The rebels who’ve taken control of most of Syria haven’t published a budget or donor list. Their fundraising is opaque, and methods have changed wildly in the past decade.
Speculation swirls online and in conversations over which countries — Turkey, Arab and Gulf states, Ukraine, even the CIA or Israel — may have helped them with cash, weapons or training.
Sitting down to write my annual assessment on trends in terrorism in early 2025, I am struggling more than usual, fresh off the horrors of an Islamic State (ISIS)-inspired terrorist attack in New Orleans that killed fourteen people and injured dozens more. It is always a challenge to look beyond the immediate, to take a step back and weigh myriad factors and variables that impact which trends may accelerate and which may disappear.
The Hayat Tahrir al Sham (HTS)-led Syrian interim government announced that it thwarted an attempted Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) attack on a prominent Shia shrine outside Damascus. The Syrian Interior Ministry announced on January 11 the arrest of ISIS members who were planning a suicide bombing attack at the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[i] The ministry stated that the General Intelligence Directorate and General Security Administration coordinated to thwart the attack.[ii] ISIS has previously attacked Shia shrines in Syria, including in July 2023, when ISIS detonated a bomb near the Sayyidah Zeinab Shrine, killing six individuals and wounding 20 others.[iii] CTP-ISW cannot verify the interim government claim about the most recent attempted ISIS attack. If true, it would indicate that ISIS seeks to attack Shia targets to stoke sectarian tensions and delegitimize HTS as the primary ruling power in Syria. HTS announced recently that it has accepted responsibility for securing the Sayyidah Zeinab shrine.[iv]
Maps
The Institute for the Study of War (ISW) with support from the Critical Threats Project (CTP) at the American Enterprise Institute launched a new interactive map of Iran and the Middle East. The map depicts events in Iran that affect the stability of the Iranian regime, namely anti-regime protests and reported poisoning incidents. It also shows developments in Syria that jeopardize regional stability and pose threats to US forces and interests, including Iranian and Iranian-backed militia positions. ISW created each of these data layer events in accordance with ISW’s research methodology. Learn more about the map here.
Le Yémen, longtemps considéré comme une victime d’une agression extérieure, est en train de réécrire les règles d’engagement au Moyen-Orient. En ciblant Israël et les marines américaine et britannique avec une précision sans faille, Ansarullah a acculé ses adversaires à une situation ingagnable.
While the world’s eyes and attention were focused on the new Trump administration, the consequences of its policies after January 21 in Ukraine, and the raging fires of the Middle East, a new fire flared up and died down in the blink of an eye in Syria. A pending issue took suddenly an unexpected turn.
On December 8, 2024, the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime marked a historic and decisive turning point in the Syrian civil war, after nearly 14 years of conflict. This sudden defeat, despite the regime’s growing difficulties, was accelerated by the rapid and coordinated advance of rebel groups, in particular Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), which launched a determined offensive from Idlib province, in the northwest of the country. The offensive, which began on November 27, 2024, benefited from the strategic and military support of Turkey, a regional power directly involved in the Syrian dynamic for several years.
The fall of the Assad regime in Syria presents the international community with a range of complex challenges. First and foremost, there’s a significant risk of an ISIS resurgence. Over the past year, there’s been an uptick of ISIS attacks every single month—not only in Iraq but in Syria as well. While the new ISIS caliph stays silent, learning from his predecessors that speaking publicly is likely to lead to his demise, thousands of ISIS fighters remain in camps and prisons run by Syrian Kurds. Therefore, should internal strife break out between the various anti-Assad forces and continue to spill over into Kurdish-controlled areas, the risks of incidents like the Hasaka prison break in 2022 will rise. Reports of fighting between the Turkish-controlled Syrian National Army (SNA) and Kurdish forces under the umbrella of the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) in Manbij, as well as between Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) forces and the SDF in Deir al Zour, are therefore highly concerning. Continued clashes between the various groups is all the more likely since a significant part of Syria’s remaining oil and gas resources are located in areas under Kurdish control, something no power broker in Damascus will likely accept.
After the fall of Bashar Assad‘s regime in Syria, the incoming Trump administration faces a complex set of challenges. Despite President-elect Donald Trump’s promise to reduce U.S. involvement overseas, completely disengaging from Syria may not be a viable option.
The interim government led by Hayat Tahrir al Sham has shown little intention of quickly transitioning to an elected government. Instead, it has proposed a lengthy four-year timeline, signaling Abu Mohammad al Jolani’s ambition to maintain power. Jolani, a U.S.-designated terrorist with past ties to al Qaida and the Islamic State group, has claimed he intends to build an inclusive and tolerant government. However, his actions tell a different story. Early moves by HTS suggest a commitment to implementing Sharia law, introducing an Islamist curriculum for children, and appointing officials with ties to extremist ideologies.
President Recep Tayyip Erdogan is making no effort to disguise his ambitions. In a bold declaration following the first meeting of Turkey’s cabinet, Erdogan made it clear that he intends to target the U.S.-backed Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF).
His message to Washington was unequivocal:
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