A senior United Nations official has warned the Security Council that urgent measures are needed to avoid famine in the war-torn region of Tigray in Ethiopia, in a briefing seen by AFP.
“There is a serious risk of famine if assistance is not scaled up in the next two months,” wrote Mark Lowcock, the UN Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief Coordinator.
Successeur par intérim d’Hamed Bakayoko à la tête de la Grande loge de Côte d’Ivoire, cet avocat d’affaires peut compter sur d’influentes connexions maçonniques.
Despite challenges of unemployment, corruption, entrenched political leadership, and political violence, many African youth have found constructive avenues to promote peace, effective governance, and reform.
Africa remains the world’s youngest continent with a median age of 19.7 years. By 2050, one in three young people will live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, 80-90 percent of African workers are still engaged in the informal sector. Each year, 10-12 million African youth enter the labor market but only three million formal jobs are created annually. Meanwhile, nearly half of all African countries rank in the bottom quartile of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. These trends underscore mounting social pressures.
Idriss Déby’s death is an outcome of the ongoing instability perpetuated by his regime. The subsequent military coup d’état led by the late president’s son risks deepening political violence in this geographically strategic country.
Chadian President Idriss Déby died on April 20 from wounds he sustained on the frontlines of fighting against the rebel group le Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT). While widely characterized as opening the door to instability, Déby’s death in battle vividly punctuates the outcome of instability wrought under his regime. Instability in Chad has simmered for decades, disrupted by periodic explosions of violence. Corruption, political exclusion, growing disparity, and repression of dissent have long been trademarks of Déby’s rule in Chad, which not coincidentally ranks 187th out of 189 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index.
Le chef des indépendantistes du Front Polisario, Brahim Ghali, hospitalisé en Espagne après avoir contracté le coronavirus, est “en convalescence” et “loin de tout danger”, a indiqué dimanche à l’AFP un haut responsable sahraoui.
“Les médecins confirment qu’il a dépassé l’état critique et qu’il est loin de tout danger”, a déclaré ce haut responsable ayant requis l’anonymat, ajoutant qu’il “récupérait bien et que son état évoluait positivement”.
La France considère que le journaliste français Olivier Dubois, disparu début avril au Mali et réapparu depuis dans une vidéo, est otage d’un groupe jidahiste, a déclaré dimanche le chef de la diplomatie française Jean-Yves Le Drian.
“On peut penser que ce journaliste est aujourd’hui un nouvel otage (…) Tout nous laisse à penser qu’il est otage d’un groupe jihadiste”, a-t-il déclaré au Grand Jury RTL/Le Figaro/LCI.
Multiple Nigerian media outlets reported last week that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has died or been mortally wounded in a confrontation with fighters from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a group that separated from Shekau’s Boko Haram in 2016. The Nigerian government has not confirmed the reports and is investigating. The caution is well-placed: Shekau has been reported dead at least four times since he became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009 following the police killing of founder Mohammed Yusuf.
Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa have terrorized parts of Nigeria for over a decade, provoking national, regional and international responses. Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), Nigeria’s national rehabilitation and reintegration program for members of Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa who have surrendered, defected or were repentant, remains among the most mature and large-scale disengagement programs that currently exist. After several years, hundreds of participants have undergone rehabilitation in transition centers — with many being reintegrated back into communities.
The book on post-9/11 U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is still being written; though, previous chapters are now familiar to most observers. Chapter 1: How the U.S. quickly routed the Taliban, but watched the group reemerge from neighboring sanctuary through a mix of intimidation and appeal to local grievances; Chapter 2: How the U.S. made significant investments in developing Afghan institutions of governance and rule of law, but undermined said efforts by empowering unaccountable local power brokers (in Afghan parlance, “warlords”) for short-term, tactical objectives; Chapter 3: How Afghan officials were regularly cited for corruption and financial mismanagement, but how the U.S. fueled a gold-rush-like situation in a country that had known nothing but conflict and depredation for over a quarter century; and so on. This is the story of the past two decades, or at least a part of it.
Libyan politicians have moved with salutary speed in 2021 to reunify their divided country. With UN help, the new government should hasten to clear two last hurdles: establishing a legal framework for elections and clarity about who holds supreme command of the armed forces.
What’s new? After years in which parallel rival governments fought an intermittent war, Libya has a new consolidated executive. On 10 March, parliament endorsed a national unity government headed by Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dabaiba, which took office in Tripoli. The two pre-existing governments handed over power peacefully.