The African continent saw a significant increase in coups in the last three years, with military figures carrying out takeovers in Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali.
After Niger’s coup in July, the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said it would not tolerate another takeover, and implemented tough sanctions and threatened military action to restore that country’s democratically elected government.
Jihadist groups in the Sahel, particularly from Burkina Faso, now regularly cross into northern Ghana, using the area for logistical and medical purposes to sustain ongoing insurgencies and help expand freedom of movement throughout West Africa.
Though Ghana has thus far been spared of any major terrorist attacks, there have been attacks in neighboring countries on the West African coast, including Benin and Togo.
Unregulated logging of the Congo Basin rainforests threatens to undercut the livelihoods of millions of households in the region, empower transnational organized criminal networks, and dramatically accelerate global warming.
President-elect Donald Trump’s victory bodes well for US-Morocco relations. As King Mohamed VI recalled in his statement congratulating Trump on his election win, during his first term, Trump recognized Rabat’s full sovereignty over the disputed territory of Western Sahara. Trump made this recognition with a presidential proclamation on December 10, 2020, in exchange for Morocco reestablishing diplomatic relations with Israel. In his statement, Mohammed VI went on to say that “the Moroccan people will forever be grateful” for this recognition, calling Washington “our longstanding friend and ally.”
Russia’s outreach to the region has successfully exploited regimes’ frustrations with the West. Yet it has encountered difficulties in navigating the complex interrelations and rivalries.
The Arab-majority states of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have become an increasing focus of Russian engagement and influence. Moscow is demonstrating a growing appreciation of their strategic value, especially in the domains of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). Geographically, these countries are part of Africa and are members of the African Union and therefore serve as important elements in Russia’s growing power projection on the African continent. They are also situated on the Mediterranean basin, offering Moscow potential points of leverage on the flow of oil and natural gas and irregular migration into the southern flank of NATO-dominated Europe, as well as potential warm water ports for its navy. Further, linguistically, culturally, and politically, the Maghreb is part of the Arab world and plays a role in Russia’s broader “return” to the Middle East and its increased strategic focus on issues such as counterterrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and Syria.
Introduction
For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.
Terrorists that plague northern Nigeria are arming themselves with weapons that originated in Libya, according to Nigerian defense officials.
Weapons traffickers in Nigeria are benefitting from instability across the Sahel, particularly in Niger, which has become a key transit point for weapons taken from Libyan stockpiles. Those weapons have moved into other Sahel countries as well as Nigeria, according to the Small Arms Survey.
On November 8, 2024, the Al-Andalus Foundation, the official media arm of Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), released[1] the 11th episode of its video series “Enlightening the Minds about the Apostasy of Algeria’s Rulers,” featuring a 13-minute audio message in Arabic from senior AQIM member Abu Yasir Al-Jaza’iri, along with a five-page transcript. The media group mentioned that the episode was supposed to precede the previous one, released[2] on September 18, and apologized to the viewers. The message discusses the prohibition to equate “unbelievers” with “believers,” i.e., non-Muslims with Muslims.
Africa has emerged as a pivotal partner in China’s Maritime Silk Road Initiative (MSRI), the maritime dimension of Beijing’s flagship Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). One of the key footholds for Chinese inroads has been the Mombasa Port, located on Kenya’s south-eastern coast.
Mombasa—the largest and busiest port in East Africa—serves as a gateway for landlocked countries in Africa and is central to regional trade. Thus, it is imperative to examine how the port serves as a crucial node in China’s engagement with Africa and reflect on China’s broader geopolitical ambitions in the Western Indian Ocean.
To safeguard its financial resources, the continent needs a cohesive strategy for promoting international tax cooperation.
Global tax cooperation and the fight against illicit financial flows (IFFs) have become crucial in international economic governance, especially for African countries. As the global economy becomes more interconnected, base erosion and profit-shifting (BEPS) practices by multinational enterprises (MNEs) have intensified, leading to significant tax revenue losses. Africa’s annual losses due to IFFs total around $88.6 billion, representing 3.7 percent of its GDP, a severe leak in its economic bucket that exacerbates inequality and stifles growth. This leakage also threatens achievement of the objectives outlined in Africa’s Agenda 2063, the African Union (AU)’s blueprint for continent-wide economic prosperity, as well as the UN Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). From 1980 to 2018, sub-Saharan Africa lost a staggering $1.3 trillion to these flows, highlighting the scale and persistence of the problem.