Africa

To safeguard its financial resources, the continent needs a cohesive strategy for promoting international tax cooperation.

Global tax cooperation and the fight against illicit financial flows (IFFs) have become crucial in international economic governance, especially for African countries. As the global economy becomes more interconnected, base erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS) practices by multinational enterprises (MNEs) have intensified, leading to significant tax revenue losses. Africa’s annual losses due to IFFs total around $88.6 billion, representing 3.7 percent of its GDP, a severe leak in its economic bucket that exacerbates inequality and stifles growth. This leakage also threatens achievement of the objectives outlined in Africa’s Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU)’s blueprint for continent-wide economic prosperity, as well as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From 1980 to 2018, sub-Saharan Africa lost a staggering $1.3 trillion to these flows, highlighting the scale and persistence of the problem.

‘Africa continues to rise up and delivers surprises. In recent days, several African leaders have made diplomatic trips that are reshaping the geometries of the international chessboard. The SAHEL Alliance states are charting a watershed that could divide Africa in two and determine a new historical course for the entire continent.

This investigation reveals how Nigeria’s dubious defence contracts gave Hima Aboubakar, a Nigerien arms broker, instant riches.

Amid the spilling of raw emotions over Boko Haram’s shocking kidnapping of 214 Chibok schoolgirls in Borno State, north-east Nigeria, in April 2014, the Nigerian government awarded contracts worth millions of dollars for the supply of weapons and tools to boost its offensive against the terrorists. But before formalising the contracts, officials began transferring millions to the contractor, Hima Aboubakar.

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.

Les opérations d’espionnage du régime français sur le continent africain et notamment dans la région du Sahel traduisent d’une part des méthodes occidentales qui ne changent pas et de l’autre confirment le rôle alloué à Paris de la part de son chef washingtonien.

Alors que vendredi 23 août marque un an que le cofondateur du groupe de mercenaires russes Wagner Evgueni Prigojine est mort, les activités militaires russes se poursuivent en Afrique. Depuis son décès dans le crash de son avion en Russie, les activités de Wagner en Afrique ont été reprises par l’État russe sous le nom d’Africa Corps. Qu’en est-il de l’évolution du groupe paramilitaire sur le continent depuis un an ? Dimitri Zufferey, membre du collectif All Eyes On Wagner, répond à Sidy Yansané.

Il s’agit d’une première étude sur la transformation des activités et de l’organisation du groupe Wagner en Afrique après la mort de son fondateur Evgueni Prigojine en août 2023, et son remplacement par Africa Corps. Dans leur rapport, « Africa corps, une nouvelle version d’une ancienne présence militaire russe », deux chercheurs de l’Institut polonais des affaires étrangères (PISM), un centre de recherche public, tentent de comprendre les évolutions récentes de cette présence militaire, économique, informationnelle sur le continent africain.

According to reports, since 2009, Muslims, inspired by Boko Haram, have murdered more than 150,000 Christians in Nigeria.

Chad, Libya, Sudan, the Central African Republic, Cameroon, Nigeria and Niger all struggle with jihadist insurgencies.