Africa

North African states have seen an uptick in the number of migrants arriving and risking the perilous Mediterranean crossing to Southern Europe since a military coup in Niger severed cooperation between the West African nation and the EU.

President’s Take: Hot Spots Near and Far

The year 2023 has seen peace and security challenges both far from the EU’s borders and closer to home. The latter, especially, have heightened in recent weeks and months, which have seen fighting in the South Caucasus and Kosovo, even as a second year of war in Ukraine stretches on. While the three crises are very different in nature, all suggest a worrying inclination on the part of some governments to seek solutions to disputes through force of arms. Insofar as this jarring trend involves a proliferation of new wars, large and small, it flies in the face of the decades of energy that the EU has invested in turning the page on past conflagrations in Europe and its neighbourhood. Crisis Group is working on a report about how these conflicts are shaping the emerging European security architecture and how best to minimise the risk of future clashes. In the meantime, however, these three crises demand immediate attention. We have explored all of them in earlier work, but I want to share a few thoughts about recent developments.

Mali’s northern Tuareg rebels said on Wednesday that they had seized another military base from the Malian army, bringing to five the number of conquered and pillaged camps in recent weeks.

Le Sahel est confronté depuis plusieurs années à une série de menaces dont les plus emblématiques sont le terrorisme islamiste, les trafics illicites et la criminalité organisée. Ces menaces ont contribué à déstabiliser cette région et dans certains pays accentué la fragilité de l’Etat. Souvent, la faiblesse des institutions démocratiques et le rôle partiellement dysfonctionnel des forces de sécurité, le manque de stratégies sécuritaires au niveau national, l’insuffisance des ressources financières, ainsi que les intérêts contradictoires des divers acteurs empêchent la mise en place de structures de sécurité modernisées. Cette situation aggrave le climat d’insécurité et accentue davantage les risques d’instabilité non propice
au développement socio-économique des pays de l’espace sahélien. C’est dans ce contexte que prospèrent également les réseaux de narco trafiquants, qui essaiment dans cette partie du continent à travers plusieurs axes transfrontaliers contribuant à déstabiliser la région du Sahel et à fragiliser la paix et la sécurité dans cette zone.

The Islamic State in the Great Sahara has sought to prioritize extending its scope, rather than sustainable entrenchment in its areas of action. This partly explains its rapid rise along the borders of Mali, Niger and Burkina Faso.

Composed of a mosaic of operational entities, the coalition of militant Islamist groups Jama’at Nusrat al Islam wal Muslimeen seeks to hide behind an apparently united front the operations of its various constituents in the Sahel, so as to prevent any more robust response to its actions.

In 2021, Africa suffered a new record level of Islamist violence, driven by a 70% increase in violence linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel.

Strengths

• The almost doubling of violence linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel (from 1,180 to 2,005 events) highlights the rapid escalation of the security threat in the region. This peak is the most important change among all regions prone to violence by militant Islamist groups in Africa. It eclipses a 30% reduction in violence in the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique and North Africa.
• Overall, violence related to militant Islamist groups increased by 10% in 2021, reaching a record level of over 5,500 events attributed to these groups in Africa. This has continued an upward trend since 2016. However, the annual rate of increase was, in 2021, much lower than the 43% increase reported in 2020.
• The number of deaths attributed to militant Islamist groups fell by 7% in 2021 compared to 2020, reaching around 12,700 deaths across Africa. This includes a 14 per cent decrease in deaths attributed to violence against civilians and a decrease in all regions outside the Sahel.
• Battles between militant Islamist groups and military forces or non-state armed groups constitute 52 per cent of the violent events counted in 2021. In recent years, this reflects the continuation of a significant increase in the number of battles in northern Mozambique, Somalia and the Sahel.
• The violence of militant Islamist groups remains largely concentrated in five theatres – Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, and North Africa – each including separate local actors and particular challenges.

Cette étude analyse les dynamiques locales qui expliquent la résilience des groupes qualifiés de djihadistes et de terroristes en Afrique subsaharienne, notamment la Katiba Macina, AQMI (Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique), le Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans, l’EIGS (État islamique au Grand Sahara) et Boko Haram. Centrée sur la partie occidentale de la bande sahélienne, elle ouvre aussi des perspectives comparatistes avec les Chebab de Somalie, du Kenya ou du Mozambique, ainsi que les ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) de l’est de la République démocratique du Congo.

Poursuivant une tendance de dix ans, le nombre d’Africains déplacés de force a augmenté l’année dernière et s’élève aujourd’hui à plus de 40 millions.

Au cours de l’année écoulée, 3,2 millions de personnes supplémentaires ont été déplacés en raison de conflits en Afrique. Cela représente une augmentation de 13 % et poursuit une tendance à la hausse incontrôlée observée depuis 2011.