Caucaz

Moscow And Washington Increasingly Being Pushed To Get In Fight Over Kazakhstan

Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in an exclusive interview with Mir Interstate Television and Radio Company on May 1, 2020, that is, a little over a year after he had assumed the presidency of his country, recounted – not without some pride at the results achieved – how Kazakhstan was managing to keep balance between the East and West. Put another way, in this case the republic’s second president and hand-picked successor of Nursultan Nazarbayev, expressed his readiness to continue to pursue a foreign policy of good relations both with the US and the EU, and with major neighboring powers. Yet this proved not to be destined to last for long. At the beginning of this year, it became already clear that Kazakhstan, according to Forbes.ru columnist Alexander Baunov, started losing its balanced position between the East and West. Why has all that changed so quickly? So let’s try to figure it out.

Conflict Trends Update

GEORGIA Breakaway territory South Ossetia’s de facto president Anatoly Bibilov announced last Friday a referendum scheduled for 17 July on whether the region — which Moscow recognised as an independent state in 2008 — should accede to the Russian Federation. Bibilov was defeated in second-round elections earlier this month by Alan Gagloev, who will take over as de facto president next week. Crisis Group expert Olesya Vartanyan says that if the referendum goes ahead, the majority of the local population of some 30,000 people will certainly vote in favour of joining Russia. But whether Moscow promptly proceeds with annexation depends on its readiness to revise the status quo that has been in place for almost fourteen years and risk precipitating a new crisis in another post-Soviet state, which could divert its focus from the war in Ukraine.

Revolution In The South Caucasus

While the Kremlin is busy in the west, developments to the south promise further threats to its aggressive policy in the borderlands.

Overshadowed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the South Caucasus is witnessing huge developments which could potentially decrease tensions between Armenia on the one hand and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The process might also critically affect Russia’s position in the region and may even give some momentum to the West’s ambivalent policy.

Iran, Turkey, and the future of the South Caucasus

Since late September 2021, when Iran-Azerbaijan relations hit a low point, Tehran and Baku have engaged in a process of de-escalation. Much of the focus is on expanding economic cooperation and advancing plans to establish pan-regional transportation links, such as the North-South railroad corridor connecting India to Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan.

With Russian Route Blocked, Uzbekistan Looks to Indian-Iranian-Afghan Chabahar Port Project

The Russo-Ukraine war, the extensive Western sanctions against Russia, and the growing possibility that European border states will block east-west transit corridors traversing Russian territory into Europe are having far-reaching implications for the landlocked countries of Central Asia, which have historically relied on road and rail corridors through Russia to reach markets there and beyond. Prior to the war, Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Belarus had all hoped to be part of the “New Eurasian Land Bridge” linking Europe to East Asia. But those aims were derailed when Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24. This has created a severe headache for China, endangering as it does its Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) northern route, which crossed Russia and the Black Sea via Central Asia (South China Morning Post, March 12).

The Events In Kazakhstan Prove That China And Russia Are Strange Bedfellows With A Different Agenda And A Fragile Relationship

Introduction

The rift between China and Russia has recently become clear in Kazakhstan. At the beginning of 2022, Kazakhstan, the largest and most politically stable country in Central Asia, had its biggest riots since it gained its independence in December 1991. On January 5, at the request of Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, the Russian-led Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) decided to send peacekeepers (in effect, Russian troops) to stabilize the situation and assist in the crackdown.

The Kremlin Wants To Be The West’s Mighty Antagonist, But It Cannot Even Control The Northern Caucasian Leaders At Its Rear

Even though the “almost imminent” war with Ukraine has been dominating the media in Russia, another important issue has been debated almost constantly: the recent actions of Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov, a person with the unique status in Russia’s political elite of not being subject to any laws existing in the Russian Federation.

Erdoğan’s Neo-Ottoman Ambitions Turning Eastward

Obsessed with reviving Turks’ imperial days of glory, Erdoğan is turning to Turkey’s east to create a pan-Turkic/Islamist strategic alliance consisting of Turkey, Azerbaijan and Pakistan, with part-time, tactical alliances with Iran, Qatar and Bangladesh.

The idea is to bring together three Muslim nations: NATO member Turkey; Azerbaijan with its rich hydrocarbon resources and growing military capabilities; and Pakistan with its nuclear weapons.

Russian Expert On Turkey Starobudtsev: Russia Outflanked Turkey With Its Intervention In Kazakhstan, But The Competition Between The Two Claimants To The Turkic Parts Of The Post-Soviet Space Will Continue

Russia had congratulated itself on its textbook intervention to quell the unrest in Kazakstan but recriminations began when Kazakh President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, arguably the main beneficiary of the intervention, appointed Askar Umarov minister of information in the new government. Umarov is accused of besmirching Russia’s Great Patriotic War (World War II) and has called the Russians living in Kazakhstan an imposed Diaspora. Yevgeny Primakov, head of Rossotrudnichestvo [Federal Agency for the CIS Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation], refused to work with the Kazakh official. Primakov charges Umarov with having Russophobic views. “I would like to remind you of by now an old, automatically operative and proven rule. It states that Rossotrudnichestvo doesn’t maintain contacts, doesn’t work and doesn’t cooperate with Russophobic trash,” stressed Primakov. Back in 2017, the ‘Kazinform’ agency, headed by Umarov, published a ‘Great Kazakhstan’ map, which designated the Russian cities of Omsk and Orenburg as a part of Great Kazakhstan.[1]