Since late September 2021, when Iran-Azerbaijan relations hit a low point, Tehran and Baku have engaged in a process of de-escalation. Much of the focus is on expanding economic cooperation and advancing plans to establish pan-regional transportation links, such as the North-South railroad corridor connecting India to Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan.
The Russo-Ukraine war, the extensive Western sanctions against Russia, and the growing possibility that European border states will block east-west transit corridors traversing Russian territory into Europe are having far-reaching implications for the landlocked countries of Central Asia, which have historically relied on road and rail corridors through Russia to reach markets there and beyond. Prior to the war, Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Belarus had all hoped to be part of the “New Eurasian Land Bridge” linking Europe to East Asia. But those aims were derailed when Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24. This has created a severe headache for China, endangering as it does its Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) northern route, which crossed Russia and the Black Sea via Central Asia (South China Morning Post, March 12).
The rift between China and Russia has recently become clear in Kazakhstan. At the beginning of 2022, Kazakhstan, the largest and most politically stable country in Central Asia, had its biggest riots since it gained its independence in December 1991. On January 5, at the request of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) decided to send peacekeepers (in effect, Russian troops) to stabilize the situation and assist in the crackdown.
Even though the “almost imminent” war with Ukraine has been dominating the media in Russia, another important issue has been debated almost constantly: the recent actions of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, a person with the unique status in Russia’s political elite of not being subject to any laws existing in the Russian Federation.
Obsessed with reviving Turks’ imperial days of glory, Erdoğan is turning to Turkey’s east to create a pan-Turkic/Islamist strategic alliance consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, with part-time, tactical alliances with Iran, Qatar and Bangladesh.
The idea is to bring together three Muslim nations: NATO member Turkey; Azerbaijan with its rich hydrocarbon resources and growing military capabilities; and Pakistan with its nuclear weapons.
Russia had congratulated itself on its textbook intervention to quell the unrest in Kazakstan but recriminations began when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, arguably the main beneficiary of the intervention, appointed Askar Umarov minister of information in the new government. Umarov is accused of besmirching Russia’s Great Patriotic War (World War II) and has called the Russians living in Kazakhstan an imposed Diaspora. Yevgeny Primakov, head of Rossotrudnichestvo [Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation], refused to work with the Kazakh official. Primakov charges Umarov with having Russophobic views. “I would like to remind you of by now an old, automatically operative and proven rule. It states that Rossotrudnichestvo doesn’t maintain contacts, doesn’t work and doesn’t cooperate with Russophobic trash,” stressed Primakov. Back in 2017, the ‘Kazinform’ agency, headed by Umarov, published a ‘Great Kazakhstan’ map, which designated the Russian cities of Omsk and Orenburg as a part of Great Kazakhstan.[1]
The anti-government unrest gripping Kazakhstan represents the most serious threat to the country’s authoritarian leadership since its independence from the Soviet Union.
The rioting was initially sparked by an increase in fuel prices but reflected longstanding resentment of Kazakhstan’s leaders’ repressive policies and monopolization of major industries.
The riots in Kazakhstan may have abated, but the country’s problems remain unresolved, and its leaders’ challenges have never been greater. Dr Neil Melvin, RUSI’s Director of International Security Studies, identifies what these are.
Riots prompted by higher fuel prices are not exactly unusual. We have seen them in places as diverse as France with the so-called Yellow Vests, or Chile with public transport. Thus, in many respects, what has happened in Kazakhstan should not surprise us. Or should it?
More even than most crises, the events unfolding in Kazakhstan in recent days can be read in myriad ways. On one level, it clearly appears to have resulted in yet another opportunity for Russian President Vladimir Putin to claw back control over domains lost by the Kremlin following the demise of the Soviet Union.
Moscow has been able to accomplish this by falsely pretending the unrest that it helped put down in its Central Asian neighbor was yet another example of what it calls a “color revolution,” meaning an insidious destabilization plot supported by the West.
Peacekeepers from a Russian-led regional security alliance will be sent to Kazakhstan to help stabilize the country, the prime minister of Armenia announced on January 5 after an unprecedented wave of unrest in the oil-rich Central Asian nation that was sparked by a fuel price hike.
Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinian said on Facebook that the decision to deploy peacekeepers from the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) for a limited period had been taken in response to an appeal from Kazakh President Qasym-Zhomart Toqaev.