South East Asia

Beijing’s primary focus for now is to ensure stability on its western border and sustain its relationship with the new Taliban government in Kabul.

It has become fashionable to characterize recent events in Afghanistan as a loss for the United States and a win for China. This zero-sum interpretation framed in the narrow context of U.S.-China relations is too simplistic and off the mark. The reality is far more complex and nuanced. The end of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the collapse of that country’s pro-Western government do not automatically translate into significant Chinese gains, nor do they trigger a swift Beijing swoop to fill the vacuum in Kabul left by Washington.

How the Islamic State affiliate’s recent attacks complicate an already precarious counterterrorism situation in Afghanistan.

Last month’s bombing outside the Kabul airport was a devastating sign of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province’s (IS-K) recent resurgence. The group had already launched 77 attacks in the first four months of 2021 — an increase from 21 in the same period last year. This renewed capacity for mass-casualty attacks could further destabilize Afghanistan’s already precarious security situation, leaving both the new Taliban government and the United States with a vested interest in mounting an effective campaign to undercut IS-K’s presence in the region.

To understand the interesting relationship between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban, one must peep into history to see how the linkages developed and why the Afghan Taliban are not responding in equal measure to Pakistan’s repeated appeals to take conclusive action against the TTP.

In a statement, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Afghan Taliban jihadi organization which seized power on August 15, 2021) has condemned remarks by American officials that some ministers appointed by the Taliban are on the U.S. blacklist of terrorists and still targets for United States counterterrorism forces.

As resistance forces continue to battle the Taliban on Afghanistan’s last war front, residents who fled the province say there is no clear winner yet.

Since the Taliban claimed “complete control” over the Panjshir Valley in Afghanistan’s northeast earlier this month, the group has been accused of “widespread atrocities”, forcing many Afghans to flee the province – the last remaining enclave of resistance against the group’s rule.

The Haqqani network derives its name from Jalaluddin Haqqani, who first fought against the Soviet army in Afghanistan, and later against the United States (US) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization forces. Following the death of Jalaluddin, the leadership of the group was assumed by his son, Sirajuddin, who is set to head the Interior Ministry, perhaps the most important ministerial position in the newly announced Afghan cabinet. India’s diplomatic presence in Afghan cities, whenever it is restored, will be under the direct watch of the Sirajuddin-led ministry. Obviously, this is far from comfortable for New Delhi.

On September 18, 2021, the top leadership of the International Union of Muslim Scholars (IUMS), which is sponsored by the Qatari Regime,[1] hosted in the organization’s headquarters in Doha a delegation on behalf of the Taliban’s government in Afghanistan, headed by Deputy Foreign Minister Sher Mohammad ‘Abbas Stanikzai, which also included Taliban political bureau member Al-Mawlawi Muti’ Al-Haqq, political bureau English-language spokesperson Suhail Shaheen and another bureau spokesperson, Muhammad Na’eem. In the course of the meeting, IUMS officials, including the organization’s head Ahmad Al-Raissouni and its secretary-general ‘Ali Al-Qaradaghi, praised the Taliban government for its jihad and offered to extend it any help it needed in the management of state affairs. Deputy Foreign Minister Stanikzai thanked the IUMS for its support and asked for the guidance of its members in establishing an Islamic regime.