Private Military Companies Continue To Expand In Africa – OpEd
The recent coup in Niger threatens to unleash more private military and security companies on a continent where they have become steadily more powerful in recent decades.
The recent coup in Niger threatens to unleash more private military and security companies on a continent where they have become steadily more powerful in recent decades.
Le coup d’État du 26 juillet au Niger, un pays d’Afrique de l’Ouest, qui menace de saper la présence militaire française et américaine dans la région, a mis en lumière l’exploitation historique et les pratiques en cours de la Françafrique, le terme utilisé pour décrire l’exploitation persistante par les Français.
Jeu de 6 entre les marchands d’hommes, les djihadistes, la Russie, la Chine, les États-Unis et les pays européens.
L’Afrique est un continent de plus en plus sollicité, riche en matières premières convoitées par tous, mais extrêmement pauvre.
Sur fond de contestation grandissante sur le continent, le gouvernement français assure qu’il a appris de ses erreurs au Sahel et qu’il va revoir son dispositif militaire en Afrique. Une nouvelle architecture réfléchie sans le moindre débat démocratique, et qui a tout l’air d’un simple ravalement de façade.
Turkey’s efforts to expand its influence in Africa often align with those of Russia, with both Ankara and Moscow holding back from condemning military coups and seeking to capitalize on post-colonial resentments.
A series of military takeovers in West Africa, the latest occurring in Niger last month, reveal the extent to which Turkish and Russian efforts converge in trying to leverage political shifts to the detriment of former colonial powers, chief among them France, and expand their own influence in the region.
In a recent escalation of tensions in northern Mali, Tuareg former rebels from the Coordination of Azawad Movements (CMA) have reported a fierce clash with the Malian Army and the Russian mercenary group known as Wagner. The incident, which took place in the town of Ber in the northern Timbuktu region, underscores the complex web of interests and alliances that characterize Mali’s ongoing struggle for stability. This article delves into the background of the conflict, the parties involved, and the broader implications for the region.
Il existe un continuum d’événements depuis l’intervention russe en Syrie et le coup d’État en Ukraine, qui culmine avec le détournement actuel des armes de l’OTAN vers les terroristes en Afrique.
En 2014, suite aux politiques de dé-russification mises en place par le Maïdan, une guerre civile a éclaté dans ce qui était alors l’est de l’Ukraine – qui fait aujourd’hui partie de la Fédération de Russie – aboutissant à la séparation de Donetsk et de Lougansk. Dans ce conflit civil, plusieurs militants salafistes de l’État islamique se sont alliés aux forces ukrainiennes, comme l’ont rapporté les services de renseignement russes et comme l’ont admis les agences de presse occidentales et les autorités européennes.
France’s relations in Africa have been strained. The setback in Niger jeopardizes the country’s entire positioning in West Africa, both militarily and politically. Unfortunately, for French President Emmanuel Macron, this is not the only place where his administration is facing failure. We might even dare to ask: Is France about to lose North Africa as well? Indeed, relations between France and Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Libya have been extremely tense.
Niger’s junta accused France on Wednesday of violating its airspace as part of a broader plan to destabilize the country, ratcheting up rhetoric in a way that left little hope for a swift diplomatic resolution of the crisis there.
As the world focuses on Niger and the junta’s standoff with West African states refusing to accept yet another coup d’état in their region, crises further east continue to deteriorate and merit more attention. On August 4, the Ethiopian government declared a state of emergency in Amhara, as clashes between the Amhara nationalist Fano militia and national defense forces escalated. The Ethiopian government’s April announcement that all regional security forces must integrate into the national military or police forces was always an easier-said-than-done exercise. The wartime coalition that Prime Minister Abiy assembled to fight Tigrayan forces has fallen apart, and peace has not delivered the rewards some were clearly expecting, making the prospect of giving up their leverage decidedly unappealing. With the terms of the Tigray peace still not fully implemented and heavy fighting in the city of Gondar, security remains elusive for many Ethiopians.