Africa

Presidential inaugural speeches give heads of states with a periodic opportunity to renew their social contract with their people. Carefully crafted and pored upon for, perhaps, weeks before their delivery, such political rhetoric are expected to leave sweet tastes in the mouth of their audience. Quotable quotes, take-away promises, renewal of hope, paradigm shifts and critical data that support government’s renewed zeal are the usual components of such epoch-making speeches. Some of these were not well-pronounced in President Muhammadu Buhari’s speech in 2019.

The Muslim Brotherhood, founded in Egypt in 1928, is a pro-jihad, Islamist movement that has branches throughout the world and seeks to implement Islamic sharia under a global caliphate. Terrorism is only one of the methods the Brotherhood employs, and among its, goals, “democratization” has never been seen as one of them.

Civilian pro-democracy protesters were gunned down on Monday by Sudanese security forces in Khartoum, the country’s capital.

According to various media reports, at least thirteen protesters were killed and approximately 200 injured.

Introduction

Since the ouster of Egyptian president Muhammad Morsi in 2013 and the rise to power of President ‘Abd Al-Fattah Al-Sisi, the regime under Al-Sisi’s leadership has been acting to take control of the media and suppress all dissent, including criticism of the regime’s treatment of its opponents, its economic policies, the government’s performance, or any other criticism. The regime has taken multiple measures to achieve this aim, including the takeover of public and private media by its associates, and the silencing or dismissal of journalists who dare to criticize the authorities.[1] Also to this end, the regime recently set up the Supreme Council for Media Regulation (SCMR), which has sweeping powers to close and block media outlets that do not abide by its rules.

Ever since Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi came to power, the Egyptian regime has maintained a tough policy and an aggressive stance toward its opponents among social activists and journalists,[1] and mainly toward the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization. In line with this policy, the MB has been designated a terror organization and outlawed, and many of its members have been arrested on charges of planning and involvement in terror attacks. In September 2018, death sentences were handed down for 75 members of the organization convicted of planning terror attacks and participating in demonstrations adjacent to the Rabi’a Al-Adawiya Mosque.[2] Subsequently, in February 2019, official Egyptian media reported on the execution of 15 MB members for involvement in the 2015 assassination of public prosecutor Hisham Barakat, the 2014 murder of the son of a judge, and the 2013 murder of a high-ranking police official.

Executive Summary

Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to the stability of Somalia, and the group is linked to at least 55 percent of all recorded incidents in the country since 01 September 2018. 
The group operates under and advances a strict interpretation of Islamic law in its areas of influence. Rural communities largely support al-Shabaab due to their ability to provide security and basic social services, providing the militant group with continuous recruitment opportunities.  
Al-Shabaab uses guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare against its targets, with skirmishes and small arms fire (23%), assassination and murder (11%), and IED detonations (11%) being the group’s preferred modes of attack.
While al-Shabaab conducts operations across Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate its focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions with relative frequency. 
In the Banaadir Region, the group primarily targets the Bondhere, Hodan, Howlwadag, and Warta Nabada districts due to the high foot and vehicle traffic, military and police presence, and government offices operating in these districts.
In the Lower Shabelle Region, Al-Shabaab uses Gandarshe as a staging area to launch attacks against military convoys traveling along the Afgoye-Mogadishu corridor and the Merca-Mogadishu corridor.
There is an increased risk of terrorist activity in the Bari Region as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) compete for influence and control over the area. 
While operations by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNA) have significantly degraded al-Shabaab’s military capabilities, the planned reduction in troops may lead to the resurgence of the militant group in urban areas.

Overview

A graph showing the Al-Shabaab operations by type

Al-Shabaab is linked to at least 349 of the 626 recorded incidents in Somalia between 01 September 2018 to 17 February 2019. The group largely operates out of rural areas due to the government’s inability to maintain constant security forces in these areas. While al-Shabaab conduct operations across 13 of the 18 administrative regions of Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate their focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions depending on the month. Al-Shabaab has not conducted any recent operations within the five remaining administrative regions due to their locality within the autonomous region of Somaliland. However, the group uses the Galgala Mountains in the neighbouring Bari Region as a staging area to launch attacks (Ahmed, 2018). Moreover, the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) also maintains an active presence in the Bari Region. Although the two groups are not ideologically aligned and frequently clash, their presence increases the chance that attacks will be carried out in Somaliland in the near future.

The escalation of violent events linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel reflects an array of diverse actors operating within distinct geographic concentrations.

As someone who grew up in fundamentalist Muslim countries, the continuing spread in the West of apologists for sharia law is, to say the least, intriguing. It is, of course, good-hearted to wish people from other cultures to feel welcome. Many of these apologists, however, have no first-hand experience of how it feels actually to live in that part of the world or to be a victim of day-by-day radical Islam. What is painful is that although many of these apologists have never lived under Islamist rules, they often act as if they had.

First, as Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan correctly said, “There is no moderate Islam; Islam is Islam.”

Since the downfall of Muammar Gaddafi, a power vacuum has led Libya down a path of factionalism and war. Isolated from both Tobruk and Tripoli’s rule, extremists and separatists thrive, leaving the future of Libya hanging in the balance.

A game of political cat and mouse between Libya’s Supreme Court in Tripoli and the government in Tobruk, highlights a widening divide that is threatening to tear the country apart.

With war raging between a myriad of militias, and some extremist groups, the latest political rift has further worrying implications for the country.

Calling for elections in the absence of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it.

For the ninth time since 2011, rival Libyan factions are slugging it out to control the country’s strategic “oil crescent,” a coastal strip which begins 100 miles south of Benghazi and arcs westward 250 miles toward Sirte. Located at the center of this crescent are the oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf. These rusting crown jewels of Libya’s oil infrastructure were blockaded by the federalist warlord Ibrahim Jadhran from 2014 to 2016 and attacked twice by the Islamic State.