South East Asia

Transhumanism is a vision of the future of humanity in which applied technologies are supposed to enhance and upgrade human existence. According to the transhumanist story, evolution has brought us very far indeed—to the moon and back, so far. Yet as an intelligent species, humanity is still very primitive and thus stands in need of upgrading. Given the rise of new technologies, transhumanists argue that we can—nay, should!—overcome our current evolutionary limitations in terms of physiology, emotion, cognition, and (at least sometimes) morality.

The meeting, as crucial as everyone believes it will be, should not occur. It is long past time for America to stop talking with the Chinese regime and start imposing costs for dangerous and other unacceptable behavior.

Talking sounds as if it should work but in fact has produced horrible results, for more than three decades. In short, dialogue enables China to buy time and often run out the clock.

Joe Biden shook hands with Xi Jinping that day in 2011 and the two vice presidents walked up a red carpet to the strains of their countries’ national anthems, until Biden paused unexpectedly before a Chinese official with a full head of hair. “If I had hair like yours, I’d be president,” he cracked, breaking the atmosphere of stately diplomacy.

President Joe Biden promised Saturday that the United States would work with a strategically vital coalition of southeast Asian nations, telling leaders that “we’re going to build a better future that we all want to see” in the region where U.S. rival China is also working to expand its influence.

How Meeting With Xi Can Redefine a Dangerous Rivalry

As Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Joe Biden sit down for a rare face-to-face meeting in Bali, Indonesia, on November 14, both leaders are confronting acute challenges at home. Despite his newly confirmed third term as China’s top leader, Xi faces far-reaching economic challenges. He is grappling with how and when to loosen the draconian zero-COVID policies that have angered Chinese citizens and battered investor confidence. Adding to the pressure are the country’s flagging growth and ambitious modernization targets, which have been further challenged by a new U.S. ban on advanced semiconductor exports to China. For his part, Biden faces a difficult domestic political environment, despite better than expected results in the U.S. midterms: with high inflation and potential loss of control of the House of Representatives, he now confronts the prospect of strengthened opposition to his administration and its policies.

In late October, Chinese leader Xi Jinping kicked off the Chinese Communist Party’s 20th Party Congress—a twice-a-decade, agenda-setting conclave of the party’s key leaders—with a report that touted China’s achievements and laid out a vision for the years ahead. In a move that was widely expected, Xi extended his own rule. But he surprised even the closest China watchers by unveiling a roster of leaders in which his confidants now occupy all the top positions within the party and state apparatus. Using direct and forceful language, Xi consolidated his hold on power and projected a strong and ambitious China to the world.

As Chinese leader Xi Jinping kicks off his third term as general secretary of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the economy that greets him today is vastly different than the one that saw him ascend to his role a decade ago. The decisions he makes during this new term risk reducing the Chinese economy by as much as five trillion dollars over the next five years, with potentially devastating effects for global growth.

Xi Jinping Brings Back Marxism

In 1978, Chinese leader Deng Xiaoping announced that his country would make a break with the past. After decades of political purges, economic autarky, and suffocating social control under Mao Zedong, Deng began stabilizing Chinese politics, removing bans on private enterprise and foreign investment and giving individuals greater freedom in their daily lives. This switch, termed “reform and opening,” led to pragmatic policies that improved Beijing’s relations with the West and lifted hundreds of millions of Chinese people from poverty. Although China remained authoritarian, Deng shared power with other senior party leaders—unlike Mao. And when Deng left office, his successors continued down much the same path.