Reflectii

Hugh Smith is a Visiting Fellow in the School of Humanities and Social Sciences, University of New South Wales at the Australian Defence Force Academy. He is the author of On Clausewitz: A Study of Military and Political Ideas, (Palgrave Macmillan: 2005).

However, Clausewitz offers a notion of grand strategy not in his theory of war but in his theory of the state.

As the affairs of states continue to evolve into a complex web of interdependence, cooperation, and competition, pressure mounts on states to effectively employ the tools of statecraft to attain their political objects. The contention of this essay is that Carl von Clausewitz implicitly defined grand strategy in his magnum opus, On War, as the sum of the tools of statecraft. Consequently, states should use this definition of grand strategy accommodated to present political conditions.

I. Introduction

From 27 December 2008 to 18 January 2009, the Israeli army carried out a military intervention in the Gaza Strip, the so-called Operation ‘Cast Lead’. During this period of time, Gaza was bombed from the sky and the sea and, in the second phase of the offensive, was invaded by land. Eventually, Palestinian casualties amounted approximately to more than 1400, most of them civilians. On the other hand, 13 Israeli citizens were killed, 10 soldiers and 3 civilians. 1 Operation ‘Cast Lead’ was judged as “the most violent, the most brutal and the bloodiest offensive against Palestinian civilians and their property since the beginning of Israeli occupation in 1967”. 2 The pattern of widespread destruction was clearly testified by the way the first attacks were carried out: the air bombing took place during rush hour, when the streets of Gaza were crowded with people. 3 On top of that, the suffering of the civilian population appears to be a distinctive feature of the Israel’s military activities throughout the entire operation. 4 These events constitute the background to the present thesis.

Key points

• Alliances are usually temporary arrangements among states to counter—or “balance” against—a specific common threat. The United States’ Cold War alliances, by contrast, have become seemingly permanent.
• States tend to balance power when they face a major threat. Bandwagoning, by contrast, is a particularly poor option for states with the capability to put up a fight. When threatened, states tend to join forces in alliances rather than surrender their national survival to the whims of a more powerful aggressor.
• Alliances, however, entail costs and risks. These include the dangers of being drawn into war through entanglement and entrapment, the deleterious effect on deterrence by allies that neglect their defense by “free-riding,” and the moral hazard produced by enabling allies to act like “reckless drivers.”
• Over time, the United States has shifted from a deep skepticism of “entangling alliances” to a global network of security dependents that are treated as an end in themselves, rather than a means to an end. This posture has left the United States overextended, while encouraging allies to neglect their own capabilities and preparedness.
• The United States can and should significantly reduce its alliance commitments, particularly in Europe and the Middle East, where threats to the U.S. are remote and local powers can balance adversaries. In Asia, the United States should act as a backstop to the regional balance of power rather than a vanguard.

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