Washington’s decision to withdraw troops from Afghanistan by 11 September spells an end to the U.S. military deployment but not peace. Crisis Group expert Andrew Watkins anticipates that negotiations will likely stall and Afghans will fear an intensified civil war as the U.S. role evolves.
What’s new in the Biden announcement that the U.S. will withdraw all troops by 11 September? Why was the announcement made now?
President Biden has announced that the United States will withdraw all remaining military forces from Afghanistan before September 11, 2021 — likely marking a definitive end to America’s longest war just months before its two-decade anniversary. The decision fundamentally changes the dynamics of the Afghan peace process, as the Taliban have defined their insurgency by opposition to perceived occupation by foreign troops. With those troops leaving, will the Taliban negotiate with fellow Afghans or seek an outright military victory? And will U.S. troop withdrawal push Afghans to unify around preserving the current democratic constitution, or to seek deals that give the Taliban more power in a political settlement to the conflict?
NATO Allies decided on Wednesday (14 April 2021) to start withdrawing forces from the Resolute Support Mission in Afghanistan by May 1, with plans to complete the drawdown of all troops within a few months.
In a joint press conference with the US Secretaries of State and Defense following a virtual meeting of Allied foreign and defence ministers, NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg said “our drawdown will be orderly, coordinated, and deliberate”. He added: “we went into Afghanistan together, we have adjusted our posture together, and we are united in leaving together”.
Good afternoon. I’m speaking to you today from the Roosevelt — the Treaty Room in the White House. The same spot where, on October of 2001, President George W. Bush informed our nation that the United States military had begun strikes on terrorist training camps in Afghanistan. It was just weeks — just weeks after the terrorist attack on our nation that killed 2,977 innocent souls; that turned Lower Manhattan into a disaster area, destroyed parts of the Pentagon, and made hallowed ground of a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania, and sparked an American promise that we would “never forget.”
In 2001, Allies invoked Article 5 of the Washington Treaty for the only time in NATO’s history and went to Afghanistan together with clear objectives: to confront al-Qaeda and those who attacked the United States on September 11, and to prevent terrorists from using Afghanistan as a safe haven to attack us. In the ensuing decades through the investment of blood and treasure, and in partnership with the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan and its security forces, we have worked together to achieve these goals.
United States President Joe Biden is expected to announce on Wednesday a complete withdrawal of American troops from Afghanistan by September 11, thereby postponing the May 1 deadline set by his predecessor Donald Trump early last year during negotiations with the insurgent Taliban group.
Late last month, Japan and Malaysia concluded a weeklong joint coast guard exercise focused on combating piracy in Southeast Asia. Despite a recent decline, piracy is still a threat across the region and cooperation between states—including some, like Japan, that are outside the region—is seen as an important mechanism for mitigating it. In an email interview, Lucio Blanco Pitlo III, a foreign affairs and security analyst on Asia-Pacific issues and a former lecturer at the School of Social Sciences at Ateneo de Manila University in the Philippines, discusses the state of piracy in Southeast Asia and what kinds of multilateral responses have emerged to counter it.
In February, India and Pakistan announced the resumption of a 2003 cease-fire along their fiercely disputed border — representing a first step toward easing tensions between the nuclear rivals. Soon after, leaders in both countries made forward-looking statements, sparking optimism for rapprochement. While bilateral progress has proven short-lived in the past, and longstanding political and security obstacles remain, could these developments open space to address the underlying drivers of conflict?
If an outsider was to say that there’s rampant corruption in Pakistan army, especially within the top echelons, Pakistan army’s media wing Inter Services Public Relations [ISPR] would label that person a “RAW agent” trying to malign the military and terming such assertions as “motivated”, outrightly dismiss the same. However, what explanation can ISPR offer when patriotic and well-meaning people in Pakistan level similar charges against Rawalpindi?
The conflict in Kashmir has undergone several changes and has kept itself relevant by drawing upon ideas and tactics from elsewhere.
Since its outbreak in 1989, the conflict in Kashmir has survived by adopting or dubbing ideas and tactics from the events elsewhere. Conflicts in today’s globalised and digitalised world often feed on new ideas as monotonous strategies and tactics are easy targets for counterinsurgencies and conflict fatigue. Thus, non-state actors and agents of conflicts often implement and introduce novel tactics and ideas to cope with the changes and keep their movements alive, and the conflict in Kashmir is no exemption to it.