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Vladimir Putin said that the emergence of the Oreshnik missile has reduced the need to use nuclear weapons. The Oreshnik is a new Russian medium-range ballistic missile, first used on the night of November 20-21, 2024, against the Ukrainian city of Dnepr. The missile is notable for its warhead, which can hit multiple targets at once — previously, such capabilities were associated exclusively with nuclear weapons delivery systems. On the other hand, the missile is extremely inaccurate, and there is no evidence of serious damage in Dnepr. These missiles themselves are unlikely to have any impact on the course of the war in Ukraine (they are too inaccurate and expensive), but due to their multiple warheads, they can quickly overload NATO’s missile defense system. Thus, the very emergence of this type of weapon forces a revision of the West’s defense strategy, says Fabian Hoffman, a researcher in nuclear and missile security, as well as defense policy at the University of Oslo (Norway).

On the night of November 20-21, 2024, Russia launched a missile strike on the Ukrainian city of Dnepr. The attack stood out from hundreds of other strikes with quasi- and aeroballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and kamikaze drones: it was the first to use the Oreshnik, a new medium- or intermediate-range ballistic missile .

The Oreshnik stands out among Russia’s other weapons, and not just because of its technical features. The missile system poses a potential threat to NATO’s defense in Europe. In addition, studying the Oreshnik’s specific features helps us understand the prospects for arms control in Russia’s relations with the West.

What is known about “Oreshnik”?
This is a new missile system that is based on the Russian RS-26 Rubezh (SS-X-31). The missile was developed from 2008 to 2018, but the project was frozen before the system was fully operational.

Shortly after the Russian strike on the city of Dnepr, U.S. intelligence confirmed that the Oreshnik was indeed based on the RS-26. However, this was obvious even without official confirmation. The Russian defense industry does not have the resources to build a new missile from scratch. The missile sector is already operating at maximum capacity. Russia simply does not have the capacity to develop, test, and launch an entirely new system. Unless the country suddenly has additional resources or new technologies (which is unlikely), the Oreshnik is almost certainly based on an existing missile.

According to the Ukrainian side, the development of the RS-26 has been resumed under the new name “Kedr”. This is probably the same missile as the “Oreshnik”. Like the RS-26, the “Oreshnik” is most likely a solid-fuel two-stage missile, with its stages identical to the first two stages of the RS-24 Yars intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM).

Although Putin described the Oreshnik as a medium-range ballistic missile system (1,000–3,000 km), it is most likely an intermediate-range missile (3,000–5,500 km). Theoretically, the missile could hit targets at the lower end of intercontinental range (over 5,500 km), depending on the flight path and the weight of the warhead.

One of the main features of the Oreshnik is its non-nuclear multiple warhead with independently targetable units (MIRV). Such a warhead allows hitting several targets at once with a single missile strike.

This technology is typical for nuclear ICBMs, but the Oreshnik is the first and so far only confirmed example of a ballistic missile with a non-nuclear MIRV. There is unconfirmed information that some Iranian medium-range missiles, such as the Khorramshahr, may also be equipped with such warheads.

The exact configuration of the Oreshnik warhead is unknown. Based on photographs and reports from the impact site, the missile carries six non-nuclear warheads, more than the RS-26, which could only carry four. It is unclear whether this number was achieved by increasing the missile’s overall throw weight or by reducing the size and weight of the individual warheads.

According to GUR reports , each of the Oreshnik warheads consists of six charges, the design of which remains unknown. However, it can be stated with a high degree of certainty that the charges do not contain explosives. Due to the high speed of the falling ammunition – up to 3-4 km per second – the most modern altitude sensors and fuses would be required for timely detonation, and Russia does not have such technologies. Detonation immediately upon impact of the ammunition on the target would be ineffective, since the high final speed of the charges would lead to the destruction of the explosives before they had time to detonate.

Thus, it is very likely that the detachable parts of the Oreshnik carry kinetic ammunition. These shells do not contain either a nuclear or conventional charge, and the destructive effect is achieved only due to their weight. This solution seems quite primitive, but nevertheless indicates that Russia has managed to develop a new warhead for the Oreshnik, unlike other missile systems in service.

Despite the novelty of the technology, the destructive power of the Oreshnik remains low for most types of targets, mainly due to its insufficient accuracy. The RS-26, on which the Oreshnik is based, was originally developed for nuclear warheads. Such weapons usually do not require high accuracy, since the enormous power of a nuclear charge compensates for possible misses. The exception is systems for pinpoint counter-strikes, but the RS-26 probably had other tasks.

If a nuclear missile system is retooled to carry non-nuclear warheads without significantly improving its accuracy, its effectiveness is greatly reduced. This appears to be what happened to the Oreshnik, which failed to cause critical damage to any of the targets in the Dnieper.

“Oreshnik” did not cause critical damage to any of the targets in the city of Dnepr
Most likely, the Kremlin understood even before the launch of Oreshnik that the strike would cause minimal damage. The attack was more symbolic in nature — as a response to Ukraine’s permission to attack targets in Russia with Western missiles. After the strike on the Dnieper, images of a warhead with several charges descending on different targets were distributed online. Previously, such illustrations were associated exclusively with nuclear weapons. This was an act of intimidation on the part of Russia: a non-nuclear munition was used in the strike on the Dnieper, but nuclear weapons could also be used in future attacks.

The Oreshnik flight profile is noticeably different from other Russian conventional missiles. The high terminal velocity of the blocks indicates that the missile followed a high and steep arc. This is consistent with its limited range and the presumed location of the launcher at the Kapustin Yar test site, about 800 km from Ukraine. The Oreshnik trajectory also explains why the Ukrainian side initially assumed that the strike was carried out by an ICBM – such missiles usually leave the atmosphere during flight.

The 9M723 Iskander-M quasi-ballistic missiles and the Kinzhal aeroballistic missiles , widely used by Russia during the war, differ from the Oreshnik in that they have a lower trajectory altitude—they remain within the atmosphere for most or all of their flight. During the descent phase, they slow to subsonic speeds. However, in the final phase, just before impact, both of these systems are likely to be significantly more maneuverable than the Oreshnik detachable pods, which most likely do not have the engines or aerodynamic surfaces necessary for effective maneuvering.

In terms of actual combat, the use of the Oreshnik is unlikely to have a major impact on the course of the war in Ukraine. Russia has more reliable missile systems that are more accurate and can carry larger munitions to deliver critical strikes on important targets. However, the Oreshnik can still cause significant damage to civilian targets, such as city centers or residential complexes. In this context, the attack likely had another purpose: to show the Ukrainian authorities and citizens that Russia has new weapons that can be used against civilian populations.

Challenge for NATO missile defense
Despite the relative simplicity of the device, the Oreshnik poses a challenge to the NATO missile defense system. Systems widely used in the West, in particular the MIM-104 Patriot and SAMP/T, provide only limited protection against this missile due to its specific flight profile. Unlike shorter-range ballistic missiles, the Oreshnik can attack targets from high altitudes and with high terminal velocity. Neither the Patriot nor the SAMP/T are optimized to intercept strikes of this type. The key word here is optimized. That is, these systems can still provide some protection, but their effectiveness in this case is significantly lower.

To protect against the Oreshnik and similar weapons, other types of missile defense systems are needed that are capable of intercepting missiles higher in the atmosphere or beyond it.

Examples include the American RIM-161 Standard Missile 3 (SM-3), which can be launched from ships or from land-based Aegis Ashore platforms, and the interceptor missiles in the THAAD system , which is not yet deployed in Europe. Another missile defense system that could counter the Oreshnik is the Israeli-American Arrow 3 (Hetz-3), which is expected to be fully operational in Germany by the end of 2025.

Given that the Oreshnik warhead, as already mentioned, has limited maneuvering capabilities, intercepting it is relatively simple, especially in terms of guiding the kinetic interceptor missile to the target. The difficulty is the number of charges delivered by one missile, even if they are relatively primitive in design. The need to intercept a large number of targets could lead to a rapid depletion of the resources of NATO’s missile defense systems.

There are two Aegis Ashore ground platforms in Europe equipped with SM-3 missiles. One is deployed in Deveselu, Romania and has been operational since 2012. The other has been operational in Redzikowo, Poland, since early 2024. Both platforms are equipped with three Mk41 launchers, each with eight launch cells. In total, there are 24 missiles per platform. Before the start of the full-scale war in Ukraine, US and NATO doctrine envisaged the use of three interceptor missiles for each enemy ballistic missile. In this case, the probability of successful interception exceeds 90%.

The need to intercept a large number of targets could quickly deplete NATO’s missile defense resources.
Even if only two SM-3 missiles are used to intercept each of the six Oreshnik warheads (which may be justifiable given the low maneuverability of the ballistic missile pods and the proven effectiveness of the American defense system in combat), both Aegis Ashore platforms will be able to intercept a maximum of 12 targets before the launchers need to reload.

Thus, theoretically, just four Oreshniks could overload the capabilities of the European Aegis Ashore platforms, exhausting their land-based arsenal. The SM-3 does not have the range to destroy the missile before the warheads separate from the main stage.

However, Moscow’s ability to deploy the Oreshniks is likely very limited. The Russian missile industry is operating at the limit of its production capacity. Most likely, all the Oreshniks in the Russian arsenal are not new products, but modified RS-26s. This means that until new Oreshniks are produced, Russia’s capabilities will depend on the number of RS-26s it has in stock. It is difficult to give an exact estimate, but it can be assumed that the stockpile does not exceed 20-30 units, and perhaps even less.

Moscow’s ability to deploy the Oreshniks is likely very limited.
Therefore, the main ballistic threat from Russia still comes from missiles operating within the atmosphere – Iskanders and Kinzhals. Specialized production lines have been created for such missiles, and they are produced in significant quantities. Consequently, drastic changes in NATO’s missile defense plans seem neither necessary nor justified.

Moreover, there are arguments for ignoring the Oreshnik threat altogether. The missile’s inaccuracy, coupled with the low lethality of its kinetic munitions, means that Russia would need a fair amount of luck to deliver sufficiently destructive strikes on sufficiently important targets. In this case, the optimal strategy might be to ignore Oreshnik launches in order to conserve missile defense resources for more significant targets. This primarily concerns non-strategic nuclear missiles that could be used in the initial phases of a NATO-Russia war after the nuclear escalation threshold has been crossed.

But military prudence rather suggests the opposite approach. Moreover, the Oreshnik design allows for dual use: theoretically, any missile launched could carry a nuclear warhead and should be considered a significant target. In practice, understanding whether an Oreshnik carries nuclear warheads can provide context for the conflict – the stage and intensity of its escalation – but complete certainty is impossible. Therefore, military prudence again requires destroying most, if not all, Oreshniks.

As a result, while the Oreshnik is far from the most dangerous ballistic missile Russia has, it could destabilize NATO missile defenses by exhausting sophisticated and expensive interceptor systems early in a conflict. Overreaction seems counterproductive, but the challenge cannot be ignored entirely.

Finally, the Oreshnik threat shows that defensive measures alone are not enough to build an effective missile defense. It is also necessary to develop offensive capabilities so that a missile threat can be neutralized before it is actually launched. This could include strikes on launchers, missile factories, or command posts. This approach is more effective than relying on expensive missile defense systems, which do not always justify the cost even if the targets are successfully neutralized.

To defend against the “Nut” it is necessary to develop offensive capabilities as well.
In 2026, the United States will begin fielding several medium-range missile systems to a “multi-domain task force” in Germany. These include a land-based version of the Tomahawk cruise missile called the Mid-Range Capability (MRC) with a range of up to 1,600 km, a land-based aeroballistic missile called the Precision-Strike Missile (PrSM) with a range of up to 500 km, and a hypersonic system called the Dark Eagle, which has an expected range of up to 3,000 km. These systems could theoretically be used to attack the Oreshnikov launchers, but none are optimized to combat the Russian medium-range missile threat.

Due to its low speed, the MRC is ineffective against fast-moving targets such as mobile launchers. The PrSM is theoretically better suited for this task, but the base version of the missile lacks the necessary range. The Dark Eagle, despite its high speed and sufficient range, is too expensive at $40 million per launch.

The number of such missiles is limited, so they will likely be used for more significant purposes than individual launchers. However, systems like the MRC and Dark Eagle could prove useful in attacking fixed missile infrastructure such as production facilities or command posts.

Ideally, NATO would have its own medium- and intermediate-range missile system capable of neutralizing the Oreshniks, as well as a wider range of targets. It has been reported that France may consider developing a conventional ballistic missile with a range of about 1,000 km, but no concrete steps have been taken in this direction. The Oreshnik threat exposed a weakness in NATO’s deterrence system, and this problem remains relevant.

The strike by “Oreshnik” according to agreements
Beyond the immediate military threat, Russia’s development of the Oreshnik proved that the Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty was effectively null and void long before the United States withdrew from it under the Trump administration in 2019.

The treaty, signed by the US and the USSR in 1987, eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with a range of 500 to 5,500 km and their launchers, and banned their deployment. The document provided both sides with comprehensive access for on-site inspections to confirm the absence of prohibited weapons. Before its final termination, the INF Treaty was considered one of the most successful arms control agreements, as it provided not only for monitoring but also for the complete elimination of an entire class of weapons.

How is Oreshnik related to the defunct treaty? As already mentioned, the new missile was developed based on the frozen RS-26 project. Many characteristics of both systems are the same, including throw weight, range and functionality. If Oreshnik is classified as a medium- or intermediate-range missile, then it is very likely that the RS-26 also primarily belongs to this category, and not to a strategic ICBM, as the Russian side claimed during the first tests of the missile. It is highly likely that Oreshnik’s predecessor fell under the restrictions established by the INF Treaty. That is, the development of the RS-26 itself was a violation of the agreements.

The very development of the missile, the predecessor of the Oreshnik, was a violation of agreements between Russia and the West
To be fair, the treaty did not directly prohibit the development of intermediate-range missiles, although such actions would clearly be contrary to the spirit of the agreement.

According to paragraph 4 of Article 7 of the INF Treaty, the range of a land-based ballistic missile is defined as “the maximum distance at which it has been tested.” In May 2012, the RS-26 was tested at a range of 5,800 km – this is the distance of intercontinental ballistic missiles, so formally the treaty was not violated. However, even then the American side expressed dissatisfaction with this fact. According to the US, Russia tested the RS-26 as an ICBM in order to circumvent the restrictions provided for by the agreement.

The events in Dnepr in November confirmed these fears. If the development of the RS-26 had not been frozen, but had been brought to full operational readiness of the missile, Russia would have acquired a land-based medium- or intermediate-range missile system, which would have been a clear violation of its obligations under the INF Treaty.

The Future of Arms Control in NATO and Russia
The vague definition of the range of land-based ballistic missiles in the INF Treaty allowed Russia to circumvent the treaty without clearly violating it. However, there were more obvious violations on the Russian side, such as the 9M729 Novator land-based cruise missile, which, according to the US, had a range of more than 500 km.

The bigger problem is that such documents often have trouble translating complex technological concepts into political agreements. The INF Treaty may have been better than many similar treaties because of its sophisticated verification system, but it left loopholes that could be used to circumvent the restrictions. But arms control treaties must be built on mutual trust—no signatory should take advantage of such loopholes, even in the absence of clear violations.

The Oreshnik, which is clearly similar to the RS-26, is further evidence that, since at least the mid-2000s, Russia has ceased to view the INF Treaty as an arms control instrument. Instead, it has exploited loopholes in the treaty’s language to develop new missile systems while NATO remains constrained by its terms.

Since the mid-2000s, Russia has exploited loopholes in NATO treaties to develop new missile systems.
Why should NATO consider returning to arms control agreements with Russia, given this history? Of course, it is impossible to predict how NATO-Russia relations will develop in the coming years, or whether hostility will remain the dominant feature of the relationship. Germany, which found itself a pariah state after World War II in 1945, was reintegrated into the Western alliance by 1955, albeit only in the western part of the country, after extensive reforms and a great deal of effort to build a democratic system.

In any case, rebuilding the trust needed to conclude arms control agreements will likely take decades, as it did during the Cold War. Moreover, it will require a fundamental change in the Russian leadership’s approach to international agreements: not exploiting loopholes in treaty language and adhering to the principle of mutual benefit.