One generation after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina stands at a crossroads: to remain bound by the rigid structures of Dayton or to embark on a path toward a more inclusive, functional and European future. The anniversary is not only a moment of remembrance, but also a reminder that peace agreements are not destinies — they are starting points
Thirty years after the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA), Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) still is a country “stuck in transition.” The constitutional blueprint created at Dayton—annexed to the peace accord as Annex 4—was effective at ending the war and preserving the territorial integrity of the state. Yet it also produced a system so fragmented and cumbersome that scholars and international institutions have long referred to it as “institutional overkill.” One generation later, the central question is whether BiH can finally move beyond a structure designed for post-conflict stabilization and build a constitutional order compatible with democratic functionality and European Union (EU) membership.
This question lies at the heart of a new volume, “The Dilemma of Constitutional Reform in Bosnia and Herzegovina: Discussing Options with a View to EU Accession”, edited by Maja Sahadžić, Tatjana Sekulić, Nevenko Vranješ, and Jens Woelk. Contributing scholars—mostly based in BiH—converge on a clear conclusion: although BiH has achieved EU candidate status, the constitutional status quo is incompatible with the requirements of a modern democratic state or the standards of EU accession. Their analysis, along with broader reflections on Bosnia’s institutional trajectory since 1995, highlights the same structural challenge: Dayton brought peace but froze the political and institutional logic of wartime divisions.
A Peace Agreement, not a permanent Constitution
The DPA was never intended as a definitive or enduring constitutional settlement. Negotiated among wartime leaders under intense international pressure, the text was drafted in English and imposed as part of a peace deal, without a referendum or domestic democratic legitimacy. This reflected the overriding priority of ending the conflict quickly, at the cost of adopting a model the population had never approved.
The result was a constitution based on an elaborate mix of federalism and consociational power-sharing. It recognized the three “constituent peoples”—Bosniaks, Croats, and Serbs—as the core political categories and distributed institutional power accordingly. While intended to guarantee participation and security for groups after violent conflict, this structure created what many describe as a structural bias in favour of the status quo. Access to the state Presidency, the House of Peoples, and other key institutions remains restricted exclusively to members of these constituent peoples.
From the very beginning, this model produced systemic discrimination against the so-called “Others”—citizens who do not identify with one of the three recognized groups. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) has repeatedly confirmed this in landmark judgments such as Sejdić and Finci, Zornić, and others. The Court made it clear that mechanisms designed to protect groups and encourage interethnic dialogue cannot justify the total exclusion of some citizens from high political office. And, even the Dayton Constitution itself refers to human rights (and the European Convention of Human Rights) as being “above all other law”.
Yet these rulings remain unimplemented (the first one, Sejdić-Finci, since 2009!). Correcting the discrimination would require substantial constitutional amendments, but political elites—whose power is rooted in Dayton’s ethnic architecture—have little incentive to change. As a result, the country remains “captured by ethnonational political logic,” with democratic legitimacy and civic equality continually subordinated to group-based vetoes and identity politics.
A system prone to paralysis
The institutional structure created at Dayton is notoriously complex. With the State, the two Entities (one of which includes ten Cantons), and the Brčko District, Bosnia and Herzegovina has fourteen governments and fourteen legislatures for a population of just over 3 million. The Venice Commission of the Council of Europe already described this as “neither rational nor efficient” back in 2005, noting that the proliferation of cross-veto mechanisms made legislative paralysis almost inevitable.
In the first decade after the war, the need to mediate deadlock ushered in an era of heavy international involvement. The Office of the High Representative (OHR), vested with broad “Bonn Powers,” became the engine of institutional development during the early post-war period. It imposed laws, dismissed obstructive politicians, and created state-level bodies needed for basic functionality, even when local political actors resisted. While these interventions stabilized the system, they also cemented Bosnia’s status as an international “semi-protectorate,” raising concerns about democratic legitimacy and local ownership.
The fragility of this arrangement remains visible today. Secessionist rhetoric—especially from the leadership of Republika Srpska—recurs regularly, and the OHR continues to intervene. The dramatic imposition of amendments to the Federation Constitution and the electoral law on election night in 2022 is a recent example. Such moves may unstick immediate gridlock but risk turning the High Representative into a “divisive factor,” undermining the very stability the office was created to safeguard.
Meanwhile, Bosnia’s security architecture rests on NATO, yet the country remains divided on NATO membership—another issue blocked by the consociational model, which requires consensus among ethnic groups. Political elites, exploiting ethnic fears and institutional fragmentation, maintain a “status quo instead of progress,” as the European Commission regularly notes.
The EU as the only real driver of reform?
Despite all the blockages, EU accession remains the only political project that enjoys broad rhetorical support across Bosnia and Herzegovina. It is widely perceived as the long-term goal most capable of breaking the constitutional stalemate. But the EU has made it clear that accession is impossible without fundamental changes to the Dayton Constitution.
The reforms required fall broadly into three closely linked areas.
First, the country must eliminate structural discrimination by fully implementing the ECtHR judgments. That means recalibrating the system so that ethnic representation does not override basic civic rights.
Second, BiH must become functional. Coordinating and implementing EU law requires clear competences and efficient decision-making, which the current arrangement inhibits. Some important state institutions, which were “added” later—such as the State Court, the Prosecutor’s Office, and the High Judicial and Prosecutorial Council—should be anchored constitutionally to ensure stability and their independence.
Third, Bosnia needs a constitutional clause establishing EU integration as a guiding objective. Such a clause would provide the legal basis for transferring sovereign powers to the EU and clarify the role of Entities in EU decision-making. Reform of the Constitutional Court—including a reconsideration of the role of international judges—is also on the table.
None of these reforms can be externally imposed as EU accession goes beyond the scope of the—provisional—Dayton Peace Agreement and its Constitution. The shift must move from international pressure to domestic acceptance, slowly building the political trust and legitimacy needed for sustainable change.
Citizens’ Assemblies: a glimpse of a different future
One of the most striking developments in recent years has come from outside the usual political channels. Citizens’ Assemblies (CAs), held in Mostar and later at the state level, illustrated that ordinary citizens—when given space to deliberate—can reach constructive cross-ethnic consensus even on the most sensitive issues. Participants endorsed bold ideas, including a recommendation to abolish the House of Peoples, long seen as a source of persistent obstruction.
Although political elites and EU representatives largely ignored these proposals, the assemblies demonstrated an important point: ethnic divisions among citizens are far less rigid than those among political leaders. The challenge now is to connect these grassroots deliberations to parliamentary debate, forcing elected officials to engage with citizen-driven reform ideas rather than shielding negotiations behind closed doors.
At 30 Years: a constitutional order at a crossroads
As Bosnia and Herzegovina marks the 30th anniversary of Dayton, the central dilemma is whether a system designed to maintain peace between groups that were “forced together” after the war can evolve into a framework capable of supporting democratic governance and EU integration. The consensus among scholars is firm: the fundamentals must finally be addressed. The constitution must transition from a framework of post-war stabilization to an engine of political and social progress.
This transformation will not happen through a single grand constitutional moment. It will require incremental but steady reforms, grounded in civic equality, institutional functionality, and genuine political ownership. The path to EU membership provides a roadmap—but domestic actors must choose to follow it.
One generation after the war, Bosnia and Herzegovina faces a choice between remaining constrained by Dayton’s rigid structures or beginning the long journey toward a more inclusive, functional, and European future. The anniversary is thus not only a moment for reflection but also a reminder that peace agreements are not destinies. They are starting points. The question now is whether Bosnia can move beyond the compromises of 1995 and build a constitutional order for the decades ahead.