Latakia’s Internal Security Command announced a curfew in Latakia city (on Syria’s Mediterranean coast), starting at 5:00 p.m. on Tuesday, 30 December 2025, and lasting until 6:00 a.m. on Wednesday, 31 December 2025.
Pour poursuivre en toute impunité le génocide à Gaza, Israël a interdit à 37 organisations humanitaires internationales l’accès à l’enclave côtière dévastée sous occupation militaire. Seules cinq organisations humanitaires sont désormais en mesure d’opérer à l’intérieur de Gaza.
«Après 34 ans, voir Israël surgir soudainement pour reconnaître le Somaliland est extrêmement inattendu et très étrange», déclare Hassan Cheikh Mohamud.
Le président somalien Hassan Cheikh Mohamud a mis en garde contre les ambitions d’Israël, qu’il accuse de vouloir installer de force des Palestiniens en Somalie et d’étendre son accès stratégique au golfe d’Aden et à la mer Rouge.
Swelling waves of dissatisfaction are sweeping the Islamic Republic of Iran into the new year. What began on December 28 as demonstrations in downtown Tehran has crossed the country to Malard, Isfahan, Hamedan, Kerman, Ahvaz, Qeshm, and several other cities. They have been joined by coordinated strikes held by merchants and business owners, who have traditionally held great influence. Nationwide protests and strikes have persisted through a fourth day, despite the fact that there have been arrests and even cases of authorities firing on protesters.
Donald Trump, le président soi-disant défenseur de « l’Amérique d’abord », a été élu par des électeurs exaspérés par les guerres absurdes, surtout celles menées par Israël. Cette semaine, il a trahi ces électeurs en offrant à Israël un cadeau de Noël : le bombardement de trois pays qu’Israël souhaitait voir bombardés. Curieusement, aucun de ces pays ne se situe au Moyen-Orient.
The Stimson Center recently convened a meeting of U.S. regional experts to discuss three scenarios for the Middle East over the next 18 months: a continuation of low-level fighting in Gaza; an “all-hell-breaks-loose” nightmare of increased war and violence; and a “keep-hope-alive” vision entailing a long-term cease fire in Gaza and a plan for physical and political reconstruction. Throughout the discussion it became apparent that some variation of the first scenario is most likely with the second scenario having some plausibility; the third scenario, however, was seen as unlikely by 2026. The meeting was held under the Chatham House Rule to foster an atmosphere conducive to frankness.
Last week, Abu Mariya al-Qahtani, a senior leader in Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), delivered a controversial message on his Telegram channel. The time had come, he wrote, for al-Qaida’s branches to shut the organization down. After the death of Ayman al-Zawahiri on July 31, 2022, and with the question of succession complicated by the leading candidate’s presence in Iran, this was the best path forward. He urged the affiliates to consider an alternative model of jihadism, one that embraces cooperation with regional states as part of a strategy of confronting “the Iranian project” in the Middle East.
The advice, or nasiha, was not received well in al-Qaida circles. Several critics of the nasiha wrote at length against it, castigating its author as an ignoramus and dismissing his arguments as unfounded. Two of these authors purport to be members of al-Qaida. The exchange is worth considering, as Abu Mariya is no stranger to the inner workings of al-Qaida—he belonged to it for more than a decade—and the advice he offered clearly struck a nerve. It may well shed light on the still murky future of the group after al-Zawahiri.
An interesting report that Israeli means have re-highlighted with Roman Göverman taking over the leadership of the Mossad, after the man in an “old paper” revealed what he described as a “strategic account statement” he prepared years ago, it does not seem just an academic study as much as it resembles an early warning of the end of the rules of the game in the Middle East.
One of the unifying themes of the Sunni jihadi movement as it has developed over the past half-century has been the view that Western-style democracy is an affront to Islam. Even worse, it is a religion fundamentally incompatible with the faith, a version of polytheism (shirk) in which authority is derived from the popular will as opposed to God’s will, and in which manmade laws are adopted and implemented as opposed to God’s law, the Shari‘a. Yet as the jihadi movement’s unity has frayed over the past decade with the rise of the Islamic State, so too has the united front against democracy. Last month’s elections in Turkey, which saw President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, head of the Islamist AKP, reelected to another five-year term in office, brought divisions over the matter into the sharpest relief yet, as ideologues debated the legitimacy not only of voting for the Turkish president but of advocating his reelection as well. For most jihadis, Erdoğan is an apostate unbeliever as he upholds a secular democratic system. But how to deal with this fact in the real world remains an issue of considerable contestation.
Since Hamas’s “Operation al-Aqsa Flood” attack on Israel on October 7, 2023, the global jihadi movement has been divided over how to respond. While the Islamic State has reiterated its unequivocal stand against Hamas, al-Qaida has staked out a position of nearly unlimited support and sympathy. The contrast could not be starker.