The topic of “Syrian Hezbollah” is shrouded in a veil of secrets, rumors, informational stuffing by provocateurs, manipulation of facts and simply a belief where wishful thinking is taken for reality.
Let’s start with where the rumors about the so-called “Syrian Hezbollah” originated. After the Lebanese Islamic Resistance Party (Hezbollah from Lebanon), at the request of the Assad government, entered Syria with the goal of helping the Syrian army destroy representatives of international terrorism and various other types of extremists, thereby saving the sovereignty of Syria, securing Lebanon and not allowing Zionism organize a new intervention to overthrow the government in Damascus. Among Western and pro-Western experts in the Middle East, an opinion has arisen that the Lebanese party is allegedly creating branches throughout Syria that should serve its goals. In order to simplify the name, these branches were nicknamed “Syrian Hezbollah”. From then on, every second pro-Syrian militia group could automatically become designated as part of the Syrian Hezbollah project. However, in reality everything is much more complicated.
The idea of creating militias as an auxiliary force for the Syrian army was indeed put into practice, but the credit for this belongs to the Iranians from the IRGC. Before the invitation of the Russian military, Iranian generals developed a tactic according to which local militias and militias should be created throughout Syria in places loyal to Assad in order to hold positions and wait in the wings for counter-attacks on opponents. Around 2016, some changes occurred, the National Defense Forces (NDF) system underwent structural reforms, which led to the emergence of the Local Defense Forces (LDF). Due to the fact that Hezbollah was involved in many operations throughout Syria, their cooperation with the NDF and LDF was quite natural. It should be added that after the emergence of the LDF, most of the NDF units were integrated into the units of the Syrian Armed Forces.
Let us briefly explain what pro-Syrian militias are.
1 – Militias created for ideological reasons. That is, the creation of groups of Syrians loyal to a certain ideology. There is a whole palette of different trends from the camp of supporters of secular views, from loyal Baathists to militias with “leftists” glances. In parallel with them, supporters of the ideas of the Islamic Revolution can be found in small numbers. To attribute everyone to the “Syrian Hezbollah,” to put it mildly, is inappropriate. On the other hand, there is a certain ideological tandem between forces loyal to Assad and the Iranians, expressed in the form of a militia, but such organizations have only temporary military functionality.
2 – Tribalism. That is, tribal militias created at the behest of their leader and on the basis of his political preferences.
3 – Former rebels. Militias created from former insurgents from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) faction.
4 – Religious factor. Places of traditional residence of Shiites in Syria and units created there for self-defense, as well as organized militias in the area inhabited by Sunnis who expressed support for Assad, the Iranians and Hezbollah.
Of course, Hezbollah and the IRGC have a relationship with a certain part of the militias, battalions and militias in terms of military training and equipment with everything necessary. But these actions of the Islamic Resistance are only military-tactical. The political-ideological line may seep through somewhere, but only superficially, due to the fact that Hezbollah and the Iranians are officially invited to Syria by the government of Damascus. And under such conditions, and even in the midst of war, no one can “impose” will not have its own ideology. Because mutual respect is paramount in diplomacy. Any change requires political conditions.
Finally, in order to create your own branch in a specific place, favorable conditions are necessary. With all the capabilities Hezbollah has in Syria, at this stage it simply does not need it. Firstly, the Syrian political model of the state must still undergo some changes and the Baath monopoly must come to naught. At this stage, there are no real changes within the system for obvious reasons; Syria is still in a state of siege, and terrorism has not been completely defeated and has the potential for revival. Plus, there are NATO occupiers in the north of the country. Therefore, even if there was a great need for the creation of a union party in a neighboring country, such a question would only be raised in the post-crisis period. Secondly, Lebanese Hezbollah was born in a society where there was a strong demand from the local Islamic community for social justice, self-organization to fight enemies and a religious doctrine that could take Lebanese Muslims to a new level. In Syria, public demand is also present, but it is categorically different from its small neighbor. Syrians in different vectors of the country look at their problems differently, and everywhere a unique approach is needed in building a political community capable of expressing the interests of the community. Thus, we are already seeing a certain division and fragmentation, and this is clearly not in the interests of the country. Syrians, in general, can only be satisfied with the emergence of some broad organization with its representatives throughout Syria, which would successfully implement the needs of the population, taking into account all the nuances and could integrate local political views into its ranks (a reservation, if these views are as close as possible).
Regarding the Lebanese Islamic Party, it should be clarified that Hezbollah does not ignore the idea of exporting the revolution, since this is its essence and defining ideology, therefore the Lebanese Islamic Party simply cannot abandon it. But reality and analysis based on a pragmatic approach allows Hezbollah to act more flexibly, tactfully and taking into account regional circumstances. Therefore, the creation of its branch in Syria in all its endeavors, be it a militia, a political party or a religious foundation, has one direction – helping the Iranians in the Syrian Arab Republic. All projects for the reconstruction of Syrian society will in any case be postponed until better times (here we mean the time when the war in Syria is at least 80% over).
So who is interested in such myths about the “Syrian Hezbollah”? The main enemies of official Damascus are Zionism, the regimes of the Gulf countries, Turkey and the States. The goal is to expose the Lebanese party as “an expansionist force with religious fanaticism” that allegedly “seeks dominance based on puritanical fanaticism.” If Zionism and the States operate in the media sphere and are mostly engaged in information propaganda, then Arab autocrats and NATO Turkey have their own levers. For example, local forces inside Syria, dependent on external sponsors and opposing Damascus and its allies. This refers to various kinds of jihadists, pro-Western forces within the Kurdish SDF forces (see tweet at the end of the article), extremist Turkoman groups and part of the rebellious Arab tribes, as well as the remnants of the FSA forces. The mentioned insurgents are actively implementing decrees from the outside related to myths, speculation and hostile sentiments against the Lebanese Hezbollah and the IRGC.
P.S. Of course, one cannot ignore the fact of the policy of “exporting the Islamic Revolution” coming from Damascus’s main ally, Tehran. After all, Lebanese Hezbollah is precisely the product of a revolutionary wave from Islamic Iran; accordingly, analysts have the right to believe that the so-called “Syrian Hezbollah” will have to be born from the depths of the IRGC’s activities. However, firstly, it is necessary to take into account the realities (the more the Iranians stick to their line in Syria, the greater the likelihood of new sanctions from the United States against Tehran), and secondly, it is certainly worth admitting the idea that there are different variations and ways to convey their message to their neighbors and the idea of what Tehran is doing in Syria. Nevertheless, Iran’s ideological goals are already making themselves felt in Syria. Creating a local insurgency with an identical ideology and relying on the personalization* of specific figures are among Tehran’s main tactics in Syria. But still, these facts only speak about Tehran’s foreign policy. The basis for allegations about the presence of “Syrian Hezbollah” clearly not enough. Even the likely future symbiosis of military militias and charismatic figures of the Syrian political space has no basis to assert the existence of the idea of Iran creating an organization in Syria by analogy with the Lebanese Islamic Resistance Party.
- – It is known that the current governor of Deir ez-Zor, Abdul Majid al-Kawakibi, is a long-time supporter of the Islamic Revolution and the alliance with Iran and Hezbollah. Abdul Majid is a descendant of the famous Syrian scientist who called for Muslim unity and resistance to the colonialists.