Orientul Mijlociu

Après l’Irak, la Libye, Gaza, le Liban et la Syrie, le Pentagone attaque le Yémen

C’est une course contre la montre que le Pentagone a enclenchée avant que le président Donald Trump prenne ses fonctions. Après avoir détruit l’Iraq, le Libye, Gaza, le Liban et la Syrie, il lance ses hommes contre le Yémen. Ne prenez pas les apparences pour la réalité : officiellement Israël réplique aux bombardements d’Ansar Allah et les États-Unis aux attaques contre des navires occidentaux. En réalité, la destruction du Yémen n’est qu’une étape dans celle de l’ensemble des institutions politiques du Moyen-Orient élargi. Ne croyez pas ce que l’on vous dit sur l’inéluctabilité du choc des civilisations, tout ceci n’est qu’une mise en scène pour vous faire accepter l’inacceptable.

Depuis le 7 octobre 2023, nous assistons à un massacre des Palestiniens, à une invasion du Liban et de la Syrie. Depuis deux semaines, la guerre se déplace au Yémen.

Comme toujours, les médias internationaux segmentent les informations et nous expliquent chaque évènement par certains facteurs locaux, parfois exacts, parfois faux. Pendant que nous nous dépatouillons avec cette mixture, nous ne parvenons pas à percevoir que tous ces évènements appartiennent un plan plus large et qu’il n’est pas possible de vaincre sur un front si l’on ignore jusqu’où il s’étend.

Ce à quoi nous assistons est la troisième étape du plan élaboré par Donald Rumsfeld et l’amiral Arthur Cebrowski, en 20001. Dans la tradition états-unienne, que le général Smedley Butler avait résumé en 1933 dans son célèbre discours War Is a Racket (La Guerre est un racket)2, le Pentagone s’est donné pour mission de détruire toutes les institutions politiques du «Moyen-Orient élargi» (c’est-à-dire d’une zone allant de l’Algérie au Kazakhstan en passant par la Somalie, à l’exception d’Israël et éventuellement du Maroc).

Smedley Butler expliquait : «J’ai effectué 33 ans et 4 mois de service actif, et durant cette période, j’ai passé la plupart de mon temps en tant que gros bras pour le monde des affaires, pour Wall Street, et pour les banquiers. En bref, j’étais un racketteur, un gangster au service du capitalisme. J’ai aidé à sécuriser le Mexique, plus particulièrement la ville de Tampico, au profit des groupes pétroliers américains en 1914. J’ai aidé à faire de Haïti et de Cuba un endroit convenable pour que les hommes de la National City Bank puissent y faire des profits. J’ai aidé au viol d’une demi-douzaine de républiques d’Amérique centrale au bénéfice de Wall Street. J’ai aidé à purifier le Nicaragua au profit de la banque américaine Brown Brothers de 1902 à 1912. J’ai apporté la lumière en République dominicaine au profit des entreprises sucrières américaines en 1916. J’ai livré le Honduras aux entreprises fruitières américaines en 1903. En Chine, en 1927, j’ai aidé à ce que l’entreprise Standard Oil fasse ses affaires en paix».

Aujourd’hui, les forces armées états-uniennes, dont la mission n’est pas de défendre l’intégrité territoriale de leur pays, mais de défendre le capitalisme dans sa version la plus sombre (la défense de la patrie US incombe à la seule Garde nationale), détruisent l’Iraq depuis 2003, la Libye et la Syrie depuis 2011, le Yémen depuis 2014, et bientôt l’Iran.

Le docteur Henry Kissinger aurait dit : «It may be dangerous to be America’s enemy, but to be America’s friend is fatal» (Il est dangereux d’être un ennemi de l’Amérique, mais être son ami est fatal).3

C’est ce qu’avait dit Mouammar Kadhafi, au sommet de la Ligue arabe de 2008 : non seulement les États-Unis ne respectent pas leurs alliés, mais ce sont généralement leurs premières victimes. Il prenait l’exemple du président iraquien Saddam Hussein, ancien agent de la CIA, pendu après que son pays ait été vaincu, et mettait en garde ses confrères4. Il a pourtant par la suite fait alliance avec le président George Bush Jr. et démantelé son arsenal nucléaire. Il en fut chaleureusement remercié avant que son pays ne soit détruit et qu’il soit lynché.5

En 20026, l’Arabie saoudite était parvenue de justesse à échapper à la destruction. Mais ce n’est que partie remise. Dans ce jeu sinistre, chaque domino est appelé à tomber l’un après l’autre. Sans exception.

Selon l’Institut international de recherche sur la paix de Stockholm (Sipri), qui fait autorité en matière de commerce des armes, les États-Unis ont fourni 22 milliards de dollars d’armement à Israël pendant le massacre des Gazaouis. Ces armes comprennent, entre autres, 70 000 tonnes de bombes, c’est-à-dire autant que toutes celles utilisées pour détruire à la fois Dresde, Hambourg et Tokyo durant la Seconde Guerre mondiale.

Nous persistons à tenir Benyamin Netanyahou comme responsable du nettoyage ethnique à Gaza. Certes, c’est lui qui en a pris la responsabilité dans la lignée des déclarations de son maître Vladimir Ze’ev Jabotinsky, mais il n’est qu’un petit exécutant de la politique de Washington7. De même, nous pouvons accuser Netanyahou de mettre en œuvre le plan d’Oded Yinon8 au Liban et le plan «A Clean Break : A New Strategy for Securing the Realm» (Une rupture nette : une nouvelle stratégie pour sécuriser le royaume d’Israël)9 en Syrie. Tout cela est important, mais partiel.

Nous persistons à tenir les Britanniques pour responsables de la progression du sectarisme au Moyen-Orient. Certes, c’est eux qui, avec Lawrence d’Arabie, organisèrent la Grande révolte arabe de 1916-1918 qui mit au pouvoir les Séoud et la secte des Wahhabites en Arabie saoudite. Certes, ce sont eux qui, avec Lord Herbert Samuel, organisèrent la Grande révolte arabe de 1936-1939 en Palestine mandataire. Certes, ce sont eux qui, avec Sir James Craig, ont organisé le Printemps arabe des années 2011-2012 qui mit au pouvoir la Confrérie des Frères musulmans en Égypte. Et ce sont eux, encore, qui se tiennent aujourd’hui derrière Ahmad el-Chareh à Damas. Mais s’ils soutiennent systématiquement les guerres des États-Unis et en profitent toujours pour en tirer profit, ce ne sont pas eux qui mènent le jeu.

Nous voyons aujourd’hui la guerre se déplacer au Yémen. Ce pays est déjà profondément marqué par les opérations préliminaires qui s’y déroulent depuis 2014 : près de 400 000 morts, directs ou indirects. Officiellement Israël réplique aux bombardements d’Ansar Allah, officiellement les États-Unis et le Royaume-Uni répliquent, quant à eux, aux attaques contre des navires en mer Rouge. Mais Ansarullah ne fait que soutenir les civils gazaouis massacrés par les FDI, ce que nous devrions tous faire. Le Conseil de sécurité des Nations unies, réuni le 30 décembre à New York, n’a pu que se rendre à l’évidence : «Ce n’est que par une approche unie et coordonnée que nous pouvons espérer parvenir à la paix et à la sécurité pour tous les peuples du Yémen et de la région». Il n’y a qu’une seule guerre au Moyen-Orient élargi depuis 23 ans.

Le Pentagone avance à marche forcée, sachant que, le 20 janvier, Donald Trump sera réinvesti président des États-Unis. Or, c’est lui qui, le 21 mai 2017 à Riyad, a stoppé la «guerre sans fin», en exigeant de certains régimes arabes qu’ils cessent de soutenir les organisations terroristes affiliées au Pentagone10. Celle-ci avait dû s’interrompre jusqu’aux élections truquées de 2020.

Le découpage de la Syrie crée une frontière de facto entre Israël et la Turquie, garantissant une guerre plus large au Moyen-Orient

«Un plan pour les guider tous : La dissolution de la Syrie et de l’Irak (…) en zones ethniquement ou religieusement uniques (…) est l’objectif principal d’Israël (…) tandis que la dissolution de la puissance militaire de ces États sert d’objectif principal à court terme. La Syrie se désagrégera en fonction de sa structure ethnique et religieuse» ~ Oded Yinon1

Turkey Says Syrian Kurdish Fighters Will Be ‘Eliminated’

Turkey said Monday that it was “only a matter of time” before Syrian Kurdish fighters – seen by the West as essential in the fight against Islamic State jihadists – will be wiped out.

“Conditions in Syria have changed. We believe it’s only a matter of time before PKK/YPG is eliminated,” Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan told a news conference in the capital Ankara.

Islamic State

ISIS is an Islamic extremist terrorist organization controlling territory in Iraq and Syria, with limited territorial control in Libya and Nigeria. The group also operates or has affiliates in many parts of the world including Southeast Asia. On 29 June 2014, the group proclaimed itself to be a worldwide caliphate, with Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi being named its caliph, and renamed itself “Islamic State”.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) is a branch of Iran’s Armed Forces founded after 1979 Revolution on 22 April 1979 by order of Ayatollah Khomeini. Whereas the regular military (or Artesh) defends Iran‘s borders and maintains internal order, according to the Iranian constitution, the Revolutionary Guard (pasdaran) is intended to protect the country’s Islamic Republic system. The Revolutionary Guards state that their role in protecting the Islamic system is preventing foreign interference as well as coups by the military or “deviant movements”.

Nasrallah R.I.P – What really happened and why!

The general secretary of Hezbollah, Hassan Nasrallah, is gone. Decades of his reign over Hezbollah, his personal connection to the spiritual leader Khamenei, and his everlasting equations – all gone. He may be mourned by his followers, maybe even by Hezbollah experts, who have studied Nasrallah for years, but many are celebrating. Many more than you could imagine. The reason for it is much more complex, much more delicate and sensitive, and far more dangerous than meets the eye. This is unexpected, and mind-blowing but makes a lot of sense. Where did the intel come from? Who played along? Why would anyone double-cross the undisputed leader and “guardian of Lebanon” and the best friend of the Iranian homeland? To understand it fully, you have to know the basic facts.

The future of US foreign policy towards a new Syria

Analysis: How Trump’s team navigates Syria’s delicate transition into the post-Assad era could have profound repercussions for the country.

Once President-elect Donald Trump returns to the Oval Office on 20 January, his administration will need to make critical decisions concerning Syria.

Ahmed al-Sharaa, Syria’s New Leader: From Jihadist to Stateman?

  • On December 8, 2024, rebels led by Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham, under the leadership of Ahmed al-Sharaa, aka Abu Muhammad al-Julani, captured Damascus and overthrew the regime of Syrian President Bashar al-Assad after a 12-day military campaign, and al-Sharaa became the de facto ruler of Syria.[2]
  • Ahmed al-Sharaa’s ideology changed throughout his life, transforming him from a youth raised in an upper-middle class family in Syria to a jihadist activist in the ranks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State in Iraq, and eventually to one of the prominent leaders of the rebellion against the Assad regime in Syria. The transformations were reflected in his positions regarding the concept of jihad, his public disassociation from al-Qaeda and ISIS, and changes in his attire and image both in Syria and toward the international community.
  • This study deals with al-Sharaa, his life, the events that influenced him, and his beliefs and ideology as they evolved over more than two decades of activity within Salafi-jihadi movements and the struggle against the Syrian regime.
  • In ITIC assessment, the ambivalence in al-Sharaa’s positions and the changes in his conduct over the years were intended to ensure the survival of his organization but also indicated his ideological flexibility and political pragmatism. He is likely to continue presenting himself as a pragmatic figure to secure popular and international support for his emerging rule. However, it remains to be seen whether the ideological positions he developed as a Salafi-jihadi leader will be manifested in his role as the political leader of Syria, including his previously expressed aspiration to lead jihad to “liberate al-Aqsa.”

Biden Weighs Strikes on Iranian Nuclear Facilities Should Tehran Dash for Bomb

Latest Developments

  • U.S. National Security Advisor Presents Plans for Strikes on Iran: President Joe Biden’s national security advisor, Jake Sullivan, presented options last month for a U.S. attack on Iranian nuclear sites should the Islamic Republic push to develop a nuclear weapon prior to January 20. A report published by Axios on January 2 claimed the meeting included discussions of military “options and scenarios” but wasn’t prompted by new intelligence. Biden reportedly did not make any final decision on a course of action.
  • Weakened Iranian Proxies Present Opportune Moment: Some administration officials assess that the IDF’s military weakening of Iranian regional proxies like Hamas and Hezbollah, coupled with Israel’s October 26, 2024, airstrikes that targeted Iranian air defenses, may now present an opportune moment of vulnerability to strike the Islamic Republic’s nuclear facilities. Sullivan suggested at a recent conference that these battlefield losses have hastened Iran’s pursuit of nuclear breakout, saying that Iranian officials’ statements on altering the country’s nuclear doctrine have “changed in the last few months” and adding that America must be “vigilant.” Sullivan reportedly did not make an outright recommendation of action during his meeting with the president.
  • Iran’s Nuclear Activity Grew During Biden Tenure: Iran has drastically increased its nuclear activity during Biden’s time in office. International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) chief Rafael Grossi said in December that Iran now possesses enough 60 percent enriched uranium to build four nuclear devices should it enrich further to 90 percent weapons-grade, which its newly installed centrifuges can accomplish in a “matter of days.” In June, the United States and Israel assessed intelligence on “suspicious research” and computer modeling that Iranian scientists could have been conducting to decrease nuclear breakout time. The Islamic Republic additionally continued construction throughout 2024 on a new nuclear facility known as “Pickaxe Mountain,” buried deep underground near the existing Natanz nuclear site, which could serve as an advanced enrichment plant.

Threat Assessment of Post-Assad Syria’s Impact on Central Asia

Executive Summary

The destabilisation of Syria resulting from the Assad regime’s fall, further complicated by the repatriation of radicalised militants to Central Asia in the last years, constitutes a substantial security risk to the region.

Central Asian nationals’ involvement in various Syrian conflict factions and related reintegration efforts reveals the dual threats of terrorism and ideological radicalisation.

If not effectively managed, these developments could destabilise Central Asia and increase regional dependency on external actors for counterterrorism activities and security support, especially Russia, Turkey, and China.

This report synthesises international and local data, together with previous SpecialEurasia assessments, to analyse the consequences of Assad’s downfall in Syria and the potential contribution of Central Asian foreign fighters.
Background Information

Since 2015, significant numbers of Central Asian citizens have participated in the Syrian conflict, aligning themselves with entities such as the Islamic State, the Syrian opposition, pro-Turkish formations, and the Assad regime’s army.

While exact numbers remain indefinable, numerous combatants brought their families to the conflict zones. After the military defeats of significant radical groups, a repatriation of these individuals has begun. Several Central Asian states, including Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan, have launched state-sponsored repatriation and reintegration programmes to address this issue, while Turkmenistan has resisted such measures.

Radicalised individuals and their networks remain active post-return. Some have moved to other crisis zones, including Afghanistan, while others have resumed clandestine activities in their countries of origin. Prominent Central Asian militant factions, such as Katibat al-Tawhid wal-Jihad and Katiba Imam al-Bukhari, remain operational under the aegis of groups like Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, which in the last weeks led a military operation whose outcome what the conquest of different Syrian cities and the capital Damascus and the end at Assad’s regime.
Analysis

The collapse of the Soviet Union and the subsequent emergence of independent states in Central Asia created an environment conducive to the spread of radical interpretations of Islam. Although the Muslim factor did not play a central role in the dissolution of the USSR, the formation of new national entities provided fertile ground for propagators of alternative ideologies.

A notable development was the rise of the Mujaddid, reformers who rejected traditional Hanafi Islam in favour of the Hanbali school, acting as a catalyst for the radicalisation process across the region. This ideological shift has significantly influenced political and social dynamics in Central Asia, which have been further exacerbated by the role of extremist groups and the complex geopolitical challenges posed by them.

In Tajikistan, the civil war of the 1990s marked a pivotal moment, with the Islamic Revival Party of Tajikistan (IRPT) becoming a major player in the conflict. The IRPT’s ideological alignment with orthodox Islam highlighted the deep social and ethnic divisions within the country, which contributed to the prolonged conflict and the eventual uneasy peace. The IRPT’s legalisation, followed by its ban in 2015, underscores the difficulties inherent in controlling Islamic radicalism regionally.

In Uzbekistan, the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan (IMU) also acquired prominence, particularly after the 9/11 attacks, cementing its place as one of the leading Islamist groups in the world. Despite suffering heavy losses in Afghanistan, the IMU might be considered a threat to regional stability, further complicated by the activities of groups like Hizb ut-Tahrir.

In the last years, the Islamic State Wilayat Khorasan (ISKP) has emerged as the major threat for the regional stability since this terrorist group has spread jihadist propaganda in different Central Asian languages and has increased its presence and violent attacks in Afghanistan after the U.S. troops’ withdrawal from the country and the Taliban’s rise to power.

The presence of these radical organisations in Central Asia presents a complex challenge for regional security. Significantly, these groups have lacked monolithic functionality, frequently engaging in competition and advocating divergent ideologies. The fragmented nature of the threat landscape complicates the development of effective countermeasures, necessitating the implementation of tailored strategies for each distinct threat actor. The rivalry among these groups also diminishes the possibility of a unified response, with individual state actors often pursuing their own distinct counterterrorism approaches.

Central Asia, positioned as a strategic battleground for regional and international actors vying for influence, sees terrorism and radicalisation as central topics in the diplomatic discourse between the region’s governments and their external partners.

The repatriation of Central Asian citizens who participated in the Syrian conflict, combined with the freeing of radical Islamist prisoners from Syrian jails, poses a significant threat to regional stability.

As these individuals return home, often alongside their families, they introduce a volatile element into an already fragile security environment. Central Asian governments, in collaboration with international partners, have launched reintegration programmes, such as Uzbekistan’s ‘Mehr’ initiative and Kazakhstan’s ‘Zhusan’ programme, aimed at mitigating the risk posed by returnees. The rehabilitation of former jihadists, however, remains a contentious matter, raising concerns about the potential for unintended radicalisation.
Implications

  • Increased Risk of Radicalisation. The return of combatants and their associated ideological networks heightens the threat of terrorism and radicalisation in Central Asia. The reintegration of former jihadists poses challenges, as these individuals may continue to promote extremist ideologies within their communities.
  • Rising Dependency on External Powers. The heightened security risks could lead to an increased reliance on Russia, Turkey, or China for counterterrorism help, with significant economic and political costs for Central Asian states.
  • Cross-Border Spillover. The increasing radicalisation among individuals returning from conflict zones, alongside persistent security crises in adjacent areas, including Afghanistan, heightens the risk of cross-border terrorism, potentially destabilising Central Asia and complicating global counterterrorism strategies.