In the eyes of Hamas and other Palestinian terror groups, the plan is nothing but another temporary ceasefire, not different than previous ones reached between Israel and Hamas over the past two decades.
Those who think that Hamas, by agreeing to Trump’s “peace plan,” has abandoned its desire to eliminate Israel or has softened its position toward Israel are unfortunately dead wrong.
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The Israel Defense Forces (IDF) killed Hezbollah’s “de facto chief of staff” and senior commander Haitham Ali Tabatabai in Beirut’s southern suburbs on November 23.[1] Tabatabai’s death will likely disrupt Hezbollah’s reconstitution for a short period because of Tabatabai’s significant experience at many echelons of command in fighting against Israel and engaging with Hezbollah’s Syrian partners. His experience at many echelons of command and in Syria would enable him to intimately understand the assets that Hezbollah needed to replace after the Fall 2024 Israeli campaign in Lebanon to defend southern Lebanon against renewed Israeli operations. His experience in Syria would have also allowed him to build relationships with many cross-border smugglers and other actors that can support Hezbollah’s reconstitution. The IDF stated that it killed Tabatabai in order to prevent Hezbollah’s reconstitution.[2] Tabatabai was considered one of Hezbollah’s three highest-ranking military officials after the Israel-Hezbollah conflict in Fall 2024, and he has reportedly led Hezbollah‘s efforts to reconstitute after the war.[3] Tabatabai has held numerous senior positions within Hezbollah’s military command since the group’s founding in 1982.[4] Tabatabai helped establish Hezbollah’s Radwan Force and reportedly commanded Hezbollah’s Southern Front in Fall 2024 after Israel killed the previous commander.[5] Tabatabai helped train Hezbollah’s partners in Syria and Yemen and commanded Hezbollah special forces in both countries.[6] Tabatabai would have been able to use his experience planning and leading defensive operations against Israel in southern Lebanon, in addition to his engagement with Syrian partners and knowledge of Lebanon-Syria supply lines, to plan Hezbollah’s reconstitution and any future attacks against Israel.[7]
Iranian-backed political parties are preparing to form the next Iraqi federal government after winning over a third of the seats in the recent parliamentary elections. These parties may exclude or at least weaken Prime Minister Mohammad Shia al Sudani, despite his coalition winning the plurality of seats. Sudani could try to obstruct the Iranian-backed parties, but will face considerable challenges, especially given their readiness to use political tools and force to consolidate their political influence. If the parties succeed in excluding or weakening Sudani, they may be further empowered to dominate Iraq and support Iranian interests within the country.
The rapidly evolving dynamics of global power and security have transformed Eurasia into a critical arena of competition and cooperation. The continent, spanning from the Atlantic to the Pacific, has become a focal point for major geopolitical shifts, particularly amid the waning dominance of Western-centric institutions and the rise of new regional powers. Within this context, the Islamic Republic of Iran articulates a distinct and comprehensive vision of Eurasian security—one that emphasises balance, sovereignty, inclusivity, and multilateral cooperation.
In addition to providing discounted crude of a quality desired by American refiners, the resumption of oil flows via the ITP is already showing promise of furthering U.S. policy toward partners and adversaries alike.
On November 24—two months after the reopening of the Iraq-Turkey Pipeline (ITP)—an oil tanker laden with crude from the Kurdistan Region of Iraq (KRI) and sailing from the Turkish port of Ceyhan discharged at the Louisiana Offshore Oil Port terminal. Although U.S. oil imports are generally driven by private trade and pricing dynamics, this particular shipment would not have been possible without a U.S.-facilitated interim deal in September under which Baghdad, KRI officials in Erbil, and international oil companies (IOCs) operating in northern Iraq agreed to reopen the ITP after a halt of more than two years.
The warning came a month after sources in the Northern Command told Walla that Israel was seeing an increased threat from the country.
US Envoy Tom Barrack warned Baghdad not to involve itself in Israel’s war against Hezbollah, telling officials the country may face Israeli strikes if they or Iran-backed militias there intervened, the Saudi state-run al Hadath news outlet reported on Monday.
In the shadow of Turkey’s growing threat to Israel and the West, the Israeli Knesset yesterday held a historic floor debate on confronting this imminent danger. The action followed an urgent motion submitted by MK Ohad Tal (Religious Zionism), co-chair of the Knesset Eastern Mediterranean Cooperation Caucus.
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Some Syrian General Security Service (GSS) units are improving their counter-insurgency approach in rural minority areas by relying on relationships with locals. The GSS arrested a large Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC)-affiliated Assadist cell in Sheikh Bader, Tartous Province, on November 12.[1] Independent Syria researcher Gregory Waters reported on November 21 that locals originally tipped off the GSS to the cell’s presence at their compound in Sheikh Bader.[2] The two GSS officers who led the investigation said that the local tip-off and local community support were critical to the GSS’s dismantlement of the Assadist cell and to stability in the surrounding area.[3]
Washington and its allies are waiting for Beirut to acknowledge the difficult but unavoidable truth: that war will resume unless serious action is taken to target all the pillars of Hezbollah’s power, bolster Shia political alternatives, and otherwise satisfy the ceasefire’s most important requirement: disarming the group.