military operations in the Gaza Strip and the inability of those operations to achieve any of Hamas’ war aims. These war aims include the destruction of the Israeli state by triggering a regional war or the destruction of the Abraham Accords.
Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey and the SNA continued shelling SDF positions along both the line of control and deeper into SDF-held territory on January 13.[xviii] The SNA has also reportedly deployed forces to the line of control near Tal Tamr since at least January 8.[xix] These deployments and the shelling around Tal Tamr will almost certainly force the SDF to deploy forces to the area to protect against any possible Turkish-SNA offensive, thus fixing significant SDF forces far from the main fighting near the Euphrates. Turkey and the SNA can therefore force the SDF to stretch its bandwidth by allocating forces to Tal Tamr without an attack from Tal Tamr. Stretching the SDF’s bandwidth would likely make Turkish or SNA operations near Kobani or the Euphrates River much easier.
Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River. Turkey and the SNA are attempting to isolate the SDF forces in their bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates by striking along supply lines and key nodes behind the front while pressuring the SDF bridgeheads with ground attacks. Local, anti-SDF media reported that Turkey struck an SDF barracks and two guard posts in Sarrin, east of the Qara Qozak bridge.[xx] The SDF operates from a base in Sarrin that Russian forces evacuated after the fall of the regime, meaning that Turkey is striking an SDF rear base that could be used to sustain the bridgeheads.[xxi] Turkey also reportedly conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions west of the Tishreen Dam.[xxii]
The SNA has followed up these airstrikes by pressuring the SDF bridgehead on the western bank of the Euphrates. Geolocated footage posted on January 13 showed SNA-affiliated fighters firing small arms at an unseen target in a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxiii] The SDF posted footage on January 12 of an SDF drone strike that targeted an SNA personnel carrier.[xxiv] Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains as of this writing, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to its rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.[xxv] The enemy force—if it discovers a withdrawal is underway—will typically attempt to turn the withdrawal into a rout to destroy the withdrawing force.[xxvi]
Geolocated footage posted by the commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—on January 13 showed SNA armored vehicles traveling through a village northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxvii] Abu Amsha claimed that the video showed SNA reinforcements arriving at the frontlines.[xxviii] The SNA may seek to move more forces to the frontline in order to continue pressuring the SDF positions or prepare for a large-scale assault to collapse the bridgehead.
Key Takeaways:
Gaza Strip Ceasefire: Israeli and Hamas officials appear to be optimistic after achieving a “breakthrough” in ceasefire negotiations in Doha on January 13. Negotiations over the buffer zone and a continued IDF presence in the Gaza Strip remain sticking points.
Hamas Reconstitution: Hamas is attempting to rebuild its military organization, but persistent IDF pressure and the severely degraded state of Hamas’ military forces will make this process extremely difficult and long. Current Israeli military operations are designed to prevent the successful regeneration of Hamas by denying Hamas adequate safe areas to train new recruits, particularly in the northern Gaza Strip.
Hamas Leadership: The Wall Street Journal reported that senior Hamas military commander in the Gaza Strip Mohammad Sinwar has reportedly begun operating autonomously from the main Hamas leadership and ignored the Hamas decision to make decisions through a leadership council. Sinwar has likely delegated control of day-to-day efforts in the northern Gaza Strip to Hamas Gaza City Brigade commander Izz al Din al Haddad.
Turkish and Syrian National Army (SNA) Operations: Turkey and the SNA may be attempting to stretch the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)’s bandwidth by threatening multiple areas simultaneously. Turkey has continued to support SNA efforts to isolate and destroy SDF elements along the Euphrates River.
SDF Bridgeheads on the Euphrates: Neither the SDF nor SNA appears to have made any significant territorial gains around the bridgeheads, but the pressure that the SNA has put these bridgeheads under will make it difficult for the SDF to disengage and withdraw in good order if the SNA or Turkey forces the SDF to contend with a threat to their rear. Withdrawing a military force while under enemy pressure is an extremely difficult undertaking, particularly when the withdrawing force comes under pressure from a large military force.
Iran Update, January 12, 2025
Iran conducted an air defense exercise for the second time in recent days. This activity reflects Iranian concerns about possible airstrikes on Iranian nuclear facilities, as Tehran has continued to expand its nuclear program. The Artesh—the conventional Iranian military—conducted the latest air defense exercise across northern and western Iran on January 12.[i] This exercise notably covered the Iranian nuclear facilities around Arak and Fordow.[ii] Though Iran typically conducts air defense exercises around this time of year, this activity nonetheless probably reflects Iranian leaders’ assumption that they will face airstrikes against their nuclear program in the near term. This assumption has no bearing on the likelihood that the United States or Israel would actually conduct such a strike, however.
The Artesh exercises tested the manned and unmanned aircrafts as well as the following air defense systems, according to Iranian state media:[iii]
Rad missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, anti-tank missile designed for T-72 tanks, fired from a 125 millimeters (mm) caliber barrel, and with a target distance of four kilometers (km).[iv]
Majid An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired, electro-optical-guided missile with a maximum target range of 15 km.[v]
Talash missile. An Iranian-made, long-range, mobile surface-to-air air defense missile system, capable of hitting all altitude targets with at a maximum range of 200km.[vi]
Misagh-3 missile. An Iranian-made, short-range, shoulder-fired system with a laser fuse and maximum range of five km and flight altitude of 3,500 meters (m).[vii]
Khordad-15 system. An Iranian-made, long-range air defense system with a detection range of 85 km and target range of 45 km.[viii]
Shahid Jalilvand radar system. An Iranian-made, medium-range, phased array radar system able to detect small flying targets with low cross-sections in three dimensions and a 24-hour operational continuity.[ix]
Samavat radar-controlled artillery system. A short-range Iranian version of the Swiss low-altitude Skyguard radar system with a range of 4 km and uses an anti-aircraft 35mm Oerlikon caliber barrel gun.[x]
Seraj radar-controlled air defense artillery system. Iranian-made artillery system with a 35mm caliber barrel gun, radar, and new optical system.[xi]
This activity comes after the IRGC Aerospace Force conducted an air defense exercise around the other major Iranian nuclear facility at Natanz on January 7.[xii] This flurry of air defense activity is part of the larger military exercise that the Iranian armed forces are holding across Iran until March 2025.[xiii] This exercise includes the Artesh and Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC). It is unlikely that Iran could repel a US or Israeli airstrike given the inferiority of the Iranian systems that have been used in these exercises relative to the modern US and Israeli capabilities. This is especially the case given that Israel neutralized Iran’s S-300s—its most advanced air defense platform—in October 2024.
Iran could use part of its exercises to prepare for an attack on US or Israeli targets, though CTP-ISW assesses that this possibility is relatively unlikely at this time. Iran previously conducted exercises ahead of its Operation True Promise and Operation True Promise II attacks on Israel in April and October 2024 respectively.[xiv] And Iranian officials have yet to fulfill their vow to conduct a third missile attack on Israel.
Fatah released a statement on January 11 affirming that the PA will prevent any Hamas effort to stoke conflict in the West Bank.[xv] Fatah stated that Hamas is responsible for the destruction of the Gaza Strip because Hamas ”gambled with the interests and resources of the Palestinian people for Iran’s benefit.” PA forces have been operating in Jenin Governorate, northern West Bank, since early December 2024 to degrade Palestinian militias networks there.
Iran Update, January 11, 2025
The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus. The Syrian Interior Ministry announced on January 11 the arrest of ISIS members who were planning a suicide bombing attack at the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[i] The ministry stated that the General Intelligence Directorate and General Security Administration coordinated to thwart the attack.[ii] ISIS has previously attacked Shia shrines in Syria, including in July 2023, when ISIS detonated a bomb near the Sayyidah Zeinab Shrine, killing six individuals and wounding 20 others.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the interim government claim about the most recent attempted ISIS attack. If true, it would indicate that ISIS seeks to attack Shia targets to stoke sectarian tensions and delegitimize HTS as the primary ruling power in Syria. HTS announced recently that it has accepted responsibility for securing the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[iv]
HTS-led Syrian interim government officials met with a senior Lebanese delegation in Damascus to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration on January 11.[v] HTS leader and interim head of state Ahmed al Shara and Foreign Affairs Minister Asaad al Shaibani met with a Lebanese delegation headed by Lebanese Prime Minister Najib Mikati.[vi] Shara said that they agreed to securing the border to prevent illegal smuggling as a top priority.[vii] Such efforts could impede Lebanese Hezbollah efforts to reconstitute militarily. Hezbollah has long relied on Syria as a conduit to receive funds and materiel from Iran. Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem acknowledged that Hezbollah had lost its ground access to Iran via Syria and signaled his willingness to restore this connection with the support of the new interim government in Syria in December 2024.[viii] The border policies that the HTS-led interim government and Lebanon enact in the coming months will determine how easily Iran can revive its ground access to Hezbollah.
The Iraqi Army and Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) launched an operation targeting the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in the Hamrin Mountains, Diyala Province. The Iraqi Air Force conducted an airstrike on January 10 that killed four ISIS members.[ix] Iraqi Army Chief of Staff Lieutenant General Abdul Amir Rashid Yarallah visited the site of the airstrike on January 11.[x] The PMF announced on January 11 that the Iraqi Army and PMF Diyala Operations Command launched a security operation under the direction of Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani to “clear and search” the Hamrin Mountains.[xi] The Diyala Operations Commander, Talib al Musawi, is affiliated with the Badr Organization and the Badr-controlled PMF 1st, 4th, 23rd, and 24th brigades all operate in Diyala.[xii]
The security operation in Diyala Province comes after Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) special operations forces conducted military exercises in neighboring Kermanshah Province, Iran, between January 4 and 9.[xiii] The Gilan Province-based Mirza Kuchak Khan Special Forces Brigade and Saberin Special Forces Brigade participated in the exercises.[xiv] IRGC Ground Forces Commander Brigadier General Mohammad Pakpour stated on the sidelines of the exercise that Diyala Province was previously a “cradle of terrorist and Takfiri groups.”[xv] The exercises and Pakpour’s statement highlight heightened concerns among Iranian officials over external threats, particularly the possibility of ISIS infiltrations into Iran.
Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted ISIS attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus.
Syria: The HTS-led Syrian interim government hosted a senior Lebanese delegation to discuss border security, counter-smuggling efforts, and immigration.
Iraq: The Iraqi Army and PMF launched an operation targeting ISIS in the Hamrin Mountains in eastern Iraq.
Iran Update, January 10, 2025
There are early indications that some Iraqi Sunni and Kurdish politicians are trying to build an alliance ahead of the Iraqi parliamentary elections in October 2025. Such an alliance would challenge the Iranian-backed Shia parties in these elections. A prominent Sunni politician, Khamis al Khanjar, met with Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) Prime Minister Masoud Barzani on January 9 to discuss the upcoming parliamentary elections and “the formation of alliances that can guarantee the rights of their people and regions.”[i] This meeting comes as Khanjar helped form a political coalition—the United Sunni Leadership Coalition—with other prominent Sunni leaders on January 7.[ii] The leader of the Shammari tribe in northwestern Iraq separately praised Barzani and emphasized the need for Arab-Kurdish unity in a statement on January 8, suggesting that the Shammari tribe is aligned with Barzani’s Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP).[iii]
Khanjar has been vocal about the need to address Sunni grievances in recent weeks. Khanjar said in an interview with Kurdish media in December 2024 that Sunnis in western Iraq are upset about the injustices they face.[iv] Khanjar added that Sunnis would turn to “other parties” that oppose dialogue and negotiation if the federal government fails to defend them.[v] Khanjar’s remarks are consistent with a recent statement from Sunni politicians calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[vi] The KRG similarly threatened to boycott the Iraqi federal government if the latter failed to regularly pay public sector salaries.[vii] The payment of public sector salaries is a common point of tensions between the Iraqi federal government and the KRG, but the KRG threat is still notable given the current discussions between Barzani and the newly formed Sunni political alliance.[viii]
The newly formed Sunni political coalition could align with national Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr as well. Sadr emphasized in early December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias must avoid interfering in Syria.[ix] Khanjar subsequently called on Iraqi political parties to “adopt” Sadr’s position of non-interference.[x] The alignment of Sadr’s and the Sunni positions here could provide a foundation for political collaboration in the upcoming parliamentary elections. The United Sunni Leadership Coalition’s outreach to the KDP and possible alignment with Sadr is noteworthy given that these factions previously allied following the 2021 Iraqi Parliamentary elections.[xi]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly rejected plans to postpone the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq during his meeting with Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani in Tehran on January 8.[xii] Khamenei told Sudani that there is “no justification” for postponing the withdrawal of US forces from Iraq, according to an unspecified source close to the Iranian presidency speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[xiii] An Iraqi official told the Washington Post in December 2024 that the Iraqi federal government was reconsidering its request for US forces to withdraw from Iraq by the end of 2026 because it is concerned that the fall of Bashar al Assad in Syria threatens Iraqi security.[xiv] The United States and Iraq agreed in September 2024 that hundreds of US-led international coalition forces would withdraw from Iraq by September 2025 and that remaining troops would withdraw by the end of 2026.[xv]
Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 10 that HTS-led interim Syrian government should be given the opportunity to address Kurdish militants’ presence within the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) before Turkey takes military action to do.[xvi] Fidan said that the HTS-led interim government has an “agenda” to address the “PKK/YPG” but promised that “Turkey will” take action if others—presumably HTS—fail to do so.[xvii] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. HTS leader Ahmed al Shara recently met with the SDF but there have been no specific reports of tangible progress toward an agreement, despite SDF commander Mazloum Abdi’s claim on January 9 that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity.[xviii] It remains unclear if Turkey would satisfied by the SDF merely being re-flagged under the new Syrian Defense Ministry.
Turkish officials have repeatedly threatened to launch a military operation to “destroy” the SDF if it fails to disarm.[xix] Fidan said on January 10 that Turkey has the objective of “cleans[ing]” Syria of “terrorism” in 2025.[xx] Turkey rejected on January 10 a proposal to deploy US and French troops to secure the Syria-Turkey border.[xxi] The deployment of US and French forces would likely preclude Turkey from conducting its offensive. Local Syrian media reported on January 10 that Turkey sent reinforcements to the Syrian border and posted footage of a convoy of heavy equipment transporters carrying 155-mm self-propelled howitzers.[xxii]
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) reportedly shelled SDF positions along the eastern Peace Spring frontlines on January 10 amid a possible SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported that the SNA shelled several SDF positions in the Tal Tamr countryside and east of Ras al Ain.[xxiii] The reported SNA shelling comes amid possible SNA deployments and preparations for an offensive into SDF-controlled territory. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about shelling along the frontline, however.
Turkey continued to support SNA operations to isolate SDF elements along the Euphrates River ahead of the possible offensive. Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions in several villages near Sarrin and along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River, according to local media.[xxiv] The SDF accusing Turkey of striking Sarrin’s grain silos.[xxv] Turkey also reportedly struck at least three SDF targets in northern Hasakah Province along the Qamishli-Faysh Khabur road.[xxvi] Local media reported that one of the strikes killed an SDF commander with two others in a vehicle in Khan Jabal.[xxvii] These strikes are likely meant to undermine SDF defenses against the SNA along the Euphrates River and the SDF ability to defend against a potential SNA offensive from Peace Spring territory.
The SNA continued to engage the SDF northwest of Tishreen Dam on January 10. Commander of the Suleiman Shah Brigades—a faction affiliated with the SNA—Abu Amsha claimed on January 10 that the SNA seized two hills northwest of the Tishreen Dam.[xxviii] Geolocated footage posted on January 10 showed SNA and SDF drone strikes about three kilometers northwest of Tishreen Dam.[xxix] Geolocated footage showed the SDF conducting a drone strike targeting SNA fighters north of Deir Hafer, east of Aleppo City.[xxx]
The HTS-led interim government located and dismantled a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED) in the Aleppo countryside on January 10.[xxxi] Syrian state media reported that the VBIED was headed to Aleppo from SDF-controlled territory, citing a source in the Interior Ministry.[xxxii] Unspecified fighters have detonated three other car bombs or VBIEDs in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[xxxiii]
Iran Update, January 9, 2025
Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF. Local, anti-SDF media reported on January 9 that the SDF and SNA exchanged artillery fire and “clashed” near the Balikh River, north of SDF-controlled Ain Issa.[i] Three SNA-affiliated fighters were reportedly injured in the fighting.[ii] Local media reported artillery shelling and fighting along the M4 highway, west of Tal Tamr as well.[iii] The SNA has reportedly sent units to the frontlines in recent days, indicating that the SNA is preparing to attack the SDF.[iv] Such an attack would be part of the Turkish and SNA effort to coerce the SDF into disarming and disbanding. CTP-ISW cannot verify the local reporting about fighting along the frontline. Although it is unclear which side initiated the reported fighting, the SNA may nevertheless exploit the recent shelling to set conditions for further attacks on the SDF.
The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam on January 8, possibly in order to fix the SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline. The SNA launched a “large-scale” attack against the SDF about five kilometers northwest of the dam.[v] The SNA also ambushed SDF fighters around Tal al Zamalah, south of the dam.[vi] The SDF accused Turkey of providing air support to the SNA attacks.[vii] A Kurdish journalist reported that the SNA launched the attacks after receiving reinforcements from al Bab, Mare, and Jarabulus.[viii] The journalist previously reported that the SNA had sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus.[ix] SNA forces likely advanced within three kilometers of Tishreen Dam, given that geolocated footage posted on January 8 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes on SNA fighters in Khirbet Tueni, which is 2.8 kilometers northwest of the dam.[x] It is unclear whether the SNA has retained any territorial gains from its attacks, however. The SNA has continued to conduct artillery and drone strikes targeting the SDF around Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge.[xi] Fixing the SDF to these locations could impede any SDF effort to reinforce its positions elsewhere along the frontline.
Turkey conducted several airstrikes targeting SDF positions on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River near the SDF-SNA frontline on January 9. Local media reported that Turkey struck an SDF rocket launcher near al Jarniyah, which is along an SDF supply line.[xii] Turkish artillery and aircraft also struck SDF positions near Qara Qozak Bridge and north of the bridge.[xiii] CTP-ISW has noted that Turkey is conducting airstrikes targeting SDF in support of SNA offensive operations but that these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed operation
SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi told Agence France-Presse that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unity with the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim government on December 30, 2024.[xiv] HTS and Turkey have coordinated in recent weeks to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus. Turkish officials have called for destroying the SDF as well—a step farther than HTS leaders have gone.[xv] The report of an agreement between the SDF and HTS raises the question of whether HTS may accept a lesser objective, such as the integration of coherent SDF units into the new Syrian armed forces, which would presumably fall short of the desired Turkish end state in Syria. The SDF may seek to integrate into the larger Syrian Defense Ministry apparatus by simply reflagging as opposed to fully dismantling its command structures. This type of absorption and reflagging often results in armed group leaders failing to observe the actual chain of command, however.
Abdi separately said that the interim government has the responsibility to intervene and achieve a ceasefire throughout Syria, likely as an implicit call for HTS to negotiate with Turkey and the Turkish-backed SNA to cease offensive operations against the SDF.[xvi] Turkish Foreign Affairs Minister Hakan Fidan has threatened that both the HTS-led interim government and Turkish armed forces could begin “military operations” against the SDF if the organization fails to disarm.[xvii]
Behrouz Esbati, one of the seniormost Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) in Syria, discussed in a leaked video Iranian plans to rebuild proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.[xviii] These remarks are consistent with CTP-ISW’s ongoing assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Syria and exploit it to rebuild the Axis of Resistance there. Esbati claimed to command over 10,000 Syrian fighters before the fall of Bashar al Assad.[xix] Esbati said that Iran can “activate all the networks” that it has developed over the years in Syria and use social media to “form resistance cells.”[xx] Esbati made these comments during a speech to military members at the Vali-ye Asr mosque in Tehran. An unspecified IRGC official—likely a member of the IRGC Quds Force—told the New York Times that Esbati’s comments about recruiting militia fighters were aspirational rather than reflective of discrete IRGC plans.[xxi] This denial is likely meant to suppress the narrative that the IRGC is trying to subvert the new Syrian government. The unspecified IRGC official also said that Iran would have a better chance at securing its interests in the Middle East if Syria descended into chaos, which is consistent with CTP-ISW‘s assessment that Iran is trying to stoke sectarian tension in Iran.
Esbati also notably said candidly that Iran “was defeated very badly, [and] took a very big blow and it’s been very difficult.”[xxii] Esbati’s statements are a stark contrast from the formal Iranian regime line that has aimed to downplay the fact that the fall of Assad marks a strategic defeat for Tehran.[xxiii] CTP-ISW previously assessed that the fall of Assad marks the end of the greater Iranian project in the Levant for the foreseeable future and will make it extremely difficult for Iran to transfer the resources needed to recuperate other actors within its Axis of Resistance namely Hamas and Lebanese Hezbollah.[xxiv]
The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian capture the Iraqi security sector. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba has reportedly agreed to such integration, according to an informed source speaking to Iraqi media on January 9.[xxv] The source added that the Iraqi federal government seeks to integrate Kataib Hezbollah and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada into the armed forces as well.[xxvi] This report comes after Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani and Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly agreed to preserve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xxvii] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes many Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba, Kataib Hezbollah, and Kataib Sayyid al Shuhada all control brigades in the PMF.[xxviii] Khamenei opposes dissolving the PMF outright but may support the integration of the PMF into the Iraqi armed forces. The Iraqi federal government could reflag PMF brigades as new units, which would largely retain the units’ composition and structure. Integrating the PMF and Iranian-backed Iraqi militias into the Iraqi security establishment would more entrench the militias into the Iraqi security sector more thoroughly, which would enable deeper Iranian infiltration.
The Anbar Province Police Command will reportedly assume responsibility for security in Anbar Province, Iraq, from Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxix] The Anbar Police Command, which is headed by Adel Hamid al Alwani, will reportedly control border areas and checkpoints that Iranian-backed Iraqi militias previously controlled.[xxx] This report comes after the Kataib Hezbollah-affiliated Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF) 13th Brigade (Liwa al Tafuf) withdrew from security checkpoints in al Qaim, along the Iraq-Syria border, on January 5.[xxxi] The Iraqi Federal Police operates under the Iraqi Interior Ministry, which is headed by Abdul Amir al Shammari.[xxxii] Shammari is a Shia whom Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani’s al Furatain Movement nominated as interior minister in late 2022.[xxxiii] Major General Saleh Nasser al Ameri has commanded the Iraqi Federal Police since January 2021.[xxxiv]
Prominent Iraqi Sunni politician and former Ninewa Province Governor Atheel al Nujaifi said that the newly formed “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” will likely oppose former Iraqi Parliament Speaker Mohammad al Halbousi.[xxxv] Five prominent Iraqi Sunni politicians, including current Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani, established the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition” on January 7.[xxxvi] The establishment of the coalition came after Mashhadani and five other Sunni politicians called for a “comprehensive national dialogue” in mid-December 2024.[xxxvii] Halbousi notably did not sign the statement calling for a national dialogue and has not joined the “United Sunni Leadership Coalition.” Iraqi media reported on January 9 that Halbousi has recently formed an “alliance” with Iranian-backed Iraqi militia Asaib Ahl al Haq leader Qais al Khazali.[xxxviii] Halbousi reportedly contacted Khazali in March 2024 to try to secure the victory of his preferred candidate in the Iraqi parliament speaker elections.[xxxix] An Iraqi researcher separately observed in October 2024 that an Asaib Ahl al Haq-affiliated Iraqi media outlet had begun “present[ing] [Halbousi] in a beautiful light.”[xl]
Key Takeaways:
Syria: Fighting reportedly erupted along parts of the frontline between the US-backed SDF and Turkish-backed SNA in northern Syria amid indications of an upcoming SNA offensive against the SDF.
Syria: The SNA continued offensive operations against the SDF around Tishreen Dam in northern Syria, possibly in order to fix SDF units there and prevent them from reinforcing other positions along the frontline.
Syria: SDF Commander Mazloum Abdi said that the SDF came to an unspecified agreement on Syrian unit with HTS, raising the question of whether HTS would accept a lesser objective than the Turkish one of destroying the SDF outright.
Syria: One of the seniormost IRGC commanders in Syria discussed in a leaked video plans to rebuild Iranian-backed proxy and partner militia networks in Syria that would oppose the HTS-led interim government.
Iraq: The Iraqi federal government is considering integrating Iranian-backed militias into the Iraqi armed forces, which would facilitate Iranian infiltration and capture of the Iraqi security sector.
Iran Update, January 8, 2025
Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would conduct a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and integrate into the new Syrian Defense Ministry.[i] Turkey frequently conflates the YPG with the SDF and uses the YPG to refer to the entire SDF. Fidan’s comment is one of the most explicit statements by a senior Turkish official threatening military action against the SDF. The SDF is currently negotiating the terms of its potential integration into the future Syrian armed forces with the HTS-led interim government in Damascus, but it remains unclear if Turkey would wait for these negotiations to conclude before launching an operation.[ii]
SNA forces have reportedly deployed and mobilized along SDF-SNA frontlines, which suggests that the SNA is preparing to launch a potential offensive against the SDF from the SNA-controlled Peace Spring area. The Peace Spring area is an SNA-controlled enclave between Ain Issa and Tal Tamr and north of the M4 Highway. Turkish state-run media reported on January 8 that the SNA sent “heavy weapons” to SDF frontlines in the Peace Spring area.[iii] A commander in the Joint Force, an SNA formation that includes the Hamza Division and Suleiman Shah Brigade, said that the SNA sent fighters, tanks, and other vehicles to the frontlines overlooking the SDF-controlled towns of Kobani in Aleppo Province, Ain Issa in Raqqa Province, and Tal Tamr in Hasakah Province.[iv] The US Treasury Department has sanctioned the commanders of the Suleiman Shah Brigade and Hamza Division for human rights abuses against Kurds.[v] Syrian media circulated footage on January 7 of a small convoy of T-series tanks and vehicles moving through Ras al Ain, a city in northern SNA-controlled territory along the Syria-Turkey border.[vi] CTP-ISW can neither confirm local reports about SNA deployments nor comment on their size and scale. The reports of SNA mobilization are consistent with recent Turkish and Turkish-backed airstrikes and artillery shelling targeting SDF positions and assets along the Peace Spring line of control.[vii] A Kurdish journalist separately reported that the SNA sent ”significant” reinforcements to Jarabulus, which is north of the Qara Qozak Bridge on the western bank of the Euphrates River.[viii]
The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River provide contours of a potential future SNA offensive. Deployments to the “frontlines” of Kobani, Ain Issa, and Tal Tamr suggest that the SNA could launch a three-pronged assault to collapse SDF defenses along the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. One objective of this advance may be to capture Kobani or fix SDF forces around Kobani while a second prong advances west and southwards from the Ain Issa area towards the rear of the Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak Bridge positions. Some interim objectives could include cutting the M4 Highway to block any SDF reinforcements to the Qara Qozak Bridge from areas to the east. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to the Tal Tamr frontlines suggest that the SNA could advance east toward al Hasakah and attempt to isolate the northernmost Kurdish-controlled territory. The reinforcements that the SNA reportedly sent to Jarabulus could advance southwards toward the SDF bridgeheads on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The timeline of a potential SNA operation from Peace Spring territory is unclear, however.
It remains unclear if Turkey will pursue a military operation into northern Syria at the same time as a potential SNA assault on the SDF. It is unlikely that the SNA’s reported deployments are happening without Turkish approval and support. Turkey is currently conducting airstrikes to interdict SDF supplies in support of SNA operations, but these efforts could also be a precursor to a wider Turkish or Turkish-backed and –approved SNA operation. Turkey has also conducted drone strikes deeper into SDF-controlled territory, which could be part of Turkish efforts to set conditions prior to a Turkish operation. Syrian media reported on January 8 that Turkey conducted a drone strike targeting a vehicle in al Malikiya, in northeast Hasakah Province.[ix] The strike likely targeted an SDF commander, given that the strike targeted only one vehicle.
Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8.[x] The SDF and SNA have fought near the Tishreen Dam, east of Aleppo, since mid-December 2024. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.[xi] Local media reported that the SDF called on employees and teachers in Raqqa and Tabqa to attend the protest.[xii] Videos posted on social media show that the convoy included around 100 vehicles, and a Kurdish social media user claimed that thousands of people ”answered the call” to participate in the convoy.[xiii] Photo and video evidence from the site of the attack shows that a single strike targeted the road and a car in the convoy, causing at least two deaths.[xiv] The SDF said that a Turkish combat drone conducted the strike.[xv]
The drone strike targeted an SDF supply line that Turkish forces have targeted since late December 2024 to try to isolate the SDF around the Tishreen Dam.[xvi] Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters along the supply line, which flows across the dam, on January 6.[xvii] Turkish backed-SNA forces continued to advance against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River on January 8 as the civilian convoy approached the dam. The SDF reported intense fighting between the SDF Manbij Military Council and SNA forces in several villages north of Tishreen Dam.[xviii] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank.
Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian media reported that Sudani would likely discuss “suspending the activities” of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias, including Harakat Hezbollah al Nujaba and Kataib Hezbollah, during his visit to Tehran.[xix] Sudani’s visit to Tehran comes after Iraqi media reports that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xx] Iraqi National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim stated on January 4 that the incoming Trump administration has warned the Iraqi federal government that it will “target” Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxi] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.[xxii] The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality.[xxiii] Sudani’s visit to Iraq also follows Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani’s visit to Baghdad on January 5.[xxiv]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Khamenei stated during a meeting with Sudani that the PMF must be “further strengthened and preserved.”[xxv]
Sudani separately discussed decreased Iranian gas exports to Iraq.[xxvi] Iran typically supplies approximately 40 percent of Iraq’s gas supply but has reportedly ceased gas exports to Iraq in the past two months.[xxvii] Iran is currently facing a severe energy crisis marked by electricity and natural gas shortages, which has presumably caused it to reduce gas exports to Iraq.[xxviii] Iraq and Turkmenistan signed an agreement in October 2024 for Iraq to import Turkmen gas via Iran to reduce Iraqi dependence on Iranian gas exports.[xxix] Iranian media reported on January 8 that the agreement has not come into effect, however.[xxx] It is unclear why Iraq and Turkmenistan have not implemented the agreement, given that there are existing gas pipelines between Iran and Turkmenistan and Iran and Iraq.
Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties[xxxi] Aliyev thanked Iran for supporting Azerbaijani ”territorial integrity” and congratulated Azerbaijan on the ”liberation of its land” after the September 2023 Azerbaijani military offensive into the Nagorno-Karabakh region.[xxxii] Aliyev’s praise for Iran is notable given the recent tensions between Azerbaijan and Russia after Russian air defense likely shot an Azerbaijan Airlines passenger plane on December 25, causing it to crash in Kazakhstan.[xxxiii] Ahmadian separately emphasized the need to strengthen energy and transportation cooperation between Azerbaijan and Iran, including by completing the International North-South Transport Corridor.[xxxiv] Ahmadian will visit Armenia after his visit to Azerbaijan.
The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.[xxxv] The IDF also found traces of another hostage in the tunnel. The IDF could not confirm the status of the second hostage. Israeli media reported that these hostages were previously thought to be alive.[xxxvi] The IDF also located the bodies of two or three militia fighters in the tunnel who were likely the captors of the hostages.[xxxvii] The IDF launched an investigation into the death of the hostage.[xxxviii]
Key Takeaways:
Northern Syria: Turkey and the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) are preparing for a possible offensive into US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF)-controlled territory in Syria. An SNA commander said that the SNA deployed forces to the line of control between the SNA and SDF in northern Syria. The reported SNA deployments and the current SNA axes of advance toward SDF-controlled territory on the western bank of the Euphrates River suggest the SNA may launch a three-pronged offensive designed to collapse SDF units along the eastern bank of the Euphrates.
Tishreen Dam Airstrike: Turkish or Turkish-backed SNA air assets struck a Kurdish government-organized civilian convoy traveling to Tishreen Dam on January 8. The Autonomous Administration of North and East Syria (AANES) which is the governing authority in northeast Syria and is affiliated with the SDF, called on January 7 for civilians to travel to the Tishreen Dam and protest Turkish-backed military operations there.
Iraqi Prime Minister in Iran: Iraqi Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani traveled to Iran on January 8, likely to try to urge the Iranian regime to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei appears to have rejected Sudani’s request for Iran to rein in Iranian-backed Iraqi militias.
Iran-Azerbaijan Ties: Iranian Supreme National Security Council Secretary Rear Admiral Ali Akbar Ahmadian met with Azerbaijani President Ilham Aliyev in Baku, Azerbaijan, on January 8 to discuss strengthening political and security ties.
Hamas-Held Hostages in the Gaza Strip: The IDF recovered the body of an Israeli hostage from a tunnel in Rafah, southern Gaza Strip, on January 7.
Iran Update, January 7, 2025
Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians issued a statement on December 14 calling for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances.[i] The officials included:
Parliament Speaker Mahmoud al Mashhadani,
Former Parliament Speaker Osama al Nujaifi,
Former Parliament Speaker Salim al Jabouri,
Former Parliament Speaker Ayad al Samarrai,
Former Iraqi National Assembly Speaker Hajim al Hassani, and
Former Deputy Prime Minister Saleh al [ii]
The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.”[iii] The officials also emphasized that Iraq should be an independent country void of external influence. The officials rejected the use of violence to achieve political transformation and reforms. The Baghdad-based Center for Political Thought interpreted the statement as a warning to the Shia Coordination Framework that the Iraqi federal government could face a major “restructuring” if it does not address these grievances.[iv]
Mashhadani separately called on unspecified Iraqi political actors to implement the “Political Settlement” document in a speech on January 4.[v] The Iraqi Forces Alliance, which was a coalition of Sunni political parties, introduced the “Political Settlement” document in March 2017 as a framework for “resolving political and security differences in the post-ISIS period.”[vi] Mohammad al Halbousi, who served as the Iraqi parliament speaker until late 2023, previously led the Iraqi Forces Alliance.[vii] Mashhadani highlighted that the “Political Settlement” document requires signatories to “reconsider the constitution.”[viii] Mashhadani was likely referring to the article in the “Political settlement document” that requires signatories to “make real and fundamental constitutional amendments that address the gaps” in the implementation of the constitution in recent years.[ix] Mashhadani stated that the Syrian regime may not have collapsed if it had reconciled with opposition groups.[x]
Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue. Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani criticized those who have called for reforming the Iraqi political system following the fall of the Bashar al Assad regime in Syria during a speech on January 4.[xi] Sudani added that changing the Iraqi political system is “not up for discussion.”[xii] Popular Mobilization Commission Chairman Faleh al Fayyadh separately emphasized on January 2 that Iraq has experienced a “greater degree of political calm, harmony, and coexistence between societal components” during the past two years.[xiii] Fayyadh added that relations between Shias, Sunnis, and Kurds in Iraq are better than they were in the past. These statements suggest that Fayyadh opposes the calls for a ”national dialogue” to address grievances from various elements of Iraqi society.
Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).[xiv] The PMF is an Iraqi state security service that includes a large number of Iranian-backed Iraqi militias. The PMF reports directly to Sudani on paper, but many of the militias that comprise the PMF answer to Iran in reality. The Iraqi media reports coincide with calls from prominent Shia figures, including Iraqi Shia cleric Grand Ayatollah Ali al Sistani, nationalist Iraqi Shia cleric Moqtada al Sadr, and National Wisdom Movement head Ammar al Hakim, to confine the possession of weapons to the Iraqi state.[xv]
Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River.[xvi] Anti-SDF media reported that Turkish drone strikes have prevented the SDF from accessing a main road that leads to the Dam in Aleppo Province. This would isolate the SDF forces that are holding the Dam and terrain on the western side of the river.[xvii] The isolation effect generated by these Turkish strikes may be temporary in nature, however, unless Turkey can maintain around-the-clock air superiority over SDF lines of communication. The SDF has shot down some Turkish drones, which would make maintaining around-the-clock air superiority more difficult for Turkey.[xviii] SDF supply lines currently flow across the Dam itself. Turkish airstrikes reportedly killed four SDF fighters on the supply line road on January 6.[xix]
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) advanced against several SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River. The SNA seized hilly terrain overlooking the village of Mahshiyyat al Sheikh about three miles from Tishreen Dam.[xx] The SNA continued to conduct drone strikes targeting SDF positions on the western bank of the Euphrates River near the dam.[xxi] The Turkish air campaign to cut off SDF resupply lines to the dam could weaken the SDF’s ability to defend against SNA attacks on the western bank. The SDF retains a salient south of Lake Assad about 20 miles from Tishreen Dam, but SNA forces have reportedly advanced near Maskanah to outflank the SDF along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway.[xxii] Turkish drone strikes targeted an SDF vehicle along the Aleppo-Raqqa highway east of Maskanah, suggesting that Turkey is also attempting to interdict SDF supplies and reinforcements for the SDF’s southern flank.[xxiii] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4 on the southern salient.
Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan said on January 7 that Turkey would carry out a “military operation” against the Kurdish People’s Protection Units (YPG) in Syria if the YPG does not disband and join the new integrated Syrian Ministry of Defense.[xxiv] Turkey frequently fails to differentiate between the YPG and the SDF and uses the ”YPG” as a euphemism for the entire SDF. Fidan said on January 6 that the “eradication” of the ”Kurdish YPG militia” is “imminent.”[xxv] Fidan, the Turkish defense minister, and Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan have made several similar statements threatening to SDF to disarm and disband but have not up until this point explicitly threatened a military operation into northeastern Syria.[xxvi] Turkish forces have limited their military action to air support for the SNA but have reportedly brought a significant number of ground forces to the border with Syria.[xxvii] Turkey and HTS have coordinated their efforts to coerce the SDF into disarming and integrating into the HTS-led defense apparatus since the fall of the Assad regime in December 2024.
ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq.[xxviii] CENTCOM and Iraqi forces conducted a series of airstrikes and ground operations in the Hamrin Mountains between December 30 and January 6. ISIS engaged non-US coalition forces on the ground during these operations, triggering coalition airstrikes. ISIS forces killed one non-US coalition soldier and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers, however. No US personnel were killed or wounded.
CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3. [xxix]
Key Takeaways:
Iraqi Politics: Six notable Iraqi Sunni politicians called on December 14 for a “comprehensive national dialogue” to address political and economic grievances. The officials emphasized the need to address issues that have caused “widespread public discontent and anger,” including corruption and “injustices in prisons.” Senior Iraqi political and security officials appear to have rejected the recent calls for political reform and national dialogue.
Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces: Iraqi media reported that the United States has pressured the Iraqi federal government to dissolve the Iraqi Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF).
Northern Syria: Turkish forces are likely attempting to isolate the US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) by interdicting SDF supply lines to the Tishreen Dam on the eastern bank of the Euphrates River. Turkish efforts to interdict SDF supplies may be a precursor to a wider operation, especially if these interdiction strikes attempt to strike deeper behind the front line.
Counter-ISIS Mission: ISIS fighters killed one non-US soldier of the US-led anti-ISIS coalition and wounded two other non-US coalition soldiers during a ground operation in the Hamrin Mountains, Iraq. CENTCOM-supported SDF personnel separately captured an ISIS attack cell leader during a raid near Deir ez Zor, Syria, on the evening of January 2 to 3.
Iran Update, January 5, 2025
Iran is likely taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5 for covert meetings with senior Iraqi officials and militia commanders to discuss “restructuring” an informed source told Iraqi media.[i] Ghaani will reportedly meet with the Iraqi prime minister, leaders in the Popular Mobilization Forces (PMF), and the Iraqi “armed forces commander.” Ghaani and the IRGC very likely also discuss the fall of the Assad Regime with these key Iraqi leaders. The many militia elements that withdrew from Syria will presumably also need to be reorganized. IRGC Ground Forces Special Forces Brigade also recently conducted military exercises in the western Kermanshah province and the Iranian Artesh Ground Forces deployed several brigades in western Iran to confront hostile groups aimed to create instability on Iran’s western border with Iraq, illustrating Iran‘s preoccupation with the threat posed by insecurity in Iraq.[ii]
IRGC-affiliated media separately published an op-ed that highlights some of the probable concerns that Iran has after the fall of Syria. The op-ed claimed that political insecurity in Syria could be transported to Iraq by terrorists who assassinate key Iraqi officials to cause insecurity and destabilize the country. [iii]Tasnim‘s Salman al Maliki claimed that other powers, such as the United States and Israel, would try to exploit a power vacuum in Iraq for their own interests. Iran regularly holds the United States and Israel responsible for the formation of Islamic State in Iraq and Syria (ISIS) and could conclude that ISIS attacks targeting Iraqi military officers and officials are encouraged by the United States and Israel.[iv] Maliki could also be referring to retaliatory Israeli or US strikes against militia targets in response to future attacks targeting Israel or US bases. Maliki urged Iraq to create a joint political and military council for addressing these security threats, sharing intelligence, and responding to terrorism in the op-ed.[v]
Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus. Tabnak reported on January 4 that an HTS-linked commander entered the Sayyida Zeinab shrine in Damascus and repeated “sectarian and sarcastic sentences.”[vi] Tabnak claimed that the provocative video could lead the Shiites and Alawites in Syria to respond with “harsh actions.” Tabnak has previously claimed that HTS fighters have threatened the security of the sacred Shia shrine.[vii]
Syrian Popular Resistance, which is a purportedly Syrian telegram channel espousing sectarian narratives, accused the HTS-led government of killing six Sayyida Zeinab Shrine workers after six dead bodies were reportedly found on January 5.[viii] The channel provided no evidence of the deaths or whether the killings were motivated by sectarian violence. This is also the first time the channel has discussed Sayyida Zeinab, which is notable given that most of the claims about the shrine have come from the Iranian information space.
Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that if the first condition of the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement–the complete withdrawal of Hezbollah and dismantling of Hezbollah weapons and infrastructure by the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF)–is not met, Israel will be “forced to act on its own.”[ix] Katz specified that if Hezbollah does not withdraw there is “no agreement.” The outgoing IDF 91st Division Commander Brigadier General Shai Klepper similarly stated in an interview published on January 5 that the IDF is ”not expected” to leave southern Lebanon after the 60-day ceasefire period concludes if the IDF’s objectives are not fulfilled.[x] The 91st Division is responsible for Israel’s northern border with Lebanon. Israeli media reported that the United States and Israel are making unspecified efforts to extend the 60-day ceasefire with Hezbollah to prevent a ”premature withdrawal” or a return to full-scale war between Israel and Hezbollah.[xi]
The LAF likely does not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26. Israeli media reported the IDF still controls most of the Lebanese territory as it did in November 2024, when the ceasefire deal was signed.[xii] The Washington Post similarly reported that the IDF has withdrawn and allowed the LAF to backfill in only two of the over 60 IDF-controlled areas in southern Lebanon.[xiii] Israeli Defense Minister Israel Katz stated that Hezbollah fighters and weapons have not yet moved north of the Litani River, as required by the deal.[xiv] CTP-ISW has previously noted that it is extremely unlikely that the LAF or UNIFIL would be willing to enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament in the south, given their failure to enforce UNSCR 1701 in southern Lebanon since 2006.[xv]
Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south. A reportedly former regime-affiliated militia led by Mohsen al Haymad engaged other local factions with rocket-propelled grenades (RPG) and small arms in al Sanamayn City, northern Daraa Province, on January 4.[xvi] Syrian sources suggested that Haymad‘s faction clashed with local groups affiliated with the Southern Operations Room, but it is not clear what started the fighting.[xvii] Haymad’s faction has operated in al Sanamayn since at least 2018 when the group reconciled with the Assad regime and began collaborating with regime Military Intelligence, according to Syrian opposition media.[xviii] Many Southern Operations Room commanders—including Ahmed al Awda, a key commander in the group—were also former opposition groups that reconciled with the regime in 2018 under a Russian reconciliation plan.[xix] The HTS-led Department of Military Operations deployed reinforcements to al Sanamayn City and convened the factions to negotiate a ceasefire.[xx] Haymad’s group and other unspecified local factions agreed to a ceasefire and to hand over heavy weapons to HTS forces.[xxi] HTS reportedly allowed the local groups to retain their individual weapons, however, which contradicts HTS’s policy of requiring the disarmament of all armed groups within Syria.[xxii] Short-term arrangements to ensure temporary security in al Sanamyan may present problems in the future as HTS continues its mission to disarm and dissolve armed factions into the Syrian Defense Ministry. This incident also highlights that the Southern Operation Room has not yet been fully folded into HTS’s forces. HTS-controlled forces will remain in al Sanamayn to set up checkpoints and maintain security within the city.[xxiii] The necessity of HTS forces and checkpoints in the city underscores HTS’s lack of control over armed factions in the Daraa and other southern provinces, which regularly sees fighting between local groups.
Key Takeaways:
Iranian Regional Policy: Iran is taking a series of steps to prevent instability in Iraq after the fall of the Assad Regime. Iranian Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force Commander Esmail Ghaani arrived in Baghdad on January 5.
Iranian Information Space: Iranian media outlets continue to stoke sectarian conflict over the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in Damascus.
Lebanon: Senior Israeli officials indicated on January 5 that the IDF will likely extend its deployment in southern Lebanon if the Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement conditions are not met by January 26. The Lebanese Armed Forces likely do not have the organizational capability or willingness to meet the conditions of the ceasefire by January 26.
Southwestern Syria: Recent skirmishes in southwestern Syria demonstrate the HTS does not yet have full control over terrain in the south.
Iran Update, January 4, 2025
An Alawite organization accused the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria released a statement on January 3 expressing its support for the interim Syrian government but argued that the interim government, though it has stated it seeks to respect all Syrians, has so far failed to back words with action.[i] The group cited instances of sectarian-motivated attacks and killings in Homs, Hama, Latakia, Tartous, Damascus, and Daraa. HTS-led security forces have been conducting clearing operations targeting former regime members in these areas since December 28.[ii] The Alawite Islamic Forum in Syria rejected the interim government’s claims that acts of violence were perpetrated by individuals and argued that the prevalence of this violence suggested that the violence was a planned revenge campaign.[iii] The group added that the government must protect all Syrians by holding the perpetrators accountable, regardless of whether the perpetrators are loyal to the HTS-led interim government or engaging in individual actions against orders.
The HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite’s fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aim to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.[iv] The HTS-led interim government has also thus far failed to prevent individual opposition fighters from targeting members of the Alawite community.[v] Accusations of sectarian-motivated attacks can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.
The interim Syrian government has begun to implement changes to the Syrian government without the consensus of a representative Syrian national dialogue conference. The interim Syrian Education Minister Nazir Mohammed al Qadri released a 12-page document on January 1 detailing changes to the Syrian education curriculum.[vi] Qadir held several administrative educational positions under the HTS Syrian Salvation Government in Idlib before being appointed by HTS as the interim Syrian Education Minister.[vii] The changes eliminated references to the Assad regime and family and altered several religious phrasings.[viii] The Wall Street Journal cited several examples of changes in religious textbooks including “sacrifice one’s life in defense of his homeland” changed to “sacrifice one’s life for the sake of Allah,” “path of goodness” changed to “Islamic path,” and “those who have gone astray” changed to “Jews and Christians.”[ix] The Wall Street Journal cited unspecified Syrians who expressed concern that the changes to the education curriculum were made without input from the rest of Syrian society.[x] Shara detailed a three-to-four-year timeline for building a new Syrian state, during which CTP-ISW assessed he would presumably rule and exert heavy influence over the allocation of political power.[xi] This timeline would effectively enable Shara to shape a Syrian government into one compatible with HTS’s ideology prior to any referendum.
The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has advanced southeastward towards the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on January 3. Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA advanced through Saideen and Khirbet Tueni, approximately 4 kilometers northwest of the Tishreen Dam, after engaging the SDF near Saideen.[xii] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA continued its advance southward from these two villages towards al Mustafa al Hamada and Mahshiyet al Sheikh to cut off the SDF supply route connecting the Tishreen Dam to areas to the west.[xiii] The SDF claimed that the SNA forces failed to advance.[xiv] Turkey provided air and artillery support to SNA forces that targeted SDF positions in and around the Tishreen Dam.[xv] Syrian media reported that Turkey launched additional airstrikes that targeted SDF positions in al Jarniyah and al Mazyouna, Raqqa province, and southwest of Tishreen Dam in Deir Hafer City, Aleppo Province.[xvi] Anti-Kurdish media reported that the SNA launched artillery at SDF positions in al Fatisah, Raqqa province.[xvii]
Iran is signaling its readiness to resume nuclear talks, probably in an attempt to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering “snapback sanctions” later in 2025. Iranian Foreign Affairs Minister Abbas Araghchi emphasized Iran’s readiness to return to the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) negotiations during an interview with Chinese CCTV on January 4.[xviii] Araghchi stressed trust-building and sanctions relief as key pillars of the negotiations.[xix] The statement likely reflects Iran’s concerns over potential snapback sanctions, which could go into effect in October 2025 and, would reimpose all pre-2015 UN sanctions on Iran. The E3 previously said it is prepared to impose international “snapback” sanctions on Iran. The E3 announcement has likely prompted this diplomatic signal from Iran.[xx]
Araghchi also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to a unified Syrian government and emphasized cooperation with regional countries to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity, which appears to be at odds with statements by other Iranian government officials, including the supreme leader.[xxi] Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei has promoted a hardline approach centered on mobilizing Syrian youth against foreign occupiers.[xxii] Araghchi framed Iran’s approach as a constructive effort to ensure stability and reject external interference. Araghchi stressed that Iran supports an inclusive political process in Syria.[xxiii]
An Israeli media and a Lebanese media report suggested that the IDF may extend its deployment in southern Lebanon by an additional 30 days due to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) failure to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure there. The Israeli Broadcasting Authority (KAN) reported on January 3 that the LAF is not complying with the ceasefire agreement by failing to disrupt Hezbollah reconstitution efforts in southern Lebanon, which KAN suggested could cause the IDF to extend its deployment in Lebanon.[xxiv] The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the LAF to deploy in areas south of the Litani River and destroy Hezbollah infrastructure within 60 days of the ceasefire implementation.[xxv] Pro-Hezbollah Lebanese newspaper al Akhbar also claimed that Chairman of the Ceasefire Implementation Mechanism US Army Major General Jasper Jeffers sent “serious signals” to the LAF that Israel may extend its presence in south Lebanon for an additional 30 days.[xxvi] Jeffers added that Israel should “take its time” to implement its goals in southern Lebanon due to the LAF’s failure to prevent Hezbollah reconstitution.
Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to break the ceasefire agreement and attack Israeli forces in response to Israeli “violations” of the agreement during a televised speech on January 4.[xxvii] Qassem said that Hezbollah’s patience “may run out” before the 60-day period ends.
Key Takeaways:
Sectarian Tension in Syria: An Alawite organization accused the Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led interim Syrian government of failing to address instances of sectarian violence. The HTS leader and interim government head of state Ahmed al Shara has attempted to assuage the Alawite’s fears by highlighting the ways HTS and the interim government aim to protect minorities, but he has made only limited concrete, unambiguous steps.
Changes to Education in Syria: The interim Syrian government has begun to implement changes to the Syrian government without the consensus of a representative Syrian National Dialogue Conference.
Syrian National Army-Syrian Democratic Forces Fighting: The Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) has advanced southeastward towards the Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW’s last data cutoff on January 3.
Iranian Nuclear Negotiations: Iran is signaling its readiness to resume nuclear talks, probably in an attempt to prevent the E3 (the United Kingdom, France, and Germany) from triggering “snapback sanctions” later in 2025.
Iranian-Syrian Relations: Araghchi also reaffirmed Iran’s commitment to a unified Syrian government and emphasized cooperation with regional countries to ensure Syria’s territorial integrity, which appears to be at odds with statements by other Iranian government officials, including the supreme leader.
IDF in Lebanon: An Israeli media and a Lebanese media report suggested that the IDF may extend its deployment in southern Lebanon by an additional 30 days due to the Lebanese Armed Forces (LAF) failure to dismantle Hezbollah infrastructure there. Lebanese Hezbollah Secretary General Naim Qassem threatened to break the ceasefire agreement in a January 4 speech.
Iran Update, January 3, 2025
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. Khamenei praised Soleimani’s leadership and defended Iran’s regional interests.[i] Khamenei asserted that the sacrifices of ”Defenders of the Shrine” in Syria were meaningful and essential, dismissing claims that their efforts were in vain. Iran refers to all of the Iranian and allied personnel who fought in Syria as “defenders of the shrines.” This speech adopted a notably defensive tone by attempting to justify Iran’s efforts rather than lashing out against the United States for the US strike that killed Soleimani. Khamenei has previously said that Iran would seek revenge for the killing of Soleimani by attacking the United States and its partners.[ii]
The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas. This is the second time Khamenei has discussed Soleimani publicly while eschewing any mention of Ghaani.[iii] An unspecified Iranian official claimed in early December that many officials in Iran blamed Ghaani for the fall of Assad and were calling for his removal as IRGC Quds Force commander.[iv]
Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria, however, emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria, comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States. These militias, which continue to operate in Iraq and today control many government institutions, formed death squads to kill Sunnis and contributed to the ethno-sectarian civil war in Iraq that al Qaeda in Iraq launched in the mid-2000s.[v] Khamenei emphasized that Syrian youth will expel ”foreign occupiers,” which presumably include the United States, Turkey, and possibly HTS.[vi] Khamenei previously emphasized the role of Syrian youth in the December 2024 speech, again likening their efforts to Iraqi militias.[vii]
Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement. The Israel-Lebanon ceasefire agreement requires the Lebanese government to “monitor and enforce” the entry of arms and related materiel to prevent the rearming of Hezbollah.[viii] Lebanese media reported that Beirut-Rafic Hariri International Airport increased security measures following leaks to the media on January 2 that Iran was planning to transfer “millions of dollars” to Hezbollah via a Mahan Air flight.[ix] Mahan Air has frequently transported Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) Quds Force funds, weapons, and operatives in support of Iranian proxy activities abroad and to support Hezbollah directly.[x] The airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight that landed at Rafic Hariri International Airport on January 2.[xi] An Iranian delegation refused to allow Lebanese security forces to inspect a diplomatic bag containing funds for embassy operations.[xii] Iranian media claimed that the security forces did not find suspicious cash transfers for Hezbollah during their searches.[xiii] Lebanese media posted videos on X (Twitter) on January 2 showing a small group of pro-Hezbollah supporters protesting the inspection of the Mahan Air flight.[xiv]
The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on January 2.[xv] The SDF claimed its forces had killed 72 SNA fighters between January 2 and January 3.[xvi] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA advanced into or seized two towns west of Tishreen Dam on January 2 after clashing with the SDF in the area.[xvii] Anti-SDF media also reported that the SNA set up north-facing defensive lines in front of the village Shash al Bubna, a town on the southern end of the SDF advance.[xviii] Well-prepared SNA defensive lines in this area could prevent the SDF from linking forces with the SDF’s southern advance further south along the west bank of the Euphrates River. SDF supply lines currently flow across the dam itself. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.[xix]
Anti-SDF media reported that Turkey conducted an airstrike targeting an SDF position in al Hurriya, northwest of Raqqa.[xx] Al Hurriya is located along an SDF supply line between the Manbij frontlines and Raqqa City.[xxi]
Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”[xxii] Syrian media posted footage of a convoy of trucks entering Kobani, northern Syria, on January 2 and unloading concrete T-walls in a suburban square in a western neighborhood of the city.[xxiii] One of the trucks in the convoy bore a US flag. There were no obvious US military vehicles in the convoy.
Key Takeaways:
Khamenei Commemorates Soleimani: Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei attempted to justify Iran’s sacrifices in Syria and emphasized resilience amid setbacks during a speech on January 1 that commemorated the death of former Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps Commander Qassem Soleimani. The speech also omitted references to current IRGC Quds Force Commander Brigadier General Esmail Ghaani, who some in Iran hold responsible for the rapid unraveling of Iran’s project in Syria and the defeat of Hezbollah and Hamas.
Khamenei on Syria: Khamenei continued to advance a hard line on Syria by emphasizing that Syrian youth will resist “foreign occupation” in Syria and comparing the “Syrian youth” to Iraqi militias mobilized by Soleimani in the mid-2000s against the United States.
Lebanese Security Forces Search Iranian Flight: Lebanese Airport security forces searched an Iranian Mahan Air flight in Beirut on suspicion of transporting funds to Hezbollah, which is in line with Lebanese obligations under the Lebanon-Israel ceasefire agreement.
Fighting Continues in Northern Syria: The US-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) have continued to clash in villages west of Tishreen Dam since CTP-ISW’s last data cut off on January 2. The SDF claimed on January 3 that SNA attacks have caused “significant damage” to parts of Tishreen Dam which poses risks to its stability, and connecting the two SDF advances would presumably strengthen supply lines in the event of critical damage to or destruction of the Dam.
US Presence in Syria: Deputy Pentagon Press Secretary said that the US has no plans to establish a base in Kobani and dismissed local Syrian reports as “inaccurate.”
Iran Update, January 2, 2025
A Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) delegation met with HTS leader Ahmed al Shara in Damascus on December 30.[i] There were no specific, public reports of meaningful or tangible progress toward an agreement between Shara and the SDF, despite an unspecified official’s statement to AFP that the meeting was “positive.”[ii] This is the first reported meeting between the HTS-led interim government and the SDF since the former assumed power over Damascus, though Shara acknowledged that the government was negotiating with the SDF in an al Arabiya interview on December 29.[iii] Syrian Democratic Council (SDC) official Bassem Ishak told Asharq al Awsat on January 2 that the parties only discussed “military issues” at the meeting, suggesting that the two parties discussed HTS’s demands that the SDF subordinate itself to the HTS-organized military.[iv] This military is—at present—dominated by HTS-affiliated commanders. It does not appear that HTS and the SDF came to an agreement on or even discussed the political requirements of integrating the Kurdish-controlled autonomous zone into HTS territory and governance. The unspecified official told AFP that this was a ”preliminary meeting” that would set the stage for future HTS-SDF dialogue.[v] It remains unclear how high of a priority negotiating with the SDF is to Shara, however, as HTS continues to formalize and deepen its relations with Turkey.[vi]
The SDF is almost certainly both unable and unwilling to subordinate itself to the HTS-organized Defense Ministry at this time, given the organizational tasks implicit in that effort. The Kurdish-led SDF is still actively engaging the Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) and continues to face an existential threat from a potential Turkish offensive in Syria.[vii] Reorganizing SDF formations under the HTS-organized Defense Ministry, regardless of whether or not the SDF formations are reflagged or reorganized, would probably require the SDF to break contact with the SNA. The SDF would presumably need to receive certain assurances that the SNA would not continue to attempt to destroy the SDF, especially given that the various SNA formations would make a large portion of the future Syrian army.
The SDF has reportedly widened its salient on the western bank of the Euphrates River around the Tishreen Dam southwards since December 31. The SDF claimed to engage the SNA in Khirbet Zamala, al Atshana, and several other villages between five and ten kilometers south of Tishreen Dam on January 2.[viii] Anti-SDF media also reported clashes in the area.[ix] Geolocated footage posted on January 1 showed the SDF conducting a drone strike on an SNA vehicle in mountainous terrain in Khirbet Zamala, south of Tishreen Dam.[x] The SDF said it destroyed six armored SNA vehicles in engagements in the area.[xi] The SDF may seek to link its forces around Tishreen Dam with the forces moving northwards from Highway Route 4. A link-up between these two advances would presumably strengthen SDF supply lines around the dam, which currently flow across the dam itself and could be more easily disrupted.
The SDF and SNA forces continued fighting west of Tishreen Dam and Qara Qozak bridge since December 31. Geolocated footage posted on January 2 showed the SDF conducting drone strikes targeting SNA vehicles and an M113 armored vehicle along a highway west of Tishreen Dam.[xii] The SDF also claimed that it shot down a Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drone near Qara Qozak bridge on January 1.[xiii] Anti-SDF media reported that the SNA sent reinforcements to the frontlines near the Tishreen Dam on January 2.[xiv]
Unspecified fighters have detonated improvised explosive devices (IED) in two separate attacks in SNA-controlled territory since December 31. An unspecified fighter detonated a possible car bomb in central Tal Rifaat, north of Aleppo, on December 31.[xv] Six people were injured. The low casualty count in a popular market makes it more likely that the culprit used a relatively rudimentary car bomb and not a vehicle-borne improvised explosive device (VBIED).[xvi] This is the third car bomb or VBIED attack in SNA-controlled territory since December 24.[xvii] An unspecified suspect also detonated a motorcycle in the nearby town of Deir Jamal on January 1.[xviii] There were no injuries.[xix] The SDF condemned the recent IED attacks in Tal Rifaat, Deir Jamal, and Manbij in a statement on January 2.[xx]
The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Military Operations Department continued to conduct raids to detain former Regime members that refused to settle with the interim government and disarm on January 1 and 2. The interim government-run media reported that the Military Operations Department detained at least 28 former regime members in Homs, including those accused of perpetrating atrocities in the early Syrian Civil War.[xxi] A telegram channel claiming to represent an armed group opposed to the HTS-led government spread claims that the raids targeting former regime members had sectarian motivations.[xxii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the exact nature and origin of this group and will not at this time report specific claims to avoid amplifying the group’s attempts to foment sectarian violence in Syria. These sectarian narratives can create a dangerous cycle of groups refusing to disarm because they fear for their safety, which then causes HTS-affiliated forces to target those groups that don’t disarm, thereby causing the groups to continue to accuse HTS of sectarianism. This dynamic could easily spiral out of control into larger armed conflict if left unchecked. The HTS-led government has a requirement to assuage the concerns of former regime loyalists and minorities, part of which requires controlling these sectarian narratives as and if they spread.
Interim government forces also engaged “remnants of an Iranian-backed militia” in Albu Kamal, Deir ez Zor Province, on January 1.[xxiii] HTS-led authorities have targeted Iran-affiliated groups over the past several days in Deir ez Zor and Aleppo Provinces.[xxiv] A local correspondent reported that that only a quarter of the estimated 2000 Iranian-backed fighters in Albu Kamal have completed the settlement process with the interim government.[xxv] Iran had deeply penetrated pro-regime militias in Deir ez Zor Province before the fall of the Assad regime, making it possible that the interim government will encounter greater challenges consolidating security control over the former militia members than in other parts of Syria.
The HTS-led interim Syrian government appears to be taking initial steps to secure cooperation with minority religious communities ahead of the Syrian National Dialogue Conference. A Damascus-based news outlet reported that the Syrian National Dialogue Conference has been delayed until the interim government has extended invitations to all relevant groups.[xxvi] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara met with a Christian clergy from the Damascus area on December 31.[xxvii] HTS leader Ahmed al Shara stated on December 29 that the National Dialogue Conference would represent the breadth of Syria’s diversity.[xxviii]
Interim Syrian Foreign Minister Assad al Shaibani, Defense Minister Marhaf Abu Qasra, and Head of General Intelligence Anas Khattab traveled to Saudi Arabia on January 2 and met with senior Saudi officials.[xxix] The Saudi Defense Minister Khalid bin Salman reported that he discussed ways that Saudi Arabia could support the Syrian government’s transitional process.[xxx] Shaibani held a separate meeting with Saudi Foreign Minister Faisal bin Farhan.[xxxi] Shaibani also visited the Syrian Embassy in Riyadh.[xxxii]
The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) continued to operate in Quneitra province since CTP-ISW’s last data cut-off on December 31. Geolocated footage from January 2 showed Israeli bulldozers operating at the Mantara dam on the outskirts of Quneitra, southern Syria.[xxxiii] A Syria-focused analyst reported that the IDF seized a former Syrian Arab Army (SAA) base in Hader village, Quneitra province.[xxxiv] Syrian media reported that the IDF deployed bulldozers and excavation machinery on a nearby hilltop, likely to construct an observation post.[xxxv] The IDF is paving a road to connect the military base to the hilltop. The IDF separately conducted airstrikes targeting a former Assad regime military base in western Damascus.[xxxvi]
Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s senior advisor, Ali Larijani, justified Iran’s actions in Syria, reaffirmed support of the Axis of Resistance, and linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of new Syrian leaders. Larijani highlighted Soleimani’s fundamental role in the Axis of Resistance.[xxxvii] Larijani dismissed claims that the resistance has been weakened and emphasized the resilience of movements such as Hezbollah, which he claimed had rebuilt itself after significant setbacks.[xxxviii] Larijani’s speech takes a more defensive tone by framing recent setbacks as temporary and reaffirming Iran’s commitment to its regional objectives. It is notable, however, that Larijani linked future Iran-Syria relations to the conduct of the new Syrian leaders. Other Iranian officials and ex-officials, such as former IRGC Commander Mohsen Rezaei, have advocated for Iran to support resistance movements in Syria against HTS.[xxxix]
Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated media in Iran claimed that the Shia Sayyida Zeinab Shrine in southern Damascus lacked the power to turn on its lights due to fuel supply issues under HTS.[xl] The HTS-led government resumed the shrine’s custodianship on 15 December.[xli] Local Syrian reporting did not confirm the Iranian outlet’s claim. Iranian media outlets have previously made false claims about the shrine and the security around it.[xlii] Iran intends to ignite unrest against the HTS-led interim government in pursuit of regaining a foothold in Syria.[xliii]