Orientul Mijlociu

ISIS has been witnessing a new surge in its activity inside Syria since the change of the former regime in December 2024, taking advantage of the fragility of the transitional authority and the overlap of its structure with different factions. Despite intense international strikes, the group has been able to carry out qualitative attacks and has begun to reposition, amid security and political complications facing the interim government. The scene is becoming increasingly dangerous with the emergence of more radicalized groups and the erosion of divides between regular forces and militant militants. On the other hand, the international community linked the support of the new government to its seriousness in combating terrorism and extremism, which poses a structural challenge to its security institutions and internal alliances.

The Israeli-American track is undergoing a qualitative shift with the announcement of US envoy Steve Whittoff of a “comprehensive deal” to stop the war in Gaza, including the release of hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, reconstruction, and the imposition of an international administration led by Washington, in a unilateral path that deviates Hamas from any negotiating role. The deal coincides with an Israeli plan to occupy the Gaza Strip in stages, and impose security control and alternative civilian administration, and this approach aims to impose the “day after” the war as a fait accompli serving Israeli goals.

I renew my sincere appeal to our Arab Shiite brothers: Let your belonging to your Arab nation be, and let your loyalty to your homeland be advanced over any partisan or external loyalty. Face the current challenges in a spirit of courage and responsibility, it is time to say: Enough. Enough successive losses that have exhausted you and exhausted your homelands. Revisit honestly, and stay away from a project that has brought you and your partners back to the country nothing but blood, destruction and woes.

Israeli tanks thrust closer to the heart of Gaza City on Monday, pressing a ground offensive hours before talks between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a diplomatic breakthrough in a bid to end the war.

After nearly two years of failed diplomatic efforts, Washington presented a 21-point plan to Arab and Muslim states last week that calls for a permanent ceasefire and the release of remaining hostages.

The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 revealed the ongoing significance of multiple foreign fighter organizations in Syria, groups that proved instrumental in Hayat Tahir al-Sham’s (HTS) campaign for Damascus. Among them were two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups that originated in Central Asia: the Imam Bukhari Battalion (Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, KIB) and the Tavhid and Jihad Battalion (Katibat Tavhid va Jihod, KTJ). Smaller numbers of Uzbeks and other Central Asians joined Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan, which also supported HTS.1 a HTS voiced no objections as these organizations’ leaders gave media interviews in Damascus, celebrating their victory, and posted images of their involvement across dozens of social media channels. These Uzbek-led groups are among some 10,000 fighters, many from Russia and China, who lent critical support to HTS for over a decade.2 In spring 2025, HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa proposed integrating such foreign fighters into the new Syrian military, a process that has now begun.3 Yet, little is known about these entities, why and how they have operated in Syria for so long, or what role they might play in the post-Assad Syria.

Abstract: Al-Qaida has evolved considerably over the past four decades. Today, it is no longer a hierarchical organization with charismatic leadership, but rather a decentralized network of franchise groups dispersed throughout Africa, the Middle East, South Asia, and beyond. The group has not conducted spectacular external operations (EXOPS) for many years, but instead has been focused on patiently rebuilding, dedicating its resources and manpower to forging relationships with regional affiliates and championing their grievances, which are often locally focused. Al-Qaida Central, including its senior leadership, has been attenuated, but the organization’s branches in Somalia and the Sahel are gaining momentum, and there is growing concern that al-Qaida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) is also looking to rebound. All of this is occurring against a backdrop of decline in the overall tempo of Western counterterrorism efforts, signaling the end of more than two decades of the Global War on Terrorism. Even in its diminished form, 24 years after the 9/11 attacks, al-Qaida and its global network of affiliates pose a serious latent security threat, including to the West, which takes these groups for granted at its own peril.

Syria’s transitional government is cracking down on the production of Captagon — an illicit synthetic stimulant that flourished under the sponsorship of the Bashar al-Assad regime until its fall in December. But production and trade of the drug are continuing, particularly in parts of Syria not yet under the control of the new administration.

Environ 50 000 anciens membres de l’État islamique (EI) et leurs familles sont actuellement détenus dans 27 prisons et centres de détention à travers le Nord-Est de la Syrie. Ils ont été les théâtres, au fil des années, de tentatives d’évasion, dont certaines ont abouti à la libération de djihadistes qui sont ensuite venus renforcer les rangs du groupe terroriste.

The Lebanese government’s efforts to secure a monopoly over weapons are advancing, but can it ignore Iran?

The decision of the Lebanese government on August 5* to officially endorse the state’s monopoly over weapons was an important milestone. Yet it was also incomplete, because it didn’t really address a dimension that has been largely overlooked in public statements, namely that, today, Hezbollah’s weapons are effectively controlled by Iran.

Knitting law and politics together into a constitution that serves as a repository of hard-won agreements is a matter of trust and bargaining, rather than foresight. But Syria’s will need both.

In March 2025, interim Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa issued a constitutional declaration to govern the country’s transitional phase. The goals inferred were clear: to assure Syrians that order and justice would be restored, that their rights would be recognized, and that the Syrian president would guide the country away from its dark experience with oppressive dictatorship.