South East Asia

The revival of the concept signals enduring frustration with inequalities embedded in the global order.

The venerable concept of the “Global South” has enjoyed a remarkable revival as a descriptor of postcolonial and developing country solidarity in world affairs. The term’s resurgence, however, has also engendered pushback, with many calling for a phaseout of the expression. Writing in the Financial Times, columnist Alan Beattie calls the label “patronising, factually inaccurate, a contradiction in terms,” and “deeply unhelpful.” In Foreign Policy, Indian strategist C. Raja Mohan argues that the phrase “denies agency to individual countries by treating them as one bloc” with “fluid boundaries and vague criteria for inclusion.”

Introduction

For the last 75 years, Beijing has been on a slow, methodical march south through the South China Sea (SCS). This second “Long March” has seen China take de facto control of the SCS. In doing so, China has flouted international maritime law and, more routinely as of late, dangerously and violently attacked vessels of other regional states such as the Philippines.

Debating Washington’s Strategy—and the Endgame of Competition

The Biden Plan

In “No Substitute for Victory” (May/June 2024), Matt Pottinger and Mike Gallagher raise important concerns about the Biden administration’s China policy. But their analysis misses the mark. Their review of key episodes in the administration’s China policy is inaccurate, and they propose steps that the administration is already taking. But above all, they make a bad bet: they contend that the United States should forget about managing competition, embrace confrontation without limits, and then wait for the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) to collapse. This approach risks runaway escalation and could force a moment of reckoning before the United States has taken the very steps the authors recommend to strengthen its defense industrial base and improve its competitive position. Such a strategy would also mean losing support from U.S. allies and partners, who would see it as irresponsible.

Afghanistan, a nation characterized by rugged mountains and a rich tapestry of ethnic diversity, has for decades been at the epicenter of regional and global terrorism. Its geopolitical significance, combined with a history of foreign intervention and internal strife, has fostered an environment conducive to the proliferation of terrorist activities.

The Chinese military has confirmed that its J-20 stealth fighter jet can easily reach supercruise, which experts said on Monday can bring significant tactical advantages and reflect the power of China’s domestically developed engines.

In international diplomacy, summit meetings stand apart from regular high-level meetings when they are held at key moments or important junctures to reinforce partnerships and/or launch major initiatives.

The summit meeting at Beijing last Thursday between Chinese President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin last falls into such a category, taking place at a momentous juncture when a great shift in the global power dynamic is happening and the breathtaking spectacle of history in the making playing out in real time.

On May 14, 2024, at least 12 terrorists and one Army soldier were killed while five other Security Forces (SF) personnel sustained injuries when terrorists from Afghanistan in their attempt to infiltrate inside Pakistan attacked Pakistani checkpoints in the Teri Mangal area, along the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, in the Kurram District of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The attack, launched with heavy weapons, targeted security installations within a 10 kilometres radius.

The timing of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Belgrade yesterday was far from accidental: exactly 25 years before, Nato forces bombed the city’s Chinese embassy during Operation Allied Force, the two-and-half month campaign against what was then the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia.