Africa

Géorgie

À une semaine de l’élection présidentielle géorgienne au suffrage indirect, la tentative de révolution colorée téléguidée et soutenue par l’Occident otanien (US-UE) semble s’essouffler, mais elle n’a peut-être pas dit son dernier mot. Il faudra aux autorités géorgiennes, confortées par le suffrage populaire, rester vigilantes jusqu’au bout, c’est à dire jusqu’à la mise en place d’un nouveau président dans 3 semaines.

On peut s’étonner que la contestation du résultat des élections législatives géorgiennes soit survenue alors même que le rapport de la mission d’observation de ces élections géorgiennes mandatée par l’OSCE a été positif. Il est vrai que les USA et l’UE préfèrent ignorer les conclusions du rapport de l’OSCE dès lors que les résultats de l’élection ne leur donnent pas satisfaction. «Contestez, contestez, il en restera toujours quelque chose»et l’on peut toujours tenter le coup d’une révolution colorée qui a marché tant de fois sur des narratifs bidons imaginés par les néocons de l’Occident otanien.

After years of failed military efforts, the path forward has to include some kind of accommodation with the militants.

Since at least 2017, when Mali’s government organised a peace forum called the Conference of National Understanding, prominent voices in the country and the wider Sahel region have explored the possibility of dialogue with jihadists.

“All we seek is a safe place, but unfortunately we found ourselves in another war.”

Thousands of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees are demanding to be relocated from unsafe camps in Ethiopia’s conflict-hit Amhara region, where they say they lack basic services and are subject to almost daily attacks from local militiamen and armed bandits.

The African continent saw a significant increase in coups in the last three years, with military figures carrying out takeovers in Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali.

After Niger’s coup in July, the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said it would not tolerate another takeover, and implemented tough sanctions and threatened military action to restore that country’s democratically elected government.

Jihadist groups in the Sahel, particularly from Burkina Faso, now regularly cross into northern Ghana, using the area for logistical and medical purposes to sustain ongoing insurgencies and help expand freedom of movement throughout West Africa.

Though Ghana has thus far been spared of any major terrorist attacks, there have been attacks in neighboring countries on the West African coast, including Benin and Togo.

Unregulated logging of the Congo Basin rainforests threatens to undercut the livelihoods of millions of households in the region, empower transnational organized criminal networks, and dramatically accelerate global warming.

Russia’s outreach to the region has successfully exploited regimes’ frustrations with the West. Yet it has encountered difficulties in navigating the complex interrelations and rivalries.

The Arab-majority states of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have become an increasing focus of Russian engagement and influence. Moscow is demonstrating a growing appreciation of their strategic value, especially in the domains of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). Geographically, these countries are part of Africa and are members of the African Union and therefore serve as important elements in Russia’s growing power projection on the African continent. They are also situated on the Mediterranean basin, offering Moscow potential points of leverage on the flow of oil and natural gas and irregular migration into the southern flank of NATO-dominated Europe, as well as potential warm water ports for its navy. Further, linguistically, culturally, and politically, the Maghreb is part of the Arab world and plays a role in Russia’s broader “return” to the Middle East and its increased strategic focus on issues such as counterterrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and Syria.

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.

Terrorists that plague northern Nigeria are arming themselves with weapons that originated in Libya, according to Nigerian defense officials.

Weapons traffickers in Nigeria are benefitting from instability across the Sahel, particularly in Niger, which has become a key transit point for weapons taken from Libyan stockpiles. Those weapons have moved into other Sahel countries as well as Nigeria, according to the Small Arms Survey.