De la războiul din Yemen la influenţa tot mai mare a Chinei în Orientul Mijlociu, restabilirea legăturilor dintre Arabia Saudită şi Iran va avea repercusiuni în întreaga regiune şi dincolo de ea, potrivit opiniilor unor analişti, transmite sâmbătă AFP, preluată de Agerpres.
The 25th Arabian Gulf Cup football tournament, held in January 2023 in Basra, Iraq, sparked diplomatic tensions between Iraq and Iran by reigniting the old argument over the use of the name Arabian Gulf, favored by Saudi Arabia and the Gulf countries, as opposed to Persian Gulf, which is favored by Iran. The tournament – which the Arab media refers to simply as the Khaliji (i.e., Gulf) tournament – has been held since 1970, usually once in two years, with the participation of the Gulf Cooperation Council countries (Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Qatar, Bahrain and Kuwait), as well as Iraq and Yemen. This year, as in the past, many called it by its official name, the Arabian Gulf Cup, which angered Iran.
Iran is ready for a new round of fence-mending talks with Saudi Arabia in the Iraqi capital city of Baghdad.
This is according to Iran’s Nour News on Wednesday, adding that the country is determined to strike an agreement.
If there is one place Saudi Arabia was happy to be low on the totem pole, it was Iran. Those days are over. Strategic thinkers in Tehran have upgraded their perception of the threat posed by the kingdom.
Rather than simply viewing Saudi Arabia as a Middle Eastern extension of the United States and a political rival, Iran today sees the kingdom as a security threat.
What’s new? Thousands of foreign nationals who joined ISIS in Syria and Iraq have crossed into Türkiye. Some have been deported. Others have stayed, with some still facing trial for terrorism-related charges and others nearing the end of their prison sentences. Their presence creates a humanitarian and security challenge for Türkiye, currently reeling from the devastating earthquakes of February 2023.
Both Russia and Iran have deep, multifaceted, and long-standing connections to Syria. During the Cold War, Damascus emerged as the Soviet Union’s most loyal Middle Eastern ally, and the relationship regained vibrancy in the 2000s as Vladimir Putin strove to reestablish Moscow’s regional preeminence. Meanwhile, the 1979 Iranian revolution reversed Tehran’s pro-U.S. orientation. Hafez al-Assad’s Syria was the first Arab state to recognize the Islamic Republic of Iran and the only Arab state (apart from Libya) to support Iran during its 8-year war against Iraq (1980-88). In subsequent decades, Tehran intensified its political, economic, and military ties with Damascus.[1]
What’s new? A three-year ceasefire in rebel-held Idlib has saved countless lives and allowed the main insurgent group, Hei’at Tahrir al-Sham (HTS), to redirect its efforts from fighting the regime to dismantling ISIS and other jihadist cells. Yet uncertainty regarding Türkiye’s Syria policy may threaten the relative peace and hamper humanitarian relief.
White House officials have previously boasted that Washington ‘owns’ one third of Syria’s territory, in particular the resource-rich northeast
The US occupation army renewed its oil smuggling campaign in northeast Syria three weeks after a 7.7 magnitude earthquake ravaged the war-torn country.
Extremist group HTS wishes to establish full control over the economy of Syria’s northern region
A 23 February report by Lebanese daily Al-Akhbar suggests that the Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) extremist group, formerly the Al-Qaeda affiliated Nusra Front, has been attempting with external support to consolidate its power in Syria’s north – with the aim of establishing full economic control over the region and thereby ‘legitimizing’ itself.
The Cradle s’est entretenu avec un haut responsable militaire du Hezbollah en Irak sur le rôle crucial joué par le défunt commandant iranien de la Force Quds, le général de division Qassem Soleimani, dans la conduite de la résistance contre Daech.