Africa

Executive Summary

Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to the stability of Somalia, and the group is linked to at least 55 percent of all recorded incidents in the country since 01 September 2018. 
The group operates under and advances a strict interpretation of Islamic law in its areas of influence. Rural communities largely support al-Shabaab due to their ability to provide security and basic social services, providing the militant group with continuous recruitment opportunities.  
Al-Shabaab uses guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare against its targets, with skirmishes and small arms fire (23%), assassination and murder (11%), and IED detonations (11%) being the group’s preferred modes of attack.
While al-Shabaab conducts operations across Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate its focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions with relative frequency. 
In the Banaadir Region, the group primarily targets the Bondhere, Hodan, Howlwadag, and Warta Nabada districts due to the high foot and vehicle traffic, military and police presence, and government offices operating in these districts.
In the Lower Shabelle Region, Al-Shabaab uses Gandarshe as a staging area to launch attacks against military convoys traveling along the Afgoye-Mogadishu corridor and the Merca-Mogadishu corridor.
There is an increased risk of terrorist activity in the Bari Region as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) compete for influence and control over the area. 
While operations by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNA) have significantly degraded al-Shabaab’s military capabilities, the planned reduction in troops may lead to the resurgence of the militant group in urban areas.

Overview

A graph showing the Al-Shabaab operations by type

Al-Shabaab is linked to at least 349 of the 626 recorded incidents in Somalia between 01 September 2018 to 17 February 2019. The group largely operates out of rural areas due to the government’s inability to maintain constant security forces in these areas. While al-Shabaab conduct operations across 13 of the 18 administrative regions of Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate their focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions depending on the month. Al-Shabaab has not conducted any recent operations within the five remaining administrative regions due to their locality within the autonomous region of Somaliland. However, the group uses the Galgala Mountains in the neighbouring Bari Region as a staging area to launch attacks (Ahmed, 2018). Moreover, the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) also maintains an active presence in the Bari Region. Although the two groups are not ideologically aligned and frequently clash, their presence increases the chance that attacks will be carried out in Somaliland in the near future.

The escalation of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel reflects an array of diverse actors operating within distinct geographic concentrations.

As someone who grew up in fundamentalist Muslim countries, the continuing spread in the West of apologists for sharia law is, to say the least, intriguing. It is, of course, good-hearted to wish people from other cultures to feel welcome. Many of these apologists, however, have no first-hand experience of how it feels actually to live in that part of the world or to be a victim of day-by-day radical Islam. What is painful is that although many of these apologists have never lived under Islamist rules, they often act as if they had.

First, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan correctly said, “There is no moderate Islam; Islam is Islam.”

Since the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi, a power vacuum has led Libya down a path of factionalism and war. Isolated from both Tobruk and Tripoli’s rule, extremists and separatists thrive, leaving the future of Libya hanging in the balance.

A game of political cat and mouse between Libya’s Supreme Court in Tripoli and the government in Tobruk, highlights a widening divide that is threatening to tear the country apart.

With war raging between a myriad of militias, and some extremist groups, the latest political rift has further worrying implications for the country.

Calling for elections in the absence of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it.

For the ninth time since 2011, rival Libyan factions are slugging it out to control the country’s strategic “oil crescent,” a coastal strip which begins 100 miles south of Benghazi and arcs westward 250 miles toward Sirte. Located at the center of this crescent are the oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf. These rusting crown jewels of Libya’s oil infrastructure were blockaded by the federalist warlord Ibrahim Jadhran from 2014 to 2016 and attacked twice by the Islamic State.

In Libya there are very few truly national actors. The vast majority are local players, some of whom are relevant at the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances.

Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk, with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidency Council (PC) – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces – in December 2015. Several types of actor scramble for power in today’s Libya: armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in eastern and southern Libya.

Abstract: To date, little work has been undertaken to analyze the Islamic State’s presence in Africa from a comparative perspective. In an effort to begin to understand the broader landscape of the Islamic State’s existence in Africa, this article presents the first overview of the approximate number of fighters in various Islamic State cells in Africa as of July 2018. Leveraging a compilation of best available open-source data along with interviews with subject matter experts, the authors’ best estimates suggest the presence of approximately 6,000 Islamic State fighters in Africa today, spread over a total of nine Islamic State ‘cells.’

Spain’s socialist government, under Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, has promised free healthcare to migrants and says it will investigate every asylum claim individually.

“[A] majority of irregular migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean are most likely not refugees in the sense of the Geneva Convention, given that some 70 % come from countries or regions not suffering from violent conflicts or oppressive regimes.” — From a 2017 report by the European Commission.

“We have created refugee shelters for tens of thousands of people, but there are hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants in our country. This has heavily impaired the security situation. They include terrorists, criminals, and human traffickers who do not care about human rights. It’s horrible.” — Libyan leader Fayez al-Sarraj.

L’année 2016 aurait connu une forte augmentation du nombre de personnes déplacées dans le monde, selon le dernier rapport du Haut Commissariat des Nations unies pour les réfugiés. Zoom sur la région MENA.

«L’Afrique du Nord et le Moyen-Orient continuent à faire face à de multiples situations d’urgence complexes, sans précédent. Des urgences qui vont encore être des défis difficiles à surmonter en 2016. Ces régions sont aujourd’hui des lieux de départ, de transit et des destinations d’arrivée pour les migrants et les réfugiés. Beaucoup, lors de leur périlleux voyage, notamment par la mer, sont victimes de trafics et de passage irrégulier.»