Russia may have lost most, or nearly all of its former preeminent position in shaping the outside world’s perception of the other CIS countries and all the events and processes occurring in them.
As Ankara finesses relations with Moscow, top Turkish officials have quietly met with Chechen leader Ramzan Kadyrov after years of chill marked by a string of murders of Chechen exiles in Turkey.
Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s Aug. 5 meeting with his Russian counterpart Vladimir Putin appears to have turned a page in Ankara’s chilly ties with Ramzan Kadyrov, the leader of Russia’s Muslim-majority Chechen Republic and a Putin loyalist. Turkey’s foreign minister and intelligence chief, who accompanied Erdogan in Sochi, huddled with Kadyrov on the sidelines of the summit, and it was the Chechen leader who made the meeting public on Telegram.
Ankara has said both sides are focused on confidence-building steps to be taken “one at a time.”
Ankara has broken its official silence and provided details on ongoing reconciliation talks with its historic foe, Armenia. In a lengthy background briefing, a senior Turkish diplomat described the substance of the talks, what their goal was and the multiple challenges that lie ahead. Speaking on the sidelines of the annual ambassadors’ huddle organized by the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the official stressed that in order to avert “big disappointments,” the sides were focused on confidence-building steps to be taken “one at a time.” The official was addressing critics’ claims that Turkey is deliberately keeping the pace of the talks slow in order to allow its regional ally Azerbaijan to pressure Armenia into further concessions on the disputed enclave of Nagorno-Karabakh.
The EU is trying its best, but it is not a magician. For a peace treaty to be brokered and signed requires one country – Armenia – to halt its support for separatism. Armenia has often acted like Russia in both backing territorial integrity of states and backing the ‘self-determination’ of the Karabakh region in Azerbaijan.
Kassym-Jomart Tokayev, in an exclusive interview with Mir Interstate Television and Radio Company on May 1, 2020, that is, a little over a year after he had assumed the presidency of his country, recounted – not without some pride at the results achieved – how Kazakhstan was managing to keep balance between the East and West. Put another way, in this case the republic’s second president and hand-picked successor of Nursultan Nazarbayev, expressed his readiness to continue to pursue a foreign policy of good relations both with the US and the EU, and with major neighboring powers. Yet this proved not to be destined to last for long. At the beginning of this year, it became already clear that Kazakhstan, according to Forbes.ru columnist Alexander Baunov, started losing its balanced position between the East and West. Why has all that changed so quickly? So let’s try to figure it out.
U.S.-funded biological laboratories are located in Armenia, Kazakhstan and Central Asian countries, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov in an interview with RT Arabic on Thursday, May 26.
GEORGIA Breakaway territory South Ossetia’s de facto president Anatoly Bibilov announced last Friday a referendum scheduled for 17 July on whether the region — which Moscow recognised as an independent state in 2008 — should accede to the Russian Federation. Bibilov was defeated in second-round elections earlier this month by Alan Gagloev, who will take over as de facto president next week. Crisis Group expert Olesya Vartanyan says that if the referendum goes ahead, the majority of the local population of some 30,000 people will certainly vote in favour of joining Russia. But whether Moscow promptly proceeds with annexation depends on its readiness to revise the status quo that has been in place for almost fourteen years and risk precipitating a new crisis in another post-Soviet state, which could divert its focus from the war in Ukraine.
While the Kremlin is busy in the west, developments to the south promise further threats to its aggressive policy in the borderlands.
Overshadowed by Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the South Caucasus is witnessing huge developments which could potentially decrease tensions between Armenia on the one hand and Turkey and Azerbaijan on the other. The process might also critically affect Russia’s position in the region and may even give some momentum to the West’s ambivalent policy.
Since late September 2021, when Iran-Azerbaijan relations hit a low point, Tehran and Baku have engaged in a process of de-escalation. Much of the focus is on expanding economic cooperation and advancing plans to establish pan-regional transportation links, such as the North-South railroad corridor connecting India to Russia via Iran and Azerbaijan.
The Russo-Ukraine war, the extensive Western sanctions against Russia, and the growing possibility that European border states will block east-west transit corridors traversing Russian territory into Europe are having far-reaching implications for the landlocked countries of Central Asia, which have historically relied on road and rail corridors through Russia to reach markets there and beyond. Prior to the war, Russia, Ukraine, Poland and Belarus had all hoped to be part of the “New Eurasian Land Bridge” linking Europe to East Asia. But those aims were derailed when Russian President Vladimir Putin ordered the full-scale re-invasion of Ukraine on February 24. This has created a severe headache for China, endangering as it does its Belt and Road Initiative’s (BRI) northern route, which crossed Russia and the Black Sea via Central Asia (South China Morning Post, March 12).