South East Asia

Terrorism remains one of the most critical issues for India’s national security, and the global security architecture in general, despite setbacks both on the tactical and diplomatic fronts in recent times. China’s move to block the blacklisting of members of Pakistan-backed terror groups such as Lashkar-e-taiba and Jaish-e-mohammed, even as recently as last week, shows the glaring limitations of the United Nations (UN) to build a broad consensus on such issues, with countries using these gaps to achieve personal goals. Coincidentally, this move by Beijing came on the same day as UN secretary-general Antonio Guterres said in India that no reason or pretext could justify an act of terrorism.

The Return of Beijing’s Dubious Economic Growth Targets

For most of the past four decades, economic development has been the Chinese government’s lodestar. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP) has implicitly justified its rule by pointing to expansive growth. Indeed, since the Chinese leadership first unveiled an annual growth target, in 1985, the target has essentially been met or exceeded each year, except in 1989.

For decades, the Pakistani establishment has termed the Baloch insurgency a low-intensity conflict confined mostly to Balochistan, the country’s largest province by territory. But that seems to have changed, as a spate of attacks this year clearly demonstrates that the insurgency has entered into a new phase.

U.S. forces are equipped to handle multiple conflicts abroad simultaneously, though positioning troops and weapons throughout the Indo-Pacific to challenge threats from China poses logistical issues because it is such a vast region, Air Force Gen. Jacqueline Van Ovost said Monday.

The Wakhan Corridor, a narrow strip of territory in the Badakhshan Province of Afghanistan, is situated at the crossroads of four countries: China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan. Wakhan Corridor is about 350 km long with 16 to 64 km wide at its eastern end, the corridor forks into two prongs that wrap around a salient of Chinese territory, forming the 92 km boundary between the two countries.

On October 6, former US Under Secretary of Defense for Policy Michèle Flournoy joined the Atlantic Council to discuss, ahead of China’s Twentieth Communist Party Congress, how the United States should invest in military capabilities in the short term to deter China in the 2020s. Below, edited for length and clarity, is her conversation with Clementine Starling, the deputy director of the Scowcroft Center for Strategy and Security’s Forward Defense practice.

On the eve of the opening of a key Chinese Communist Party congress, party leader, head of state and commander of the armed forces Xi Jinping seems more in charge than ever, having given no indication of stepping away from power or anointing a successor.

As concerns grow of a possible nuclear conflict between Russia and the West over Ukraine, there are hopes China could defuse the crisis.

But Russia’s most influential ally may not have the desire or the ability to help, according to analysts.

“If any power has influence over Putin, it is China,” said Steve Tsang, director of the SOAS University of London’s China Institute.

While Russia’s invasion of Ukraine shocked Japan, its seriousness was multiplied by China’s support for Russia. Facing this new reality, Japan’s national security policy is now undergoing a historic change at an unprecedentedly fast pace.

Many countries expand their military strength as they acquire wealth. However, there are at least two important exceptions, the most important of which was the United States in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It was only after the start of the Cold War that the United States became a standing military superpower.