Africa

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.

Analysing how separatist camps near communities in the region provide a hideout for the insurgents, a cover for their cache of weapons, and a grave for their victims.

As far as many residents of southeastern Nigeria are concerned, the vast stretch of interstate borderland between Anambra and Imo state is no man’s land — except for the few who find haven in the area.

Resolution allows deployment of 12,626 personnel – but it is unclear if Ethiopia will stay part of peacekeeping force amid territory dispute

The UN has authorised a new African peacekeeping mission to continue supporting Somalia in its fight against al-Shabaab, the insurgent group affiliated with al-Qaida, but there are doubts about whether troops from neighbouring Ethiopia will remain part of the deployment.

Abstract: The Yemen-based Houthis’ top priority is the continued development of their unmanned vehicle and missile programs. Both programs are vital to the Houthis’ ability to exert leverage over both their domestic and external enemies. Securing supply chains and funding for the programs, especially funding and supplies that are independent of Iran, is a key objective for the Houthi leadership. To this end, the Houthis have deepened their relationship with Yemen-based al-Qa`ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP). AQAP, in turn, has opened new doors for the Houthis to interact with Horn of Africa-based militant groups such as al-Shabaab. Both AQAP and al-Shabaab now act as facilitators and, to a degree, as partners that help the Houthis smuggle needed materiel into and out of Yemen. These relationships are also vital to the Houthis’ expanding efforts to fund their weapons programs and the broader organization. The Houthis’ relationship with al-Shabaab and Horn of Africa-based smugglers points to the organization’s growing footprint in the Horn of Africa.

Abstract: Over the past year, mercenaries from the Wagner Group, a private military company with very close ties to the Kremlin, deployed to Mali—first to Bamako, the capital, then to the central part of the country, then in the east all the way to Gao and Ménaka and in the north to Timbuktu. The arrival of Russian mercenaries hastened the departure of French and European forces. However, the Russian private military company did not deploy capable, disciplined, and well-equipped troops to fill the gap, and its brutal and indiscriminate counterinsurgency efforts are serving as a recruiting tool for the jihadis. A year after the arrival of the Russian mercenaries to Mali, the security situation has worsened. Despite ongoing fighting between al-Qa`ida and the Islamic State’s branches in the Sahel, the two terrorist groups are consolidating their sanctuaries and gaining an unprecedented range of action. With concern that Wagner may seek out Burkina Faso as its next client, the Russian mercenaries’ aggravation of the jihadi threat has very concerning implications for the stability and security of the region.

The terrorist group said it attacked military and civilian positions in Nigeria, Niger Republic, Mozambique, the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), and Mali, revealing the group’s sustained influence in Africa despite global efforts to curtail its activities.

In the newly released Al-Naba weekly newsletter, the Islamic State (IS) has claimed a series of attacks across several African countries in one week between Dec. 6 and 12, 2024.

ADRE, CHAD: A man wields a whip for crowd control as refugees wait to receive food. As starvation spreads in Sudan, its military is blocking food aid from coming into the country. Ivor Prickett/The New York Times/Redux

Sudan’s civil conflict has ground on for nearly eighteen months, stirring little outside attention. It now faces the world’s worst famine in forty years.

Libya was the seventh-largest crude oil producer in OPEC and the third-largest total petroleum liquids producer in Africa, after Nigeria and Algeria, in 2023.1 At the beginning of 2024, Libya held 3% of the world’s proved oil reserves and 41% of Africa’s proved oil reserves.2 Despite Libya’s large oil reserves, political conflicts and militia attacks on hydrocarbon infrastructure have limited investments in the country’s oil and natural gas sectors. These challenges have also constrained exploration and development of its reserves since 2011.