Africa

In 2021, Africa suffered a new record level of Islamist violence, driven by a 70% increase in violence linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel.

Strengths

• The almost doubling of violence linked to militant Islamist groups in the Sahel (from 1,180 to 2,005 events) highlights the rapid escalation of the security threat in the region. This peak is the most important change among all regions prone to violence by militant Islamist groups in Africa. It eclipses a 30% reduction in violence in the Lake Chad Basin, northern Mozambique and North Africa.
• Overall, violence related to militant Islamist groups increased by 10% in 2021, reaching a record level of over 5,500 events attributed to these groups in Africa. This has continued an upward trend since 2016. However, the annual rate of increase was, in 2021, much lower than the 43% increase reported in 2020.
• The number of deaths attributed to militant Islamist groups fell by 7% in 2021 compared to 2020, reaching around 12,700 deaths across Africa. This includes a 14 per cent decrease in deaths attributed to violence against civilians and a decrease in all regions outside the Sahel.
• Battles between militant Islamist groups and military forces or non-state armed groups constitute 52 per cent of the violent events counted in 2021. In recent years, this reflects the continuation of a significant increase in the number of battles in northern Mozambique, Somalia and the Sahel.
• The violence of militant Islamist groups remains largely concentrated in five theatres – Somalia, the Lake Chad Basin, Mozambique, and North Africa – each including separate local actors and particular challenges.

Cette étude analyse les dynamiques locales qui expliquent la résilience des groupes qualifiés de djihadistes et de terroristes en Afrique subsaharienne, notamment la Katiba Macina, AQMI (Al-Qaïda au Maghreb islamique), le Groupe de soutien à l’islam et aux musulmans, l’EIGS (État islamique au Grand Sahara) et Boko Haram. Centrée sur la partie occidentale de la bande sahélienne, elle ouvre aussi des perspectives comparatistes avec les Chebab de Somalie, du Kenya ou du Mozambique, ainsi que les ADF (Allied Democratic Forces) de l’est de la République démocratique du Congo.

Poursuivant une tendance de dix ans, le nombre d’Africains déplacés de force a augmenté l’année dernière et s’élève aujourd’hui à plus de 40 millions.

Au cours de l’année écoulée, 3,2 millions de personnes supplémentaires ont été déplacés en raison de conflits en Afrique. Cela représente une augmentation de 13 % et poursuit une tendance à la hausse incontrôlée observée depuis 2011.

À la suite de deux coups d’État militaires en 2022, les groupes islamistes militants ont encerclé Ouagadougou, laissant dans leur sillage une violence sans précédent.

France is planning to intervene in Niger, as it continues to deploy troops to several countries in the region, the West African state’s military government has claimed. Relations between Niger and former colonial power France have deteriorated since a coup in July.

The military governments of three African states, which all deposed their Western-backed leaders in recent years, have agreed to assist each other, individually or collectively, in case of any external aggression or internal threat to their sovereignty.

Oversight, accountability, and governance of the security sector are essential ingredients to a capable and effective force, mitigating infractions and contributing to a learning environment that improves future practices.

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