Africa

Libya was the seventh-largest crude oil producer in OPEC and the third-largest total petroleum liquids producer in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria, in 2023.1 At the beginning of 2024, Libya held 3% of the world’s proved oil reserves and 41% of Africa’s proved oil reserves.2 Despite Libya’s large oil reserves, political conflicts and militia attacks on hydrocarbon infrastructure have limited investments in the country’s oil and natural gas sectors. These challenges have also constrained exploration and development of its reserves since 2011.

Géorgie

À une semaine de l’élection présidentielle géorgienne au suffrage indirect, la tentative de révolution colorée téléguidée et soutenue par l’Occident otanien (US-UE) semble s’essouffler, mais elle n’a peut-être pas dit son dernier mot. Il faudra aux autorités géorgiennes, confortées par le suffrage populaire, rester vigilantes jusqu’au bout, c’est à dire jusqu’à la mise en place d’un nouveau président dans 3 semaines.

On peut s’étonner que la contestation du résultat des élections législatives géorgiennes soit survenue alors même que le rapport de la mission d’observation de ces élections géorgiennes mandatée par l’OSCE a été positif. Il est vrai que les USA et l’UE préfèrent ignorer les conclusions du rapport de l’OSCE dès lors que les résultats de l’élection ne leur donnent pas satisfaction. «Contestez, contestez, il en restera toujours quelque chose»et l’on peut toujours tenter le coup d’une révolution colorée qui a marché tant de fois sur des narratifs bidons imaginés par les néocons de l’Occident otanien.

After years of failed military efforts, the path forward has to include some kind of accommodation with the militants.

Since at least 2017, when Mali’s government organised a peace forum called the Conference of National Understanding, prominent voices in the country and the wider Sahel region have explored the possibility of dialogue with jihadists.

“All we seek is a safe place, but unfortunately we found ourselves in another war.”

Thousands of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees are demanding to be relocated from unsafe camps in Ethiopia’s conflict-hit Amhara region, where they say they lack basic services and are subject to almost daily attacks from local militiamen and armed bandits.

The African continent saw a significant increase in coups in the last three years, with military figures carrying out takeovers in Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali.

After Niger’s coup in July, the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said it would not tolerate another takeover, and implemented tough sanctions and threatened military action to restore that country’s democratically elected government.

Jihadist groups in the Sahel, particularly from Burkina Faso, now regularly cross into northern Ghana, using the area for logistical and medical purposes to sustain ongoing insurgencies and help expand freedom of movement throughout West Africa.

Though Ghana has thus far been spared of any major terrorist attacks, there have been attacks in neighboring countries on the West African coast, including Benin and Togo.

Unregulated logging of the Congo Basin rainforests threatens to undercut the livelihoods of millions of households in the region, empower transnational organized criminal networks, and dramatically accelerate global warming.

Russia’s outreach to the region has successfully exploited regimes’ frustrations with the West. Yet it has encountered difficulties in navigating the complex interrelations and rivalries.

The Arab-majority states of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have become an increasing focus of Russian engagement and influence. Moscow is demonstrating a growing appreciation of their strategic value, especially in the domains of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). Geographically, these countries are part of Africa and are members of the African Union and therefore serve as important elements in Russia’s growing power projection on the African continent. They are also situated on the Mediterranean basin, offering Moscow potential points of leverage on the flow of oil and natural gas and irregular migration into the southern flank of NATO-dominated Europe, as well as potential warm water ports for its navy. Further, linguistically, culturally, and politically, the Maghreb is part of the Arab world and plays a role in Russia’s broader “return” to the Middle East and its increased strategic focus on issues such as counterterrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and Syria.