To identify the essence of modern “color revolutions”, it is advisable to carry out a typological comparison with the “classical” revolutions of previous historical eras. Comparison can be made based on the following components – goals; publicly articulated ideology; social composition; organization; implementation technologies. Understanding the specifics of revolutions of a new type will allow us to raise the question of finding new effective tools to counter them. One of the main problems of such counteraction today is the use of outdated means against them, the arsenal of which was developed from the experience of past revolutions.
Goals of “color revolutions”
In terms of purpose, the revolutions of the past were aimed at changing the model of statehood in the direction of strengthening its sovereign potential. In practice, the ongoing model inversion could undermine the viability of the corresponding state system. The hecatombs of the victims of many past revolutions are a historical warning against the use of revolutionary tactics in the future. But in this case we are talking about targets. The goal in the revolutions of the past was associated with strengthening the country’s sovereign potential. This strengthening was not necessarily conceived in the context of the idea of the nation-state. The project of the Bolshevik revolution denied in its target plan the previous model of the world of nations and states. But at the same time, he built a sovereign, denying the external bourgeois world, a new world-system. Even the February Revolution, which led in the shortest possible time to the actual desovereignization of Russia, was largely determined by the call of the struggle for sovereignty. The prologue to the revolution was, as we know, the famous speech of the leader of the Cadet Party P.N. Miliukova “Stupidity or Treason?” The driving force of the February Revolution was the formula: “In order to defeat the external German, you must first defeat the internal German.”
The target of “color revolutions” is desovereignization. Their context is the presence of a global world system. There is an obvious center in this system. “Color revolutions” are aimed at subordinating the corresponding geopolitical space to this center. To ensure such subordination, it is often necessary to implement the task of leaving another supranational system, or quasi-system. Hence the possible discrepancies between the publicly presented ideology of the color revolution and its target guidelines. The ideologeme may be a national state, but the goal is to ensure resubordination from the regional center of power to the global one.
The post-Soviet context of most of the color revolutions that have occurred reveals this re-subordination. The destruction of the USSR could not simultaneously destroy all the interregional ties that had developed historically. These connections were built around the former center of the Soviet (and earlier Russian-imperial) world system – Russia. Color revolutions dealt a blow to the preserved components of this world-system. In this regard, the persistent anti-Russian (Russophobic) pathos of revolutionary actions is not accidental. In none of the color revolutions was a pro-Russian (or even neutral) position revealed. This in itself best reveals the true purpose of the color revolutions.
The anti-Russian nature of the “color revolutions” meant at the same time that they were pro-American. The final removal from the orbit of Moscow’s influence allowed the corresponding group of states to move more focusedly in the direction of Washington.
Since 1991, the entire post-Soviet space has been moving in the direction of the United States. But the speed of this movement was different. In some states, over time, trends of “slipping” and “moving backward” have emerged. The articulation of projects for the reintegration of the post-Soviet space was perceived in the United States as a threat (recreation of the USSR). Color revolutions were supposed to return the “lost path” states to the integral line of pro-American development.
In this regard, three waves of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space can be distinguished. Through the first wave, the Soviet world-system was destroyed. Conventionally, this stage can be defined as “velvet revolutions”. The events of 1991 and 1993 in Moscow were the final chord of this revolutionary phase.
The goal of the second stage was to destroy the prospects for reintegration in the post-Soviet space. The name of this stage can be conditionally defined as the “orange revolutions”. The first in their series was not, as is commonly believed, the “Rose Revolution” in Georgia, but the “bulldozer revolution” in Yugoslavia. The regime of S. Milosevic was overthrown, on the one hand, as a communist enclave of the former world system, and on the other, as a pro-Russian enclave of promising reintegration around Russia. Obviously, the revolution in the Russian Federation was supposed to complete the orange phase of color revolutions. However, the script failed.
Attempts to overthrow the regimes in Uzbekistan, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Armenia failed. The plan to create a new “cordon sanitaire” around Russia was not fully realized either. In particular, the establishment of the Organization for Democracy and Economic Development – GUUAM – oriented towards such a prospect. The membership of Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Azerbaijan and Uzbekistan shows the target plan – the geopolitical envelopment of Russia by a ring of hostile states. Considering the well-known anti-Russian position of the Baltic republics and Poland, the scale of coverage turned out to be even more significant. The withdrawal of Uzbekistan from GUUAM and the ambivalent political course of Azerbaijan somewhat weakened the strategic line of forming an anti-Russian “cordon sanitaire”, although they did not cancel it completely. Color revolutions were organized twice in Kyrgyzstan. However, after both revolutionary inversions, the anti-Russian pathos fueled from outside soon weakened, and the republic again moved closer to Russia.
Finally, the “white ribbon” performances in Russia did not lead to revolution. Obviously, the elections of 2011-2012. should have become the apogee of the “orange” period in the history of “color revolutions”. The weakness of the “non-systemic opposition” did not allow this plan to be realized. Probably, the very preparation of the speech of the white ribbon workers assumed the presence of a conflict in the power tandem by the conditional date. Such a conflict was fueled by external pressure, but, as we know, the bet on it did not work.
The third stage in the history of “color revolutions” apparently began in 2014 with the Euromaidan. If at the second stage the task of removing the corresponding republics from the orbit of Russian influence was set and solved, then at the third stage we are already talking about the formation of a force of anti-Russian and anti-Russian military aggression. Nationalists, who were previously on the sidelines, become the vanguard of the revolutionary movement. This is the fundamental difference between the Maidan of 2004-2005. (“orange”) and 2013-2014. (“brown”) For the first time, the focus in a color script is on outright Nazism. This is a major milestone not only for the history of “color revolutions”, but also for the Western project as a whole.
According to the fixed stage-by-stage logic, it is precisely in the West’s accentuated support for Nazism and fascism that one should expect a new phase in the development of the revolutionary process in the post-Soviet space. Accordingly, in Russia, the vanguard role in the revolution will probably shift from the liberal to the nationalist segment. The low rating of liberal ideology and the growing popularity of radical nationalism among young people creates the necessary environmental conditions for such a reorientation. There is reason to believe that the growth in the number of nationalist organizations is largely controlled from the outside. The use of the “Russian theme” in this case obscures the anti-Russian targets and is capable of entraining certain segments of the population in a “march against the Kremlin,” which is no longer within the power of liberalism. In accordance with the already developed tradition of using “flower” semantics, the new stage of “color revolutions” can be defined as “neo-brown”.
In Russia, judging by the available media leaks, a network of ultranationalist organizations is developing that adhere to “direct action” tactics. Not only liberals, but also many nationalists receive financial support abroad, which reveals the true organizers of the movements. This allows them to conduct active propaganda work and publish relevant printed materials in large quantities. In Russia there is a boom in book publications on neo-pagan Russian-Aryan issues. The websites of many nationalist organizations are registered abroad, which does not allow the Russian authorities to resolve the issue of closing them. The format of sports, recreational and military-patriotic institutions allows nationalists to recruit “militants” and purposefully prepare for the “H” hour.
Of course, color revolutions were organized not only in the space of the former Soviet world-system. But this does not change their general goal – the geopolitical subordination of the corresponding country to the world center. The destruction of the Chinese world-system in the conditions of the modern breakthrough of the PRC clearly reveals the plan to organize “color revolutions” in China. The first attempt in the context of the wave of “velvet revolutions” was made back in 1989, but, as is known, it ended in a harsh response from the authorities. The second attempt consisted of provoking speeches by national minorities in Western Chinese territories and occurred during the preparation for the 2008 Beijing Olympics. The calculation was that, given the pre-Olympic attention of the international community, the Chinese authorities would not take decisive repressive measures. The third attempt, called the “jasmine revolution,” was planned for 2011. It was seen as a transfer of the wave of the “Arab Spring” to China, meaning the Muslim component of the population of Western Chinese regions. And finally, the fourth attempt was made already in 2014, as a performance launched in wealthy Hong Kong. It was known as the “umbrella revolution”.
The “Cedar Revolution” in Lebanon was aimed at removing this Middle Eastern state from the orbit of Syria’s influence and achieving its subordination to the “world center.” According to a similar scenario of using the confessional factor, there will then be an attempt to carry out a revolution in Syria itself, indicating the presence of a single scenario line.
The revolutionary movement united by the concept of the “Arab Spring” stands apart in the reconstruction of the goals of the “color revolutions”. Its specificity determines the spread of the position according to which the Arab revolutions are not flower-type revolutions. Of course, there are differences, just as there are between the stages of color revolutions in the post-Soviet space. But there is also a paradigmatic commonality associated, first of all, with the external projectability of the revolutionary scenario. The Arab Spring dealt a blow to the secular, modernization-oriented regimes of the Greater Middle East. Many of these regimes were genetically connected with the world socialist alternative. Especially for the Middle East region, the adaptation concepts of “Arab socialism” and “Islamic socialism” were used. In this regard, the “Arab Spring” finished off the remaining elements of the previous bipolar world order in the region.
When organizing “color revolutions,” it was impossible not to take into account the extreme anti-American and, more broadly, anti-Western sentiments in the Middle East. Such sentiments exist even in countries that are traditional allies of the United States. “Cartoon scandal” 2005-2006 showed the deep mass rejection of Western culture in the Muslim world. Perhaps this scandal was designed as a monitoring of the degree of rejection of the West in the modern Islamic world, in the context of the beginning of preparations for “color revolutions” in the region. A new provocation – the release of the film “The Innocence of Muslims” again confirmed the diagnosis.
Under these conditions, a direct focus of the new revolutionary regimes on the United States would be impossible. Hence the idea of indirect desovereignization through inclusion in the American project. This project can be conditionally defined as the “New Caliphate” – a radical Islamic state that could be used as a “big stick” to unleash civilizational wars in the Old World. The implementation of such a project creates zones of military escalation with at least four civilizational areas – European, Russian, Chinese and Indian. At the same time, there is a “cleansing” of undesirable regimes, such as Libyan (already overthrown), Syrian (in the active phase of overthrow) and Iranian. US support for Islamic fundamentalists in revolutions in the Middle East parallels similar support for Nazi forces in Ukraine. Such synchronicity indicates the presence of a unified strategy for managing color revolutions and their entry into a new stage development.
The ideology of “color revolutions”
Classical revolutions were characterized by rigid certainty in the formation of an ideological base. The revolutionary project began with the articulation of ideology. At the first stage, a group of ideological comrades was created. Within the framework of it, the doctrine of building a new life management system was worked out in detail. Bolshevism, it should be recalled, began with an ideological demarcation from Menshevism. The second congress of the RSDLP, at which V.I. Lenin made a sharp polemic against the positions of G.V. Plekhanov and Yu.O. Martov, and was the starting point for the formation of the Leninist party. The construction of party coalitions was possible only after their own ideological certainty was achieved.
Mass party building began already at the second stage of partogenesis. The values and goals, the understanding of which had been achieved at the previous stage, were broadcast to the masses. Going to the masses without a well-developed ideology seemed fundamentally impossible. And already at the third stage, the ideologically and organizationally crystallized mass party seized power. The staged nature of the revolutionary scenario was thus expressed by the following triad – the formation of ideology – mass party building – coming to power.
“Color revolutions” unfold in a fundamentally different way. The ideology of “color revolutions” is not clearly articulated. In view of this, it turns out to be, in fact, elusive for criticism. Due to such ideological uncertainty of the revolutionary forces, it is difficult for the authorities to conduct counter-propaganda.
“It’s not clear what they want,” was the reproach addressed to supporters of the white ribbon movement in Russia. “Where is their own constructive program?” But the fact of the matter is that none of the color revolutions fundamentally put forward their own program. This is their typological feature.
Refusal to put forward one’s own ideology is determined by the following circumstances. Firstly, the attitude towards protest. Color revolutions accumulate precisely the protest moods of the masses. A certain level of protest energy always exists in society. It cannot be zero in any social system. But this protest can be heated up and catalyzed in a targeted way. This is what color revolutions are betting on. Their ideology is limited to the message – to destroy the old. Due to the imperfection of life itself, protest in itself is invulnerable to propaganda. There is always something that the existing regime can be accused of.
Putting forward any constructive program is another matter. It’s much more complicated. A constructive program may itself become the subject of criticism. It is not obvious that the articulated positive ideology will be more attractive than the one from which the ruling regime proceeds.
An undoubted disadvantage of refusing to articulate one’s own ideological platform is the lack of a strategy for the development of the state in the event of opposition forces coming to power. But the fact of the matter is that such a strategy is not needed for the forces of a color revolution. If their goal is correctly identified – desovereignization of the country, then, consequently, revolutionary activity should be aimed at depriving the state of its own identical strategic guidelines.
Secondly, the refusal to articulate the ideology of the color revolutions makes it possible to hide their true target intentions. The goal – the implementation of desovereignization and subordination to the world center, naturally, cannot be publicly formulated. Hence the immanent propaganda lie.
Knowledge of the true goals of the “color revolutions” can only be available to the leadership. Its spread to the lower levels of the movement can instantly undermine the revolutionary forces, and therefore is categorically not allowed. Thus, the ideology of “color revolutions” still exists, but is of a latent nature. It is appropriate in this case to draw analogies with esoteric structures like the Gnostics, or Freemasons. There is a level of initiates into the true goals of the movement. For the “profane” level, a certain quasi-mythological surrogate is proposed.
Thirdly, “color revolutions” are based on attracting the widest possible ideological spectrum of forces. Frontal performance creates the illusion of a nationwide movement. Coalition also sets the leveling of ideological differences.
In all color revolutions, liberals acted hand in hand with nationalists. Such an alliance was already revealed during the organization of the dissident movement in the USSR. The struggle against the Soviet project was carried out from different sides, but coordinated from one external center, at the same time by liberals – Westerners, adherents of Russian conservatism and nationalism of a monarchist type (like the Memory society), supporters of a social-democratic European-style platform and adherents of national-separatist movements . Since the period of perestroika, individual public actions of anti-communist content have been carried out jointly. Among the defenders of the White House during the August events of 1991 were representatives of all the forces listed above. Among them were, for example, the future oligarch Mikhail Khodorkovsky and the future terrorist Shamil Basayev. The white ribbon movement was again built on the principle of an all-ideological campaign – liberals (B. Nemtsov), nationalists (E. Limonov), communists (S. Udaltsov). The figure of Alexei Navalny, positioned on several ideological platforms at the same time, is especially characteristic of the context of “color revolutions.”
The projector’s synchronous support of the revolutionary scenario of various ideological forces guarantees his control in any scenario in the government that comes to power. Any victorious outcome of the revolution would be beneficial for its customer. This is exactly how Great Britain acted back in the nineteenth century (the famous principle of “divide and conquer”), and today the United States.
The protest propaganda of the “color revolutions” reveals, however, certain patterns. Such patterns include autocracy, violation of democratic principles and corruption.
In fact, each of the color revolutions created a central, negativized image of the autocrat. Through his personal disavowal, the entire state system is disavowed. For the period of the Velvet Revolutions, in particular, Erich Honecker, Nicolae Ceausescu, Ramiz Alia, Todor Zhivkov, Gustav Husak, Janos Kadar were represented in this capacity. The revolution in Libya was focused on the cult of Muammar Gaddafi, and in Egypt – Hosni Mubbarak. One of the main unifying factors of the Euromaidan protest movement was the consensus against the figure of Viktor Yanukovych. A number of information resources targeted the figure of the Ukrainian president. V.F. himself Yanukovych provided ample opportunity for such criticism. According to the Forbes rating of the high cost of state leaders (salaries of presidents and prime ministers compared to the average level of salaries in the state), he ranked fourth in the world.
Historical figures could also serve as symbols of the state system stormed by the revolution. This happens in cases where hopes are pinned on the leader in power to support revolutionary inversions. Such hopes during the period of perestroika in the USSR were addressed to M.S. Gorbachev. I.V. were positioned as historical symbols of the system. Stalin and L.I. Brezhnev.
Accusations of the ruling group’s violation of the democratic principles declared at the level of the Constitution are also traditional for all “color revolutions” without exception. It is no coincidence in this regard that the catalyst for many of them was elections. The scenario repeats itself steadily. The opposition accuses the authorities of falsifying the voting results. This is followed by an appeal to the people to protest the perfect forgery. The people take to the streets and sweep away the current government, or force it to re-election. Having gone to re-election, the morally defeated government, which admitted the fraud committed, is defeated. Accusations of election dishonesty are made regardless of whether there was actual election fraud or not.
What is new in comparison with classical revolutions in the new revolutionary propaganda is the promotion of the topic of corruption. It turns out to be consistently one of the central ones in all modern revolutions. In this regard, the Corruption Perceptions Index can be seen as an indicator of a revolution in the making. The perception of corruption is a psychological value that is not identical to the real scale of corruption. The scale of corruption can be both higher and lower than the level of perception of corruption.
It is found that on the eve of revolutions, with a certain time lag, the Corruption Perceptions Index indicators in the corresponding countries begin to fall, i.e. The population’s perception of the scale of corruption in the state is increasing. This indicates that society is being informationally heated in a targeted manner in the “H” time perspective.
In Russia, ideas about the corruption of the state system began to intensify precisely from the time when geopolitical differences between its position and the West became apparent. Simultaneously with the beginning of vectorial changes in the dynamics of the perception of corruption in Russian society, the formation of a non-systemic opposition begins. The minimum indicator in the Index (i.e. the maximum in ideas about the scale of corruption) occurred in 2010, i.e. the time immediately preceding the making of a key decision about the future president and the start of the election race. The results obtained allow us to recommend continuing to consider indicators of the level of perception of corruption not only from the point of view of the scale of real corruption, but also from the angle of assessing the growth of protest sentiments in society.
Social base of “color revolutions”
Classical revolutions evolved in the direction of expanding the social base of the revolutionary movement. In this regard, a contrast was made in Marxist theory between bourgeois, democratic and proletarian revolutions. They differed according to two classification criteria – by goals and by the definition of a revolutionary hegemon. The hegemon (driving force) of the bourgeois revolution was the bourgeoisie, and the proletarian revolution – the proletariat. The concept of democratic revolution was introduced to reflect the state of transition. It was assumed that the driving force in them was the broad social strata of society.
Of course, the Marxist scholasticism of the late USSR significantly deformed the real sociology of revolutions. But the very vector of expanding the social base of the revolutionary movement was, apparently, determined correctly. Many non-Marxist sociologists agreed with Marxism on this. Among them is Pitirim Sorokin with his classic work “Sociology of Revolution”. One of the main angles of Sorokin’s consideration is the problem of social elevators. The classical revolution expands lifting, allowing representatives of lower strata to rise up the social ladder. In this regard, color revolutions are unfolding completely differently from the classical scheme.
P.A. Sorokin associated the impulse of revolutions with the suppression of the biological instincts of the majority of the population. According to him, the corresponding revolutionary catalysts can be: 1. hunger, as the suppression of the instinct of nutrition (in a dissonant circumstance – overconsumption of the elite); 2. impoverishment, as the suppression of the instinct of property (a dissonant circumstance is the luxury of elitist groups); 3. an unsuccessful war and/or state terror, as a suppression of the instinct of self-preservation (a dissonant circumstance is the inability of the elite to lead to victory over an external enemy, its involvement in repression); 4. any forms of suppression of the sexual instinct (dissonant circumstance – demonstrative sexual promiscuity, sexual immorality on the part of the elite); 5. censorship and a ban on migration as suppression of the instinct of freedom (a dissonant circumstance is freedom for the elite); 6. class restrictions, as suppression of the instinct of self-expression (a dissonant circumstance is the intellectual and professional degeneration of the elite). All these factors can still become a catalyst for social unrest.
However, the impulses of “color revolutions” are fundamentally different. They are neither a movement for expanding channels of social lifting, nor an anti-elitist movement of the majority. The elite turns out to be the hegemon of “color revolutions”. Accordingly, their guideline is the further elitization of the social system. The elite is understood in this case in a broad sense as a part of society that is in fact in a beneficial and preferential position. It can act against another part of the elite – the top of the existing bureaucratic apparatus. But victory over it does not expand social lifting, but leads exclusively to intra-elite rotations.
The elitist group of instigators of the “color revolution” finds a new positioning image – the “creative class” (“creacles” in the terminology of their opponents). The corresponding theory of Richard Florida was adopted. However, in the practice of neo-elitist filtration, the “creative class” excludes that part of intellectual workers who do not achieve the appropriate level of material security. Teachers, doctors, most scientists in Russia do not belong to the “creative class”, and, accordingly, to the social base of the “color revolutions”. “Creative class” is contextualized in the office subculture. In relation to the lower echelon of the forces of the color revolution, opponents use the concept of “office plankton.” The economist Mikhail Khazin, who introduced it into widespread use, described “office plankton” as a circle of “young people accustomed to receiving thousands of dollars simply for the fact of their existence.”
During the period of development of the white-ribbon movement, its opponents also used other identification symbols, in particular, the “mink coat riot.” It emphasized the fairly high material and social status of the participants in the protest movement. According to the survey, the definition of the essence of the “swamp” unrest as a “mink riot” received the largest number of votes – 26.3%.
On the part of the white ribbon people, a set of discreditable identifiers were also used in relation to the “pro-Putin” majority – “cattle”, “anchovies”, “vatniks”, “dog-people”, emphasizing the social and even anthropological distance. Classical revolutions sacralized the image of the worker-fighter. All artistic means worked for this sacralization. For “color revolutions,” on the contrary, the worker, generally a person of manual labor, is a negative figure, expressing archaic traits, serving as a support for the regime. The theme of the elite’s contempt for the “working man” was successfully used as counter-propaganda during the launch of the campaign in support of the election of V.V. Putin. Igor Kholmanskikh personified the image of a worker from Uralmashvagonzavod, condemning “advanced slackers who have arrogated to themselves the right to speak on behalf of the entire people.”
But the office stratum is not the only social actor in the “color revolution.” Office workers could not radicalize the revolutionary movement, as was the case, in particular, in Ukraine, or in a number of Arab states. For such a scenario, other social forces had to be involved. And they are found among various marginal and near-marginal groups of the population. In fact, crime and people of deviant behavior were associated with each of the color revolutions. From them the “combat groups” of the color revolution are formed. Even Herbert Marcuse, rethinking Marxism, pointed out that the driving forces of new revolutions will no longer be the working class integrated into consumer society, but radical students, immigrants, and various marginalized people. Indeed, in relation to “color revolutions” it is appropriate to talk about a kind of union of the “creative class” and the marginalized. Scenario-wise, the first component provides the initial peaceful stage of the opposition’s speech, the second component takes the vanguard positions during the transition to the second combat stage.
Organizational structures of “color revolutions”
The main governing body in revolutions of the classical type was the revolutionary party. In Bolshevik ideology, a special place was given to revolutionary party building. The organization being built was determined by V.I. Lenin as a “party of a new type.” Organizationally, it was akin to ancient religious sects. The party was constrained by iron discipline. Its core was formed from professional revolutionaries who fanatically believed in the proclaimed ideology. At the head of the party was a recognized and indisputable leader – the “great teacher”. I.V. Stalin later likened the creation of V.I. Lenin’s party to the “Order of the Sword”. It is this type of party that turned out to be more effective in the context of the development of a revolutionary scenario than traditional parties of the parliamentary type (such as, for example, the Constitutional Democratic Party).
Subsequently, the Bolshevik experience of revolutionary party building was adopted in many countries of the world. The National Socialist German Workers’ Party was built on the same principles – strict discipline, ideological weaponry, consolidation around the leader.
The organizational structure of “color revolutions” is formed in a fundamentally different way. They have neither a clearly identifiable party core nor a clearly recognized revolutionary leader. This complicates the activities of the authorities, protecting the structural cells of the “color revolution” from preventive defeat. Personal blows from the authorities cannot in this situation disorganize the revolutionary movement. Color revolution cells operate on a network principle, which gives them fundamental stability when organizing repression by the authorities.
But a natural question arises: how is such a politically amorphous, managerially non-hierarchical force capable of carrying out coordinated operational actions that are ahead of government decisions? Of course, this movement cannot be spontaneous. But it is not controlled by some national party located within the country, but by external structures. Modern communication capabilities completely allow this. The governing bodies of the movement are thus brought outside. Outside the country there is also a “cash office” for the “color revolution”. In this case, there is no need for a movement leader, due to the fact that leadership powers are assigned to external governance structures.
Carrying out a revolution is an expensive undertaking. It requires the availability of a proper resource base. Accordingly, there must be organizations that finance “color revolutions”. The funding of “color revolutions” was never limited to the US State Department channel. Along with external sources of financing, internal sources are also included. In each of the “color revolutions” circles of national capital supporting it were found. This is explained by the inclusion of the dominant part of large business in the system of global financial relations. This inclusion presupposes the presence of dependence mechanisms. And hence the dilemma that arises for the oligarchy – to lose their own business, or to finance a “color revolution”.
“Color revolutions” would not have had a chance of success without the inclusion of part of the bureaucratic corps, first of all, representatives of security forces, in their organization. The state always has the opportunity to respond to opposition speech by using force. Such an armed response to the opposition was given, in particular, in 1989 by the leadership of the PRC. As a result, the revolutionary prospect was ended in one day on June 4th. For almost twenty years after this, the threat of a “color revolution” did not arise for the PRC.
Muammar Gaddafi also resorted to using force against the opposition. The overthrow of the Gaddafi regime became possible only after the direct military intervention of external forces. Another example of a forceful response to the development of the revolution scenario was presented by Syrian President Bashar al-Assad. Despite severe external pressure, he eventually managed to reverse the seemingly unfavorable situation.
In the vast majority of other cases, the authorities did not use their right to use force against the oppositionists. Not least of all, this was determined by the ambivalent position of the security forces. The oppositionists received a signal: “military forces will not be used.” This is for them to radicalize their speeches.
Judging by the experience of the color revolutions that have taken place, a special role in terms of assembling extremist-minded youth belongs to football fan organizations. Their near-sports profile of interests removes them from the focused attention of security agencies. Meanwhile, in street clashes with other fan clubs and immigrants, these structures gain practical experience and turn into ready-made fighting squads. Ideologically, fans tend to adhere to an ultra-nationalist platform. Hence, the scenario of a color revolution unfolding as a protest against “foreigners” is very likely. The catalyst for such a speech could be any clash on ethnic grounds. The potential scale of this action in Russia can be gleaned from the riots of December 2010 on Manezhnaya Square.
It is significant that prominent figures of the non-systemic opposition are active participants in a number of interethnic clashes. From this point of view, these actions can be considered as a development of a revolutionary scenario. Its unfolding is seen in the following sequence of events: 1. a high-profile offense, possibly a murder, committed by representatives of the non-Slavic population; 2. a call to protect the Russian people, statements by leaders of the non-systemic opposition; 3. quasi-spontaneous pogrom action against foreigners; 4. government intervention, law enforcement agencies take action against rioters; 5. redirecting popular anger against the authorities, accusing them of anti-Russian policies; 6. mass anti-government protest with the prospect of overthrowing the regime.