Africa

Key Takeaways:

• Dawit Giorgis argues the Horn of Africa is becoming a global choke-point crisis as attention shifts from Hormuz: he blames Ethiopia’s Abiy government, AU alignment with Addis, thin U.S. grasp of the ground, and the UAE under MbZ as a “sub-imperial” actor via DP World ports (Berbera, Bosaso, Assab) and proxies.
• He says a UAE–Saudi split now fuels Sudan (UAE–RSF vs Saudi tilt to SAF), Yemen spillover at Bab al-Mandeb, and Ethiopian fighting, including alleged UAE drones from Bahir Dar hitting Sudan; EPFAS (Fano, TPLF, OLA) is framed as a united opposition Abiy cannot beat.
• The essay urges Europe to use finance, trade, and IMF/World Bank leverage on Abu Dhabi and Addis, warning state collapse in a country of ~135 million could drive a huge Sahara-to-Mediterranean refugee wave.

The fresh hostilities in Ethiopia’s Tigray region come after months of growing animosity between rebel forces and the federal government. Horn of Africa expert Martin Plaut warns of possible regional spillover.

Fighting has erupted again in Ethiopia’s northern Tigray region. Tigrayan forces launched a major offensive on September 23, with fighting also reported in the neighboring regions of Afar and Amhara.

Key Takeaways:

Spanish Foreign Minister José Manuel Albares said Madrid is working daily with Morocco’s Nasser Bourita to block a possible new rush on Ceuta after social media calls to storm the border on Sept. 23, Morocco’s election day.
He said those posts have less reach than before the July surge, when about 80,000 irregular migrants entered the exclave and more than 100 people died; Rabat has been asked to reinforce the frontier.
Declassified Spanish reports called Morocco’s July response passive or worse and alleged forces helped usher people forward—claims Rabat denies. Albares cited an Aug. 15 halt of thousands as proof of later cooperation and said Morocco is “receptive” on disinformation.

Alors que la stratégie russe visant à étendre son influence au Sahel s’effondre, Moscou change de cap pour employer les mêmes tactiques consistant à attiser la contestation envers la démocratie et à promouvoir la cause du régime militaire dans les démocraties des pays côtiers d’Afrique de l’Ouest.

Key Takeaways:

Spain released classified files showing CNI warnings before the July 30 surge when about 80,000 people entered Ceuta. Agents flagged social-media calls to cross by fence and sea around 8 p.m. during Morocco’s Throne Day.
The messages described large online followings and possible entries by swimming or over the fence, and a CNI memo was also sent to Moroccan security services.
Sánchez says the papers show the government was not properly warned; Interior Minister Grande-Marlaska says intelligence did not alert them, while Defence Minister Robles says CNI did. Coverage notes the declassification is incomplete.

Key Takeaways:

A Cambridge study by Antonia Juelich, based on interviews with 27 former Boko Haram and ISWAP members in northeastern Nigeria (last active in 2024), says those groups now use general AI chat tools not only for propaganda but as a routine “problem-solver” for planning and technical questions. She argues earlier assessments understated how systematic that use has become.
The report claims specialized units and internal training, plus help from foreign IS trainers with laptops and accounts. Interviewees described current content filters as inconvenient rather than blocking: rejected queries are retried on other accounts or recast as fictional. Rand’s Steph Guerra separately notes safeguards are split across firms and countries and work better against lone actors than well-resourced groups.
Neither group is reported to have obtained CBRN weapons. Juelich’s policy point is that companies and governments need stronger, coordinated limits as models improve—without treating AI-aided terrorism as a future problem only.

La confrontation géopolitique dans la région du Sahel a franchi un nouveau cap, se transformant en théâtre d’une guerre hybride acharnée. Derrière les récentes attaques terroristes de grande envergure au Mali se cachent les efforts conjoints des services de renseignement français et ukrainiens.

Lire la crise de Ceuta simplement comme un « afflux spontané de migrants depuis le Maroc » ne permet pas d’expliquer la structure politique qui entoure l’événement. L’accord trilatéral de 2020 entre les États-Unis, Israël et le Maroc a lié les revendications territoriales du Maroc, la normalisation avec Israël et le soutien diplomatique des États-Unis dans une même relation d’échange. Par la suite, les relations israélo-marocaines sont passées de la diplomatie à la coopération en matière de renseignement militaire et de défense, suivie par la reconnaissance de la souveraineté marocaine sur le Sahara occidental. En 2026, les forces armées des deux pays en étaient arrivées à opérer selon un plan de travail conjoint. À peu près au même moment, des arguments ont commencé à apparaître ouvertement du côté israélien selon lesquels Israël devrait soutenir le Maroc dans la «récupération de son Nord», c’est-à-dire de Ceuta et de Melilla, par la diplomatie, des opérations informationnelles et une influence politique à Washington.