Orientul Mijlociu

• Turkey, under the leadership of President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, is one of Hamas’ most important strategic allies, especially since the violent events of the Mavi Marmara flotilla in 2010. Turkey hosts senior Hamas figures, some of whom have received Turkish citizenship, and provides political, diplomatic and propaganda support, as well as economic and humanitarian assistance.
• Hamas has established one of its most important overseas centers in Turkey, primarily operated by prisoners released in the Gilad Shalit exchange deal of 2011. It uses Turkey to plan terrorist attacks and transfer funds to finance terrorist activities inside Israel, in Judea, Samaria and the Gaza Strip, and to raise and launder money in support of its terrorist operations, including the October 7, 2023, attack and massacre.
• The close relationship between Turkey and Hamas was manifested during the Gaza Strip War, when Turkey did not condemn Hamas but sharply criticized Israel, often using antisemitic themes. Throughout the fighting, political coordination continued between Erdoğan, senior Turkish officials and the Hamas leadership, including regarding negotiations with Israel and humanitarian assistance. Turkey also received Palestinian prisoners who were released from Israeli prisons and deported.
• Hamas documents seized by IDF forces in the Gaza Strip during the Gaza Strip War showed the relationship between Hamas and Turkey, including how Hamas used Turkey for terrorist activities against Israel. One document provided the Hamas plan to establish a branch in Turkey to coordinate operations against Israel abroad, including the assassination of military personnel and attacks on Israeli vessels.
• In ITIC assessment, given the Hamas operational infrastructure in Turkey, its deep involvement in terrorism and Turkey’s hostility toward Israel, Hamas will seek to strengthen and expand its ties with Turkey. The deportation of terrorists, particularly senior terrorists from Israel, to Turkey in particular, is likely to reinforce the Hamas operational base in Turkey and facilitate the rebuilding of its military wing and the return of released prisoners to terrorist activities. A Turkish aegis would strengthen the “external” Hamas leadership and increase Hamas terrorist activity outside Israel. Given Turkey’s location and its strained relations with Israel, Israeli security forces would face significant challenges in effectively countering Hamas infrastructure and activities in Turkey.

On February 25, Syria held a National Dialogue Conference, which is supposed to help the country come together after years of civil war and the toppling of the Assad regime. Syria’s new president, Ahmad Shara’a, spoke at the event and warned that Syria must not be partitioned.

Kurdish autonomy is a problem that today’s Syria can’t afford.

On a recent trip that I took across Syria, one thing was palpably clear: Syrians were universally elated to be free from the iron grip of Bashar al-Assad’s regime. For now, that euphoria is inspiring and sustaining a semblance of hope and national unity that had all but vanished throughout the past 13 years of brutal civil conflict.

President Donald Trump continues to double down on his out-of-left-field proposal to take over the Gaza Strip, remove the two million Palestinians who live there, and turn it into the world’s largest beach resort. During the press gaggle on Feb. 11, before his meeting with Jordan’s King Abdullah II, whom Trump is pressuring to accept some of those Palestinians he is proposing to relocate, the president said, “We will have Gaza… We are going to take it. We are going to hold it.”

Après quatre décennies de violence, le fondateur et dirigeant emprisonné du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, appelle le groupe armé à abandonner le combat et à s’autodissoudre. Mais cet appel, lancé jeudi 27 février 2025, n’est qu’un début.

C’est un appel historique ou, du moins, qui pourrait le devenir s’il ne reste pas lettre morte. Le fondateur et chef historique du Parti des travailleurs du Kurdistan (PKK), Abdullah Öcalan, a demandé jeudi 27 février à son mouvement armé de se dissoudre et de déposer les armes après quatre décennies de combats contre l’État turc. « Tous les groupes doivent déposer les armes et le PKK doit se dissoudre », a ordonné le leader kurde dans une lettre lue en son nom par des députés du parti pro-kurde légal, le DEM, qui lui avaient rendu visite quelques heures plus tôt. Abdullah Öcalan, emprisonné depuis 1999 sur une île en mer de Marmara, dit « assumer la responsabilité historique de cet appel ».

In an interview, Stéphane Malsagne discusses former Lebanese president Fouad Chehab, whose biography he has written.

Michael Young: Your book is a fascinating and much-needed biography of Fouad Chehab, Lebanon’s president between 1958 and 1964. But might I start with a disagreement? The subtitle of your book is “Une figure oubliée de l’histoire libanaise,” or “a forgotten figure in Lebanese history.” Yet not only is Chehab far from forgotten in Lebanon, many Lebanese often seem to be in perpetual anticipation of the return of a Chehabist figure. In using this subtitle, what were you trying to say?

Enough already of the media’s lazy indifference to the vast undercount of the Palestinian death toll from Netanyahu’s genocidal daily bombing and shelling of Gaza’s defenseless civilian population. I’m referring to all the media – the corporate media, the public media, and the independent media. They all stick with the Hamas Ministry of Health’s (MOH) count of named victims whose corpses have been identified by hospitals and mortuaries. For months there have been no operating hospitals and mortuaries to send their grisly data to the Health Ministry.

ISIS carried out at least six confirmed attacks in November in the Homs, Hama, and Deir Ez Zor governorates, killing at least eight pro-regime soldiers and two civilians. There were also two high quality* attacks carried out during the month. ISIS attacks in central Syria declined for the third consecutive month, dropping to their lowest point since January 2023. However, attacks did not diminish in other parts of Syria, and the regime’s downfall has given ISIS new avenues to expand while also opening new ways to counter the group.

For the third consecutive day, clashes have erupted on the Syrian-Lebanese border between the Syrian Army and drug and arms smugglers from Lebanese tribes residing in villages and towns along the border near al-Qusayr, southern Homs. The confrontations have resulted in casualties on both sides.

Syrian Army Gains Ground in al-Qusayr Countryside

According to Syria TV’s correspondent, intense fighting broke out Saturday night between the Syrian Army and Lebanese tribal groups in the border villages, particularly in Matraba, with both sides using various types of weapons.