Conflict and counterterrorism are two sides of the same coin, and silos between the two must be broken down to reduce terrorism.
The ongoing Russian invasion of Ukraine overshadowed the latest step taken in Washington to turn the page on 20 years of a costly, largely military-driven approach to addressing conflicts.
Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has turned into the largest testing ground for ballistic and cruise missiles in modern warfare. According to the latest figures from a senior U.S. official as of April 29, 2022, Russia had launched more than 1,950 missiles — far more than the 955 cruise missile strikes U.S. forces carried out during the invasion of Iraq in 2003.
Since late September 2021, when Iran-Azerbaijan relations hit a low point, Tehran and Baku have engaged in a process of de-escalation. Much of the focus is on expanding economic cooperation and advancing plans to establish pan-regional transportation links, such as the North-South railroad corridor connecting India to Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan.
As the U.S. administration considers whether to remove Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps as a foreign terrorist organization, understanding its nature, development, and ideology is essential to making an informed decision. There is much about it that differentiates it from a conventional armed force. One fundamental aspect of its ideology that until now has been overlooked is the doctrine of Mahdism.
Western leaders shrugged it off when, in 2016, Erdoğan said in plain language that Turkey did not need to join the European Union “at all costs” and could instead become part of a security bloc dominated by China, Russia and Central Asian nations.
The Greek government is expected to raise with its EU partners Ankara’s decision not to join western sanctions against Russia, questioning Turkey’s narrative of being a neutral broker, EURACTIV has learned.
“It’s inconceivable that Turkey has managed to escape western sanctions against Russia,” a source close to the matter told EURACTIV Greece.
As it continues its unprovoked invasion of Ukraine, Russia finds itself facing growing international isolation, including an expanding list of sanctions.
While not exactly a pariah nation, Russia can now count on few allies. Other nations have remained essentially neutral, including China, the Persian Gulf monarchies, and Turkey.
Adversaries of Yemen’s Huthi rebels say they will never negotiate in good faith. Others think they might, given the right mix of incentives. With a nationwide truce in place, diplomats should give the latter hypothesis a shot.
In the fall of 2012, as Syria plunged into civil war and the Eurozone crisis generated panic across global markets, a parliamentary election in Ukraine signaled trouble ahead to those who were paying attention. The results that trickled out on Oct. 28, 2012, indicated that then-President Viktor Yanukovych’s Party of Regions had secured a strong position through dubious constitutional maneuvers and ballot manipulation.
The response of the Gulf Arab states to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine has been somewhat revealing of the depth of fissures between the United States and its Gulf allies. The “stress test” United Arab Emirates (UAE) Ambassador to Washington, Yousef Al Otaiba, hinted at on March 3, was on full display in the pushback by the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries—particularly Saudi Arabia and the UAE—against pressure from Washington to condemn the invasion and side with Ukraine.