U.S. President Donald Trump’s proposed peace plan for the Gaza Strip, unveiled on Monday during meetings with Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, comes at a crossroads. On the eve of the war’s two-year anniversary, the humanitarian dimensions of the crisis increasingly are intersecting with political pressures and security priorities. This makes any approach to reconstruction and stability in Gaza a difficult test: Can this peace plan reconcile its ambitions with the reality on the ground?
The peace plan proposed by Israel and the United States for Gaza is not only a trap, but it repeats the same mistakes of the past that did not lead to peace.
Hezbollah may not be fully up and running in Syria following the fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime, but it is still seeking to take advantage of the instability in the country, along with other militant groups. The Iranian-backed terror group is still using Syria as a corridor to arm its forces in Lebanon, and just as troubling, a Syrian official confirmed that remnants of Iran-linked militias continue to operate in Quneitra, close to Israel’s border.
ISIS has been witnessing a new surge in its activity inside Syria since the change of the former regime in December 2024, taking advantage of the fragility of the transitional authority and the overlap of its structure with different factions. Despite intense international strikes, the group has been able to carry out qualitative attacks and has begun to reposition, amid security and political complications facing the interim government. The scene is becoming increasingly dangerous with the emergence of more radicalized groups and the erosion of divides between regular forces and militant militants. On the other hand, the international community linked the support of the new government to its seriousness in combating terrorism and extremism, which poses a structural challenge to its security institutions and internal alliances.
The Israeli-American track is undergoing a qualitative shift with the announcement of US envoy Steve Whittoff of a “comprehensive deal” to stop the war in Gaza, including the release of hostages, the disarmament of Hamas, reconstruction, and the imposition of an international administration led by Washington, in a unilateral path that deviates Hamas from any negotiating role. The deal coincides with an Israeli plan to occupy the Gaza Strip in stages, and impose security control and alternative civilian administration, and this approach aims to impose the “day after” the war as a fait accompli serving Israeli goals.
I renew my sincere appeal to our Arab Shiite brothers: Let your belonging to your Arab nation be, and let your loyalty to your homeland be advanced over any partisan or external loyalty. Face the current challenges in a spirit of courage and responsibility, it is time to say: Enough. Enough successive losses that have exhausted you and exhausted your homelands. Revisit honestly, and stay away from a project that has brought you and your partners back to the country nothing but blood, destruction and woes.
Israeli tanks thrust closer to the heart of Gaza City on Monday, pressing a ground offensive hours before talks between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump, who has hinted at a diplomatic breakthrough in a bid to end the war.
After nearly two years of failed diplomatic efforts, Washington presented a 21-point plan to Arab and Muslim states last week that calls for a permanent ceasefire and the release of remaining hostages.
The fall of Syrian dictator Bashar al-Assad’s regime in December 2024 revealed the ongoing significance of multiple foreign fighter organizations in Syria, groups that proved instrumental in Hayat Tahir al-Sham’s (HTS) campaign for Damascus. Among them were two primarily ethnic Uzbek fighter groups that originated in Central Asia: the Imam Bukhari Battalion (Katibat Imam al-Bukhari, KIB) and the Tavhid and Jihad Battalion (Katibat Tavhid va Jihod, KTJ). Smaller numbers of Uzbeks and other Central Asians joined Malhama Tactical, Muhojir Tactical, and Katibat al Ghuraba al Turkistan, which also supported HTS.1 a HTS voiced no objections as these organizations’ leaders gave media interviews in Damascus, celebrating their victory, and posted images of their involvement across dozens of social media channels. These Uzbek-led groups are among some 10,000 fighters, many from Russia and China, who lent critical support to HTS for over a decade.2 In spring 2025, HTS emir Ahmed al-Sharaa proposed integrating such foreign fighters into the new Syrian military, a process that has now begun.3 Yet, little is known about these entities, why and how they have operated in Syria for so long, or what role they might play in the post-Assad Syria.
