Burkina Faso’s security, economic, and humanitarian conditions continue to deteriorate under the military junta despite a high-volume information campaign.
Since seizing power in a military coup in September 2022, Burkina Faso’s ruling junta under Captain Ibrahim Traoré has prioritized controlling the narrative of this Sahelian country of 23 million people. With the aid of a cadre of online influencers, intelligence-linked operatives, and affiliated media pages—the Traoré junta has extolled his reported achievements as a transformative leader paralleling the iconic Thomas Sankara.
Initié en avril dernier, le rapprochement entre Ankara et l’homme fort de l’est libyen s’est poursuivi lundi 25 août avec la visite à Benghazi du chef des renseignements turcs, Ibrahim Kalin. Une première pour un responsable turc de ce niveau depuis 2020.
Le maréchal Khalifa Haftar, qui contrôle les parties est et sud de la Libye, a reçu ce lundi 25 août dans son quartier général de Benghazi le chef des renseignements turcs, Ibrahim Kalin, arrivé à la tête d’une haute délégation militaire. Pour l’occasion, son hôte était lui entouré de ses deux fils, Saddam et Khaled Haftar, récemment promus à la tête de l’Armée nationale libyenne (ANL) : alors que le premier en a été nommé vice-commandant général, le second en est devenu le chef d’état major.
Working as the medical coordinator for Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) in Somalia, I see every day how conflict and poverty damage people’s lives. One of our biggest challenges is tuberculosis (TB), which affects many children. TB is not just an illness—it takes away energy, health, and sometimes lives. I see its impact on children like Ahmed*, a 5-year-old I met recently at Mudug Regional Hospital in Somalia.
Abstract: China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Alors que l’armée malienne n’a toujours pas repris ses positions attaquées par les jihadistes du JNIM dans le centre du pays, mardi 19 août, les civils des villages alentours eux aussi pris pour cible continuent de fuir la zone. C’est notamment le cas des habitants de la localité de Farabougou qui a été incendiée.
Security in northwestern Nigeria is deteriorating, with an estimated 30,000 bandits operating in loosely organized groups that have evolved from resource disputes into actors capable of mass abductions and high-casualty attacks.
Zamfara State is the epicenter of violence, where armed groups exploit gold, copper, and lithium deposits to fund operations and sustain arsenals through trafficking routes and raids on state armories.
Abstract: China has recently been pursuing a much more aggressive stance in African security affairs, including playing a more engaged role in counterterrorism (CT). Where is China engaged in CT in Africa, and by what means? What challenges would China face in engaging more robustly in African CT? Most importantly, why is China newly expressing interest in engaging in the African CT landscape at this particular moment? In the main, this piece argues that despite ostensible rationales related to self-defense of economic interests and solidarity with African states, at its core, Beijing’s primary motivations for entering the African CT space are to diversify its means of influence in Africa beyond its historical “economics-first” approach. Recognizing that engaging in African CT is a high-risk but potentially high-reward activity (which other global powers have recently engaged in with mixed results), Beijing likely believes it has a new genre of CT assistance—less kinetic, more economic, and rooted in equitable partnerships—that represents a fundamentally new and productive means of gaining influence in Africa. Yet, China faces challenges in its African CT pursuits, including reconciling whether its cautious ethos can stomach the turbulent landscape of African terrorism; how to deal with a saturated African CT space; and how not to fall victim to the same pitfalls as other global powers that have recently engaged in African CT. Nevertheless, if China can prove that its cautious non-military-first approach is fundamentally different from existing CT value propositions from external states, Beijing could deeply rival, and potentially replace, Washington as the partner of choice for security cooperation in Africa.
Adam Issa struggled to explain why he quit his fisherman’s job to join one of the many jihadist groups holed up in the hundreds of islands of Lake Chad.
“Some of my friends who joined Boko Haram told me that I would make a lot of money with them,” the baby-faced 20-year-old said, eyes fixed firmly downwards.
En présence de dignitaires sénégalais et français, et dans une atmosphère solennelle teintée à la fois de fierté nationale et de gravité, le drapeau tricolore a été descendu pour la dernière fois d’un mât militaire en terre africaine de l’Ouest. La France remettait officiellement au Sénégal la dernière base militaire encore active sur son territoire, mettant un point final à 75 ans de présence militaire ininterrompue. Ce retrait n’est pas un cas isolé : il fait suite aux départs successifs de l’armée française de pays de l’AES, du Tchad, et du Gabon ces dernières années. Ce qui aurait pu sembler, il y a seulement deux décennies, impensable, s’est aujourd’hui imposé comme une réalité géopolitique : l’Afrique francophone, particulièrement dans le Sahel et l’Ouest du continent, tourne délibérément la page d’une relation postcoloniale marquée par une dépendance structurelle, des déséquilibres économiques persistants et un imaginaire politique hérité de l’époque coloniale.
