Orientul Mijlociu

The issue of normalization between Saudi Arabia and Israel has been a hot topic in the Middle East and the world, especially after the speeches of their respective leaders at the UN General Assembly. Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu in his address to UN General Assembly expressed his optimism about reaching a historic peace deal with the Saudis saying that it would create a new Middle East and enhance the prospects of peace with the Palestinians.

Israel’s security service said it had foiled a plot by five Israelis and Palestinians recruited for Iran to spy on Israeli politicians, including the far-right minister Itamar Ben-Gvir.

Two Israelis and three Palestinians were charged Thursday for their involvement in a “terror cell” operated by a person living in Jordan and working under Iranian instructions, Israel’s security agency, Shin Bet, said.

Turkish President Erdogan said Iran, which has opposed a land corridor linking Turkey to Azerbaijan, is now changing its tune.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan said Tuesday that Iran is now warming up to a joint Turkish-Azeri plans to set up a transport corridor connecting Turkey to Azerbaijan via Armenia.

The failures of the Israeli intelligence community in the Yom Kippur War in 1973 and of the American intelligence community on September 11, 2001 have been widely discussed. But there was another failure on the part of the Israeli intelligence community that merits attention: For over two years after the Oslo Accords signed on September 13, 1993, its experts failed to detect he threat posed by the Yasser Arafat’s Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The political climate that prevailed in Israel during the early 1990s had a negative effect on the assessment of the situation by the Israeli intelligence community, and there is a general lesson to be learned from these events. This article will first discuss the key failures of Israel’s intelligence community during these years, and then it will assess the role played in these failures by the contemporary political climate in Israel.

Overview

This past week no unusual incidents were reported along the Israel-Lebanon border. Hezbollah-affiliated media outlets reported on works carried out by Israel in the Ghajar region. The exposure of Iran and Hezbollah’s secret airport in south Lebanon continued to make headlines. Hezbollah has yet to address the issue directly.
Preliminary details have been published about the plan of Amos Hochstein, the American president’s coordinator for energy security, to resolve the issue of the land border between Israel and Lebanon.
Tensions continue in the Ein al-Hilweh refugee camp. Several meetings were held in an effort to calm the situation.
So far, there has been no solution to the presidential crisis in Lebanon nor is one on the horizon. Hezbollah and Amal continue to promote the candidacy of Suleiman Frangieh.

Tensions continue to rise along the Lebanese border, centered around the town of Ghajar, a disputed area that straddles Lebanon and Syrian territory captured and occupied by Israel in 1967.

What seems to be unfolding as a controlled escalation, deterring all sides from a more intense conflagration, could give way to all-out conflict, a situation most of the belligerents would like to avoid.

Iran is equipping its regional allies with sophisticated armed unmanned aerial systems (UAS) – drones – to help them project power on Tehran’s behalf against shared adversaries.

In June and July, Lebanese Hezbollah used Iran-supplied aerial surveillance drones to signal its opposition to Israel’s development of offshore natural gas fields in disputed waters.

Twenty years after the Iraq War began, scholarship on its causes can be usefully divided into the security school and the hegemony school. Security school scholars argue that the main reason the Bush administration decided to invade Iraq was to safeguard the United States against the conjoined threat of Iraq’s weapons of mass destruction and links to terrorist groups. Hegemony school scholars argue instead that the purpose of the Iraq War was to preserve and extend U.S. hegemony, including the spread of liberal democratic ideals. Debates between these camps inform broader disputes about the lessons of the Iraq War for the future of U.S. foreign policy and the analysis of other key questions about the war’s origins. Nonetheless, this binary may not be productive for Iraq War scholarship, and more attention to global and cultural factors would be a useful way to advance this field.