According to reports, since 2009, Muslims, inspired by Boko Haram, have murdered more than 150,000 Christians in Nigeria.
Chad, Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger all struggle with jihadist insurgencies.
Le général Abdel Fattah al-Burhane, chef de l’armée soudanaise et protagoniste principal du conflit contre les paramilitaires, a annoncé un remaniement gouvernemental, incluant le remplacement de quatre ministres clés, dont ceux des Affaires étrangères et des Médias. Cette décision intervient dans un contexte de guerre civile intense qui secoue le pays depuis avril 2023.
Au moins 117 terroristes ont été éliminés par l’armée tchadienne dans l’ouest du pays, lors d’une opération militaire lancée en réponse à une attaque attribuée au groupe jihadiste Boko Haram, survenue le 27 octobre. Une quarantaine de soldats tchadiens ont été tués, selon des sources militaires. L’incident s’est produit dans la province du lac Tchad, une région stratégique bordant le Cameroun, le Niger et le Nigeria, où les forces armées tchadiennes ont mis en place un dispositif de représailles.
Le lieutenant-colonel Paul Henri Sandaogo Damiba, ancien président de la transition du Burkina Faso (janvier-septembre 2022), ainsi que quatorze autres officiers des forces armées, ont été radiés des effectifs de l’armée nationale, selon des décrets signés par le président de la transition, le capitaine Ibrahim Traoré.
Since 2023, Islamic State Sahel Province (IS Sahel), a violent extremist organization affiliated to the Islamic State, has shifted from perpetrating high levels of indiscriminate violence against civilians towards building community support in areas where it has consolidated its influence. It has also begun actively reviving local economies (including illicit activities) that had been heavily undermined by its earlier indiscriminate use of violence.
When Niger’s democratically elected President Mohamed Bazoum was overthrown in a July 2023 coup, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) moved within days to impose punitive measures that it hoped would force a return to constitutional order. This included financial sanctions on Niger and the closure of all member states’ borders with the country.1 The bridge over the Niger River, linking the Beninese city of Malanville and the city of Gaya in Niger – a key transit point for migrants and both licit and illicit trade – was therefore officially closed.
In June 2024, fighters from the Katiba Serma sub-group of Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM) redoubled their efforts to cut off the town of Boni, in the Mopti region of central Mali.1 This is the latest iteration of a blockade that the jihadist group had intermittently imposed for more than nine months on the Route Nationale (RN) 16.2 Blockades are very much part of JNIM’s toolkit in its areas of influence not just in Mali, but also in neighbouring Burkina Faso.
As the host of the upcoming COP29 in Baku, the president of Azerbaijan is using every means at his disposal to ‘punish’ Emmanuel Macron for his support for Armenia – including boosting anti-colonial activist Kemi Seba.
Map 1 : The Gendarmerie Academy and barracks and the International Airport Modibo Keita
At dawn September 17, 2024, the Malian capital of Bamako witnessed one of the most brazen terrorist attacks seen in recent years. Armed gunmen first stormed a barracks of the gendarmerie in the south of the capital and subsequently attacked the military part of the airfield Modibo Keita.
Two African Union soldiers were killed and a third one injured by an al-Shabab mortar attack Sunday on their base inside the perimeters of Mogadishu’s international airport.
A statement by the head of the African Union Transition Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and Special Representative of the Chairperson of the African Union Commission Mohamed El-Amine Souef condemned the attack on the facility known as the Halane Base Camp.