South East Asia

Tajikistan is interfering in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, Abdul Ghani Baradar, the acting deputy head of the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (IEA) said on Sunday.

On 18 July, Taliban leader Hibatullah Akhundzada said the group seeks strong diplomatic, economic and political relations with all countries including the United States. The Taliban soon revealed it had opened several channels of communication with foreign countries. China is among the first in the region to embrace — albeit cautiously — the new political reality shaping Afghanistan. For Beijing, the Taliban takeover presents opportunities as well as threats.

It’s now been more than three decades since terrorism first raised its ugly head in J&K and no Kashmiri has remain untouched by the pain and suffering it has caused. Despite a host of human rights organisations and activists who claim to be extremely concerned and greatly distressed by violence in J&K, not even one of the self-professed ‘well-wishers’ of Kashmiri people has made any serious attempt to educate those who have picked up the gun on the futility of the so called “armed struggle.” Au contraire, there are plenty who by justifying violence perpetrated by terrorists are actually encouraging a culture of violence that’s brutalising the very people these activists claim to be so worried about!

On September 15, 2021, seven Army soldiers and five terrorists were killed during an intelligence-based operation (IBO) in the Asman Manza area of South Waziristan District in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KP). The Inter-Services Public Relations (ISPR), in a statement, disclosed that the operation was launched on intelligence about the presence of terrorists in the area.

Beijing’s primary focus for now is to ensure stability on its western border and sustain its relationship with the new Taliban government in Kabul.

It has become fashionable to characterize recent events in Afghanistan as a loss for the United States and a win for China. This zero-sum interpretation framed in the narrow context of U.S.-China relations is too simplistic and off the mark. The reality is far more complex and nuanced. The end of the U.S. military presence in Afghanistan and the collapse of that country’s pro-Western government do not automatically translate into significant Chinese gains, nor do they trigger a swift Beijing swoop to fill the vacuum in Kabul left by Washington.

How the Islamic State affiliate’s recent attacks complicate an already precarious counterterrorism situation in Afghanistan.

Last month’s bombing outside the Kabul airport was a devastating sign of the Islamic State of Khorasan Province’s (IS-K) recent resurgence. The group had already launched 77 attacks in the first four months of 2021 — an increase from 21 in the same period last year. This renewed capacity for mass-casualty attacks could further destabilize Afghanistan’s already precarious security situation, leaving both the new Taliban government and the United States with a vested interest in mounting an effective campaign to undercut IS-K’s presence in the region.

To understand the interesting relationship between the Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP), also known as Pakistani Taliban, and the Afghan Taliban, one must peep into history to see how the linkages developed and why the Afghan Taliban are not responding in equal measure to Pakistan’s repeated appeals to take conclusive action against the TTP.

In a statement, the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan (the Afghan Taliban jihadi organization which seized power on August 15, 2021) has condemned remarks by American officials that some ministers appointed by the Taliban are on the U.S. blacklist of terrorists and still targets for United States counterterrorism forces.