Le champ de bataille qui n’existe pas : L’art russe de la tromperie, de l’Armée rouge à l’Ukraine

Le 17 janvier 2024, environ 150 troupes d’assaut russes disparaissaient sous le sol du champ de bataille au sud d’Avdiivka. La formation russe s’approchait du territoire au sud de la ville, en particulier la fortification ukrainienne de Tsarskaya Okhota (la Chasse du Tsar). Avancer vers la position par des approches classiques les aurait exposés à un champ de bataille sous la surveillance constante de drones. De plus, le terrain était fortement miné et les tentatives d’approches étaient reçues par les tirs de l’artillerie ukrainienne. L’armée ukrainienne avait installé des positions pour détecter et détruire les formations russes se dirigeant vers la ville.

Cold‑War Geopolitical Map Is Fraying: AI Is Rewriting Power Before Our Eyes

My core argument is straightforward: frameworks forged during the Cold War are not merely outdated—they can become actively dangerous as guides to a world being reshaped by artificial intelligence. Today’s strategists risk preparing to fight yesterday’s conflicts, while tomorrow’s power dynamics are being framed inside data centres—and, one day, potentially in outer space.

The Muslim Brotherhood Still Controls Jordan’s Rebranded Ummah Party

The political wing of the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood (MB) elected a new leader over the weekend. The Ummah Party elected Muath al-Khawaldeh as secretary general at its seventh general conference, defeating Ahmad al-Qatawneh in a closely contested race.

Khawaldeh served as the official spokesperson for the MB until Amman outlawed the group in 2022 and later banned it in April 2025. The ban followed the group’s involvement in a plot to procure drones and missiles and recruit operatives for terror activities inside and outside Jordan. The United States later designated the group as a Specially Designated Global Terrorist (SDGT) for providing material support to Hamas.

The Ummah Party has been on a rebranding kick since the ban of its parent organization. After changing its name in May from the Islamic Action Front, it sought to install new leadership to signal distance from the MB. But the changes have been largely cosmetic. Despite the changes, party officials have said that “opening up to a new name does not mean abandoning its identity.” The election of an MB official to lead the party demonstrates the MB’s continuing influence.

MB Figures Take Top Spots in ‘New’ Party’s Leadership

Al-Khawaldeh has held an official role in the organization since at least 2015, when he became its spokesperson. In 2024, he joined the Brotherhood’s executive council, where he oversaw several political portfolios, including the Palestine portfolio.

The Muslim Brotherhood’s foothold in Ummah is not limited to al-Khawaldeh. The party’s Shura Council, its main decision-making body, also includes MB officials and members. On the same day as al-Khawaldeh’s election, the party elected 21 members to fill vacant seats on the council, including several prominent MB figures: Hamzah Mansour, a former head of the MB’s Shura Council; Jamil Abu Baker, a former deputy leader of the MB and member of its executive council; Mustafa Saqer, a member of the MB’s executive council; and Aref Hamdan, a member of the MB’s Shura Council and a former member of its executive council.

The Party’s Rebranding Is Less Than Skin-Deep

Despite Amman banning the Muslim Brotherhood, it allowed its political wing to continue operating and remain represented in parliament. Jordan has historically sought to manage Islamist participation rather than eliminating it. The government used a 2022 law restricting religiously affiliated party names in an effort to push the Islamic Action Front to rebrand.

The party has not moved away from its Islamist leanings. Its new constitution continues to emphasize the promotion of Islamic values and culture, as well as mobilization against “colonial projects,” including Zionism, while framing the Palestinian cause as a shared Arab and Islamic responsibility.

Following his election, al-Khawaldeh’s remarks adopted a more inclusive, nationalist tone. “We extend our hands to the national community to serve our country, our nation, and the causes of the nation,” he said. He described the Palestinian cause as “a national cause par excellence,” and stressed the party’s continued support for the Palestinians’ “resistance.”

U.S. Should Investigate Whether the Party’s Ties to the Jordanian MB Warrant Sanctions

When Washington designated the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood in January, the designation did not extend to the movement’s leadership or to entities subordinate or affiliated with it, including its political wing and charities. The election of Muslim Brotherhood officials to senior positions in the Ummah Party shows personnel continuity between the two organizations.

Washington should review the relationship between the Ummah Party and the Jordanian Muslim Brotherhood, focusing on whether the two organizations share decision-making structures, including individuals serving in dual capacities. The United States should also investigate whether Brotherhood officials direct or influence party decisions, and whether the party provides funds or other material support to the designated organization.

Les propos scandaleux de Trump à l’ONU

Donald Trump vient de prononcer, depuis la tribune de l’Assemblée générale des Nations unies, un discours à l’adresse du reste du monde qui est sans doute le plus grandiloquent, ignorant, agressif et scandaleux de toute l’histoire de l’organisation, vieille de 81 ans.

Louis Althusser’s Assessment of Early Marx and the Epistemological Break

The Transition from Young Marx to Mature Marx

Louis Althusser’s interpretation of Karl Marx is marked by a fundamental distinction between the early writings of Marx and the theoretical work that emerged from the mid-1840s onward. In For Marx and Reading Capital, Althusser develops the argument that Marx’s intellectual development cannot be understood simply as a gradual accumulation of ideas. Instead, he identifies a decisive theoretical transformation, which he describes through the concept of an epistemological break.

L’Allemagne et la clause des États ennemis

La «clause des États ennemis» place l’Allemagne sous la tutelle des vainqueurs de la Seconde Guerre mondiale depuis 1945. Jamais abrogée, cette disposition souligne les limites actuelles de la souveraineté allemande.

Remarques préliminaires

Récemment, la «clause des États ennemis» de la Charte des Nations unies — tombée depuis longtemps dans l’oubli — est revenue sur le devant de la scène. Comme j’étudie cette question depuis plusieurs années déjà, je souhaiterais l’aborder une nouvelle fois dans l’article qui suit. La première partie de mon analyse a déjà été publiée en janvier 2024, notamment dans Overton Magazine le 18 janvier 2023, ainsi que dans mon ouvrage Niemand soll hungern, ohne zu frieren (Personne ne devrait souffrir de la faim ni du froid), paru en 2024. La deuxième partie est un extrait de mon ouvrage Geopolitik im Überblick. Deutschland-USA-EU-Russland (La géopolitique en bref : Allemagne-États-Unis-UE-Russie), publié en juillet 2025, dans lequel j’aborde, entre autres, l’importance de la «clause des États ennemis» pour la situation politique actuelle, qui devient de plus en plus tendue.

The Graveyard Of Eastern European Socialism – OpEd

Key Takeaways:

Shoe, then collapse. The author starts with Khrushchev’s 1960 “we will bury you” and says CMEA (Comecon) after 1945 locked Albania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, and Romania—later Mongolia, Cuba, Vietnam—into state ownership, banned private initiative, and replaced prices with planners’ guesses.
Political specialization, shoddy goods. Examples: Hungary’s Ikarus buses; East Germany’s Trabant/Wartburg vs. the Beetle; Poland’s coal peak of 200 million tons in 1979, then 1980 strikes, an 80% drop in CMEA coal exports in two years, and recession; Czechoslovakia’s uncompetitive machines; Bulgaria’s Balkancar forklifts sold in the West at a loss; Ceaușescu’s debt payoff via rationing; Soviet cars costing years of wages.
Cuba as the hangover. After joining CMEA in 1972, ~80% of Cuban exports went there; when the USSR fell, GDP dropped about a third. Author’s line: output without market prices and competition looks strong in GDP tables and fails when buyers can choose.

Where the Hell Is the Oil Money Trump Stole From the People of Venezuela?

At any other time in American history, it would end the career of somebody like Scott Bessent, our limited-intelligence Treasury Secretary. It came out yesterday when Illinois Congressman Sean Casten was questioning him about the “billions of dollars” that Trump keeps claiming America is “getting” from selling Venezuelan oil.

L’approche américaine de la gestion des conflits

L’approche américaine de la gestion des conflits se résume rarement à un simple soutien à l’une des parties. Même lorsque Washington est officiellement lié par une alliance, il maintient un canal de communication avec la partie adverse et s’efforce de préserver un équilibre afin qu’aucun des belligérants ne remporte une victoire totale ni ne subisse une catastrophe militaire. C’est une machine bien huilée, dont les rouages restent constants : la fourniture mesurée d’armes ; les autorisations et interdictions concernant leur utilisation ; les renseignements parfois partagés, parfois dissimulés ; les sanctions ; et les négociations secrètes avec l’adversaire dans le dos de l’allié, écrit le consultant politique Igor Dimitriev.

Le certificat de performance énergétique, ou l’arme de discrimination massive

De l’information du consommateur à la sanction du propriétaire : anatomie d’un glissement.
D’un droit à savoir, à un droit de punir

À l’origine, la certification énergétique des bâtiments est un pur produit du droit européen de la consommation. La directive 2002/91/CE, adoptée en décembre 2002, engage l’ensemble des États membres à se doter d’un système d’étiquetage énergétique des logements. Chaque pays la transpose à son rythme et selon ses propres modalités : en France, le diagnostic de performance énergétique (DPE) devient obligatoire dès 2006 pour les ventes, puis en 2007 pour les locations ; en Belgique, où la matière relève des Régions, le certificat PEB (performance énergétique des bâtiments) s’impose entre 2008 et 2011 selon qu’on se trouve à Bruxelles, en Wallonie ou en Flandre. Dans les deux cas, l’objectif affiché reste le même, et limité : corriger une asymétrie d’information.