The launch of Turkey’s military incursion into northern Syria on Oct. 9 represents an existential threat for the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES) and Kurdish parties in Syria as a whole, prompting Kurdish political factions, both within Syria and abroad, to reevaluate their survival strategies and alliances. This report explores the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES and the major rifts between them. Even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the Turkish invasion independently.
Introduction
On Oct. 9, Turkey launched Operation Peace Spring1 and Turkish forces began shelling border towns in the Autonomous Administration in Northeast Syria (AANES). After administering the destruction of Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) fortifications2 along the border with Turkey, U.S. forces abandoned their allies and withdrew3 from the area. As of Oct. 21, most U.S. troops had crossed over the border into Iraq, with the last several hundred set to depart within weeks.4
Four days after Turkey announced Operation Peace Spring, a 35-year-old Kurdish politician named Hevrin Khalaf was brutally murdered on her way home from a meeting in Hasakah. Her party, the Future Party in Syria, called for a pluralistic society in the northeast and included an Arab co-chair. Like nearly all Syrian Kurdish political parties, it was tied up with external politics. Turkish state media claims that the party was founded at the request of U.S. officials.5 Future Party representatives ardently refuted these claims, stating that the party is a local and independent movement that opposes the Assad regime.6 After Khalaf’s death, the Future Party requested that the Kurdish National Council (KNC) sever its ties with the Turkey-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) movement known as the Syrian National Coalition. The KNC has since suspended its membership in the Coalition.
Kurdish political factions within Syria and abroad are currently reevaluating their survival strategies and alliances as civilians in the “safe zone” flee the incoming bombardment. KNC executive committee member Ibrahim Biro declared that the KNC had warned7 the Democratic Union Party (PYD) that its U.S. allies would desert it. Biro went on to say that the KNC would defend the AANES borders but that it was the PYD’s actions that had precipitated the invasion that “will change the demographics”8 of northeast Syria.
The situation in the AANES is chaotic and unpredictable with alliances being tested on all sides. The KNC has called on the international community to confront Turkey militarily and condemns the systematic “demographic engineering”9 taking place in northeast Syria. However, each of the external actors engaging in the conflict has different goals and relationships with internal Kurdish movements. The SDF has made a deal with the regime (the details of which are not yet fully understood), which will likely push Kurdish political parties back into the shadows, as they were before the war. Likewise, Kurdish activists and parties that have strongly opposed the regime and the invasion of Afrin have found themselves caught between the invading Turkish forces on one side and the Syrian Arab Army on the other.
This report will explore the various political factions within the Kurdish coalitions in Syria as they functioned under the AANES. The Turkish invasion represents an existential crisis for the AANES and Kurdish political parties in Syria as a whole, yet even under these dire circumstances Kurdish political factions in Syria have responded to the invasion independently.
“Kurdish activists and parties that have strongly opposed the regime and the invasion of Afrin have found themselves caught between invading Turkish forces on one side and the Syrian Arab Army on the other."Abstract
This article will discuss the major rifts in Kurdish political parties in Syria as well as the ramifications of Turkish operations Euphrates Shield and Peace Spring. It seeks to provide context and detailed analysis of the internal Kurdish political processes in the region rather than a broader international perspective. Kurdish political parties fall into two major categories: the KNC and the PYD-dominated Movement for a Democratic Society (TEV-DEM).
The SDF represents an attempt by the U.S. to form a political umbrella to bring together the various militias fighting ISIS and not a long-term democratic governance structure in northeast Syria. As this article will show, Kurdish political parties were hardly united under TEV-DEM. The oppressive political consolidation techniques of the PYD led to local disillusionment with the political processes supported by the U.S. but not with attempts at pan-Kurdish unification. Operation Peace Spring has been universally condemned by prominent Kurdish politicians in both factions, but the differing ideologies and alliances may present an insurmountable barrier to cooperation for the Kurdish political administration and lead them to pursue independent survival strategies.
In order to simplify various Kurdish parties with similar or the same names, this article will employ the English acronyms or most commonly used names in English. I have provided a brief profile of most of the parties referenced at the end of this report to avoid constant introductions to smaller parties and coalitions.
"The SDF represents an attempt by the U.S. to form a political umbrella to bring together the various militias fighting ISIS and not a long-term democratic governance structure in northeast Syria."Why so many parties?
The first Kurdish political parties were established in the late 1950s to counter the rise of Arab nationalism in Syria. These parties were immediately targeted and deemed illegal by the Syrian authorities, first under the United Arab Republic and later the Ba’ath Party.10 Early Kurdish parties and their predecessors differentiated themselves from popular communist movements by specifically addressing Kurdish rights and adopting a range of leftist ideologies.
Almost all modern Kurdish political parties can be traced back to offshoots of the first Kurdish political party in Syria, the Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (KDP-S), which was founded in 1957. Kurdish parties in Syria have a long history of fragmentation for several reasons. The illicit nature of their political activities and their exclusion from Syrian politics forced them to form advocacy networks without a central authority. In order to maintain secrecy and evade the Syrian secret services, Kurdish political parties operated in a highly compartmentalized and hierarchical structure that was vulnerable to in-fighting and un-democratic practices.11 Parties split based on the will of their leaders and often ended in bitter rivalry between like-minded political opponents each eager to lead their own party. However, more importantly, Kurdish political parties have often been co-opted, funded, and supported by external actors.12 Party alliances with the Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) in Turkey, the Barzani family in Iraq, and more recently the Turkish government have led to conflicting goals and adversaries despite similar demands and ideologies.
Before the outbreak of the civil war, it was estimated that Syrian Kurds made up about 10 percent of the population,13 while in Turkey Kurds make up about 19 percent of the population.14 The Kurdish conception of “Kurdistan” extends throughout Turkey, Syria, Iran, and Iraq, where Kurds also make up a sizeable portion of the population.
Since the Dersim Rebellion in Turkey in 1937, pan-Kurdish sentiment has transcended national borders, creating complex identities and insurgencies across many different tribes. As such, Kurdish movements in Syria have been unable to escape associations with Kurds in neighboring countries and the formation of an autonomous Kurdistan. Syrian Kurds have often contributed to movements in Turkey and Iraq and these borders and national identities are somewhat fluid.
"Kurdish political parties have often been co-opted, funded, and supported by external actors. Party alliances with the PKK in Turkey, the Barzani family in Iraq, and more recently the Turkish government have led to conflicting goals and adversaries despite similar demands and ideologies."What do they want?
Kurdish political parties in Syria agree in their demands for democratic governance and Kurdish cultural rights. The vast majority also call for a Kurdish autonomous region or federation inside Syria. The difference between these two power-sharing models has warranted considerable attention from both the Syrian regime and its neighbors. The KNC has advocated for a federation similar to the KRG while the PYD promotes its autonomous administration.
At the onset of the Syrian Civil War most Kurdish political parties distanced themselves from the Free Syrian Army (FSA) on several fronts. The issue of Kurdish autonomy was off-putting to many Syrian rebels and from the start many Kurdish political parties viewed the FSA as a distinct movement from their own. Yet, in the early years of the revolution many Kurds joined flanks on both sides and several Kurdish parties became part of the Syrian National Council (SNC), a coalition of FSA groups supported by Turkey.
"In the early years of the Syrian Civil War many Kurds joined flanks on both sides and several Kurdish parties became part of the SNC, a coalition of FSA groups supported by Turkey."The two factions
After the 2004 Kurdish uprising15 in Syria there was a resurgence in the formation of new political parties, and between 2004 and 2010 seven new parties were formed.16 The Syrian Civil War did not halt the fragmentation of Kurdish political parties despite the increased motivation for a unified movement. The rise of the PYD pushed opposition parties together into a hodgepodge of coalitions that eventually formed the boundary line between the KNC and the PYD-led autonomous administration. In 2012, the PYD’s military component, the People’s Protection Units (YPG), and its allies were allowed to lay claim to vast swathes of land in northeast Syria while the regime retreated, largely without contestation. The forces that would later form the SDF focused their manpower on pushing ISIS out of northeast Syria and the KNC developed as a response to the hegemony of the PKK-aligned PYD.
The PYD
The PYD functions as the leading party within TEV-DEM, the legislative body of the AANES. It was founded in 2003 as the Syrian branch of the Kurdistan Communities Union (KCK), a transnational coalition of PKK-aligned political movements in Turkey, Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Abdullah Öcalan founded the KCK from prison in 2003 with the hope of establishing democratic confederacies in each region.17 In 1998 Turkey and the Assad regime signed the Adana Agreement to work together to combat Kurdish insurgents.18 Previously Hafez al-Assad harbored and funded PKK training camps in Lebanon’s Bekaa Valley19 and in some pockets of Syria in order to counter Turkey’s threats to continue its restrictive dam projects on the upper Euphrates.20 Assad’s aid to the PKK also provided an external outlet for Kurdish insurgent movements. The Adana Agreement prevented Turkish military intervention but also pushed the Syrian government to crack down on Kurdish resistance and become increasingly oppressive to appease its Turkish neighbors. Human Rights Watch notes “since 2004 the Syrian government has quashed public gatherings to express solidarity with fellow Kurds across international borders with harsh measures, including firing live ammunition at demonstrators, arrests, detention, and prison terms.”21 The PYD, among other Kurdish movements, continued its political activism despite the oppression of the Syrian regime up until the revolution.
At the brink of the Syrian Civil War the PYD faced new ideological dilemmas and opportunities. Despite the fact that the party leadership “such as party chairman Salih Muslim, Hadiya Yusuf, and Anwar Muslim have all spent time in prison” the YPG has both clashed and cooperated with the Assad regime during the war. The PYD has since developed a unique ideology and has distanced itself from its origins as a political party and a PKK affiliate. Its charter no longer declares Öcalan as the leader of the PYD,22 and former PYD leader Saleh Muslim Mohammed further distanced himself from the party’s origins, claiming that “the decision making [in the self-ruling areas] is no longer the PYD’s — now the people rule themselves. The councils have been established, and the people decide.”23 Nevertheless, there have been many credible claims regarding the overwhelming influence of PKK leaders from Qandil in the PYD political process. Long-time PKK commander Sahin Cilo, who now is often referred to as Mazlum Kobane, serves as the commander-in-chief of the SDF.24 Despite the notable differences in central ideological claims and uses of violence, the PYD is both politically and practically tied to the PKK.
With the withdrawal of regime forces from the northeast in the early days of the war, the PYD was able to redefine its ideology and governance structure as it developed. As a result, what began as a weak political party transformed into an armed struggle and the only Kurdish enclave to successful attempt Öcalan’s democratic confederacy experiment.25 Unlike the PKK, the PYD operates as a ruling political party and functions within TEV-DEM. Its autonomy from the regime allowed it to develop as a political organization separate from its military wing, the YPG.
The PYD’s transition into a semi-autonomous governance structure allowed it to establish a reputation somewhat independent from the PKK in the international sphere. The YPG’s reputation as one of the few “secular” and “progressive” movements in Syria won it the sympathy of many international actors. With U.S. support for the YPG in its fight against ISIS, the PYD gained political legitimacy and temporary protection from both the regime and the FSA.
The KNC
The KNC (also known as ENKS) acts as the umbrella coalition of Kurdish political parties and movements in Syria. Founded in 2011 in Erbil, Iraq, the organization is closely aligned with the Barzani family and the Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) in Iraq.26 The KNC acts as a coalition of KDP-backed Syrian Kurdish parties. It has advocated for the use of Iraqi Peshmerga in the fight against ISIS and promotes the formation of a federation within a democratic Syria.27 The KNC opposes the PYD based on its links to the PKK and oppression of opposition parties.
FSA movements and the KNC have had a rocky relationship from the start despite the KNC’s continued dedication to the fall of the regime and the creation of a democratic Syria. In February 2012 all KNC parties except the Kurdish Democratic Union Party (KDUP) left the Turkey-backed FSA coalition SNC and the National Coordination Committee for Democratic Change (NCC) due to their outright rejection of a potential Kurdish federation within Syria. Nevertheless, on Aug. 27, 2013 the KNC rejoined the SNC despite the fact that its ally, the KDP, refuses to work directly with the SNC.28 When Turkey invaded Afrin in early 2018, the KNC once again suspended its relations with the SNC, but later returned to the council to work to find a diplomatic solution.
The KNC promotes itself as abiding by international initiatives and laws and promoting dialogue. As a result the KNC has engaged with several different actors in Syria and abroad, including the United Nations.29 In 2012, Turkey’s former foreign affairs minister, Ahmet Davutoglu, met with KNC leaders,30 and in May of the same year KNC leader Hakim Bashar met with U.S. officials. In December 2016 Russia declared that it would attempt to mediate between the KNC and the PYD, but the former rejected any dialogue with Russia.31 In January 2018, the KNC held a protest in Amude against the Turkish occupation in Afrin.32 In July 2012 the KNC formed a joint council, the Kurdish Supreme Council, within the overarching political body of TEV-DEM, known as the People’s Council of Western Kurdistan (MGRK).33 The KNC has experienced infighting of its own as well, however. In 2015 hundreds of protesters rallied outside a KDP-S office over allegations that the party had rigged the local KNC elections in Derik, Syria in its favor.34 In 2017, Jwat Mella of the KDP-S was elected to replace Ibrahim Brio as the head of the KNC,35 but Ibrahim Biro remains the most prominent and vocal KNC representative. The KNC National Assembly has 26 members with 11 independent representatives,36 and the KNC currently has 14 member parties:37
The Kurdish Union Party in Syria (Yekîtî), chairman: Ibrahim Biro
The Kurdistan Democratic Party – Syria (PDK‑S), chairman: Siʿud Mala
The Kurdish Reform Movement – Syria, chairman: Faisal Yusuf
The Kurdish Democratic Equality Party in Syria, chairman: Niʿmat Dawud
The Kurdish Democratic Patriotic Party in Syria, chairman: Tahir Sa’dun Sifuk
The Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (el‑Partî), chair: vacant
The Kurdish Democratic Union Party in Syria (Democratic Yekîtî), chairman: Hajar ʿAli
The Kurdistan Democratic Union Party, chairman: Kamiran Haj ʿAbdu
The Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria, chairman: Shalal Gado
The Kurdistan Left Party – Syria, chairman: Mahmud Mala
The Kurdish Future Movement in Syria, chairman: Siamand Hajo
The Kurdish Future Movement in Syria, head of the communication office: Narin Matini
Syrian Yezidi Assembly, chairwoman: Mizgin Yusuf
Avant-garde Party Kurdistan-Syria, chairman: Ismail Hesaf"In 2012, the PYD’s military component, the YPG, and its allies were allowed to lay claim to vast swathes of land in northeast Syria while the regime retreated, largely without contestation."Political processes in AANES
With the formation of the AANES some Kurdish political parties became, practically speaking for the first time, functioning political parties instead of unelected movements. On paper AANES offered parties the opportunity to contribute to parliament as well as local communes and councils. Despite the promising prospects, many parties faced the same oppressive tactics utilized by the Syrian regime before the uprising. Members of KNC-affiliated parties were arrested and deported, offices were vandalized, and radio stations were disbanded by pro-PYD vigilantes or the AANES police force, known as the Asayish, themselves. The political parties of the KNC refused to register as official political organizations with AANES and were ironically deemed “illegal” by the PYD. As a result, most KNC parties boycotted the election. Others broke with the KNC and joined the political process dictated by the PYD to take part in the historic elections of 2015 and 2017.
"In order to reduce the influence of the KRG in the region, the PYD refused the Iraqi Peshmerga entry into the autonomous region and repressed political parties backed by Barzani."Arrests, detentions, and political oppression in Rojava
The PYD has attempted to consolidate political and military power over the region. In order to reduce the influence of the KRG in the region, the PYD refused the Iraqi Peshmerga entry into the autonomous region and repressed political parties backed by Barzani.38 While the PYD has strengthened its ties with local minorities, it has failed to earn the support of many of its Arab and Kurdish constituents.
The Asayish employed by the TEV-DEM has conducted both formal and plainclothes arrests of the PYD’s political opponents on numerous occasions. Raids on opposition party offices, attacks on political demonstrations,39 and other oppressive tactics have been spurred by anti-PYD rhetoric, symbolic responses to political actions taken by the KRG in Iraq, and perceived support of Turkish operations.40 According to a 2014 Human Rights Watch report, arrests regularly occur without necessary warrants and end in arbitrary detention, torture, and/or inadequate trials.41 On June 27, 2013, YPG militants killed five members of the opposition party Yekiti and arbitrarily arrested and beat 50 others in response to anti-PYD protests in Amude. In 2016, the long-time KNC leader Ibrahim Biro himself was arrested and later released across the border in Iraq.
In the months preceding the 2017 elections, a wave of new arrests targeted “illegal” and unpermitted political parties, resulting in the closure of nearly all opposition party offices.42 The Northern Syria Observer stated that 44 organizations’ headquarters and offices were closed in just three days.43 In May 2017, 13 leading members of the KNC were arrested in Qamishli.44 In September 2017 Asayish also arrested several KNC party members and affiliates on the organizing committee for publicly celebrating the KRG independence referendum.45
However, in January 2019 TEV-DEM announced that unlicensed parties could now legally reopen their offices in an attempt to repair relations between the two factions. The Kurdistan National Congress (KNK), a pan-Kurdish coalition of organizations with over 288 representatives, also pledged to investigate detained opposition party members.46 This decision came in response to the threat of an impending Turkish invasion made increasingly likely by President Donald Trump’s stated intention to withdraw U.S. troops from Syria. Nevertheless, in the most recent meeting of the central committee of the Kurdish Union Party of Syria (PYKS), a KNC member, it reported that although the PYD had called for the reopening of PYKS offices, those in Amude and Qamishli were still under the control of the PYD.47 In September, the KNC reported that a member of the local KNC office in Qamishli, Kandri Jan, had been arrested and a cultural seminar had been shut down.48 KNC members noted that the promised concessions were a “positive step,” but sought greater gains in power-sharing and representation.
Since the elimination of ISIS’ territorial control in Syria, SDF anti-terror operations have increased sharply. While the SDF regularly claims to arrest “ISIS agents,” there are growing reports that some of those arrested are civil activists.49
However, many fake videos have also been published in the past year claiming to show “PKK” abuses against the local Arab population. These are often poor quality with over-the-top emphasis on showing PKK or YPG symbols during the alleged event.
"In 2016, the long-time KNC leader Ibrahim Biro himself was arrested and later released across the border."Free press
In August 2015 the Kurdish Supreme Committee, a political body created in 2012 to incorporate the KNC and TEV-DEM, announced the creation of the Union of Free Media (YRA). According to Reporters Without Borders, this new body, which acts as a sort of information ministry, requires journalists and news agencies to request a permit to operate and update authorities on their movements.50 Many media workers have reported abuse and threats that have impeded their political coverage. Zara Seyda, the former head of the Yekiti Party’s media and editor of Ara News, fled to Turkey after filming Asayish fire upon anti-PYD protesters in Amude in July 2013. According to the U.S. State Department website, the PYD “violently suppressed freedom of assembly and severely limited freedom of speech.”51 At times opposition media, such as Orient TV and SMART news, have been able to operate in the area, but the permitting process and informal “redlines” have caused both self-censorship and active censorship to occur.52 The autonomous administration also requires permits for public protests — though opposition protests do still occur.53 In September 2019 pro-KRG media outlet Kurdistan 24 was banned from the AANES despite having a permit.
"According to the U.S. State Department website, the PYD 'violently suppressed freedom of assembly and severely limited freedom of speech.'”Elections
On March 13, 2015 members of three cantons in northern Syria went to the polls to elect municipal council members. A total of 160 polling stations were opened in Derik, Girke Lege, Tirbespiye, East Qamishli, West Qamishli, Amude, Dirbesiye, Ras al-Ayn (Sari Kani), Hasakah, Al Yaarubiya, Al Jawadiyah, and the villages of Ebu Raseyn. The Rojava High Election Commission stated that 565 candidates stood for 12 municipal councils.55 The process was to be repeated after a series of reforms and changes in political parties in the region.
In 2017 TEV-DEM scheduled a series of elections to fill positions on both a local and parliamentary level. The local commune election was set to take place in September 2017, followed by municipal and provincial elections in November the same year. While both elections were carried out, the regional and Democratic People’s Congress elections scheduled for January 2018 never came to fruition.56 They were postponed, and later postponed indefinitely, due to “administrative issues.” Thus, as of 2019 the PYD administration still appoints rather than elects all parliamentary positions.
Nonetheless, the 2017 elections provided residents with a ballot (a right which “stateless” Kurds57 were previously denied under Assad) and was met with a relatively high turnout rate. Delegations from the KRG and Turkey’s People’s Democratic Party (HDP) were allowed to observe the election process.58 Two lists dominated the polls: the opposition’s National List and the PYD-aligned Democratic Nation List (LND).
The LND included 18 parties: Democratic Union Party, Arab National Body, Kurdistan Democratic Party – Syria, Kurdish Liberal Party, Syrian Union Party, Kurdish Left Party in Syria, Syrian Kurdish Democratic Party, Kurdistan Democratic Peace Party, and several smaller parties.
The National List included four parties: Kurdish Democratic Unity Party in Syria (Yekiti), Kurdish Democratic Left Party in Syria, Kurdish Democratic Party in Syria (al-Party) Reformist Movement of Syria, and Syrian Kurdish Democratic al-Wefaq Party.
Additionally, the Syrian National Democratic Alliance acted as a small grouping of primarily Arab opposition allies of the PYD.60
Local commune elections
On July 27-28, 2017, 13 observers from Iraqi Kurdistan witnessed 70% of residents of the Democratic Federation of Northern Syria take to the polls to vote for representatives of 3,700 local communes. Candidates were elected in pairs, one man and one woman (hence double the elected officials per seats available).61
Results in Cizire Canton: In Cizire Canton 437,142 voters cast their ballots for 7,687 candidates competing for 5,102 seats in 2,551 communes. 8,370 of the voters were internally displaced people (IDPs).
Results in Euphrates Canton: In Euphrates Canton 135,611 voters cast their ballots for 3,192 candidates competing for 1,698 seats in 849 communes. 772 of the voters were IDPs.
Results in the Afrin Canton: In Afrin Canton 155,697 voters cast their ballots for 1,440 candidates competing for 830 seats in 415 communes. 5,395 of the voters were IDPs.62
Local council elections
The second round of elections was scheduled for November to elect local council members for towns, cities, and regional councils, but was postponed to December.63 On Dec. 5, 2017 69% of residents finally went to the polls.
Rejected candidates: Of the 3048 candidates, 102 were rejected by the PYD in Cizire Canton, 4 in Euphrates Canton, and 48 in Afrin Canton.65
Results in Cizire Canton:
The LND won 2,718 seats out of 2,902 candidates.
The National List won 40 seats out of 99 candidates.
Independent candidates won 144 seats out of their 267 candidates.Results in Euphrates Canton:
The LND won 847 seats out of 954 candidates.
The Syrian Democratic Unity Party in Syria’s list (Yekiti) won 40 seats out of 124 candidates.
Out of 95 independent candidates, 67 were elected.Results in Afrin Canton:
The LND won 1056 seats out of 1175 candidates.
The Syrian Democratic Unity Party list won 72 seats out of 197 candidates.
The list of the Syrian National Alliance won 8 seats out of 48 candidates.
Independent candidates won 40 seats out of 86 candidates.“The 2017 elections provided residents with a ballot (a right which ‘stateless’ Kurds were previously denied under Assad) and was met with a relatively high turnout rate.”
Divisions over Afrin
Turkey views the AANES as a threat to Turkish national security due to the PYD’s connection to the PKK, which is designated as a terrorist group by the U.S., Turkey, and the EU. Unlike the PYD, the KNC joined the Turkish-backed SNC opposition movement. While the KNC and the SNC have had a rocky relationship over disagreements on the formation of a Kurdish federation, the KNC refused to abandon its connection to the FSA and remains obstinately anti-regime.
In January 2018, Operation Olive Branch united Kurdish movements on some fronts while confronting Kurds with the threat of Turkish invasion and control over the autonomous region.76 Human rights abuses and the eventual occupation of Afrin pushed the rhetoric against Turkey and Turkish-backed FSA forces to extremes. The KNC’s connections to the KRG, which has in recent years developed a closer relationship with Turkey and greater cooperation on operations against PKK militants in Qandil, led to accusations from PYD and PKK supporters that KNC parties were merely Turkish proxies. This accusation is further fueled by the fact that the KNC is often touted as a “legitimate” Kurdish organization by Turkey.77
While the KNC spoke out78 against the actions of Turkish-backed FSA groups in Afrin and called for the withdrawal of Turkish troops, it also remained a member of the SNC, which has supported Turkey’s military operations.79 PYD officials have accused Afrin Council leader Hasan Şindi of having ties with the KNC, and upon the council’s formation they issued arrest warrants for two top Yekiti officials on apparent charges of supporting it.80 Hasan Şindi later fled Syria after receiving threats from a violent group known as the Wrath of Olives Operation Room, which has been accused of being backed by the PYD.81
Further accusations of KNC cooperation with the Afrin Council and Turkish authorities in Afrin stem from former KNC member Abdulaziz Temo, who founded the Independent Kurdish Coalition in Syria. Temo’s organization supports Turkey’s intervention in Syria and takeover of Afrin. Contrary to this accusation, Temo’s movement has referred to both the PYD and the KNC as “terrorists” and considers them foreign proxies. Al-Monitor reported that the organization regularly displays Turkish flags at its meetings, illustrating its ardent support for the Turkish-led administration of Afrin.
The already divided Yekiti Party, a member of the KNC, exemplifies the divisiveness of the Afrin operation and the SNC. On June 5, 2019 the party split in two.82 Abdulbaqi Yousef, Abdulsamad Xalaf Biro, and Hassan Salih left the party to form the Kurdistan Union Party.83 Prominent KNC official and Yekiti party leader Ibrahim Biro claimed that the defectors were influenced by the PKK and had been ousted.84 However, one of the former party members explained that the split was based on internal disputes about condemning the Turkish occupation of Afrin.
Rhetoric around the Turkish occupation has also given the PYD a pretense to arrest KNC party leaders based on their alleged support for Turkey. On July 11, 2018 members of KNC member party the Kurdish Democratic Progressive Party in Syria (PDPKS) in Afrin were arrested85 by an unnamed armed group despite the fact that the party has publicly condemned the Turkish occupation of Afrin.86 KDP-S member Hussein Ibish was also arrested by military police in Afrin.87 The accusations linking the KNC to Turkish authorities have persisted in 2019: in August a pro-PYD news agency alleged that the KNC had met with a Turkish intelligence officer, and on Oct. 3 the KNC reported the circulation of disinformation regarding KDP-S leader Mohammed Ismail’s stance on the Turkish occupation of Afrin.88 The KNC denounced both of these claims.89
In an interview with Syria Direct in January 2018 former KNC leader Ibrahim Biro stated that the KNC had been in contact with Turkish officials, but only to warn them of “the serious repercussions of their intervention in Afrin,”90 and their renewed involvement with the SNC after a brief hiatus was solely on a political level. The KNC began talks with the SNC to establish a joint education committee to ensure that Kurdish is taught for the first three years of school in Afrin and that youths can access certified educational degrees.91 After the KNC’s brief estrangement from the SNC, the former was also allowed to represent itself independently at the Syrian opposition’s High Negotiations Committee (HNC) for the first time, in line with its desire for representation distinct from the largely Arab SNC.92 Hakim Bashar, member of the KDP-S political bureau, former leader (and current member) of the KNC, and vice president of the National Coalition of Syrian Revolution and Opposition Forces, has been the most vocal in supporting dialogue between Turkey and the KNC.93 On July 27, 2019 he and other members of the SNC met with a variety of organizations in Afrin to address the basic needs of residents, such as elementary education.
“In January 2018, Operation Olive Branch united Kurdish movements on some fronts while confronting Kurds with the threat of Turkish invasion and control over the autonomous region.”
The best laid plans
Since the beginning of the Syrian Civil War Kurdish factions have increased their efforts to form a pan-Kurdish movement. In 2012 the KNC and the PYD met in Erbil and agreed to form the Supreme Kurdish Committee as part of the first Hawler Agreement. After constant back and forth between the PYD and the KNC, in October 2014 the KNC and TEV-DEM made yet another agreement to cooperate in order to focus their efforts on the fight against ISIS.94 The agreement envisioned the creation of a 30-member council to rule the autonomous region in northeast Syria and the formation of a joint military force.95 Later that year, Iraqi Kurds in the Roj Peshmerga came to the aid of the YPG in Kobani, demonstrating a strong show of solidarity.96 However, as was with the case with the previous Hawler Agreements and the Supreme Kurdish Committee, collaborative efforts failed. The Roj Peshmerga later returned to the KRG to prevent fighting between the pro-KNC forces and the YPG.97 Ultimately, promises on both sides proved hollow, and in 2017 the KDP-backed Roj Peshmerga and the YPG-affiliated Sinjar Resistance Units (YBS) clashed in a violent turf-war in Sinjar.98
President Trump’s announcement that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria in December 2018 rekindled efforts to unify Kurdish forces. France and the U.S. attempted to nudge the KNC and the PYD together through a series of diplomatic talks aimed mostly at engaging the KNC.99 In an interview with Kurdistan24100 in January 2019, KDP-S leader and KNC executive member Mohammed Ismail stated that for relations with the PYD to thaw “prisoners should be released, political activities of the KNC should be allowed, KNC offices should open, the media should be free, and people who were deported should come back.” Then, he remarked, they could sit together and reach a solution. The KNC also requested that an international guarantor help mediate between the two factions to facilitate shared governance.
In the newest phase of the Astana Agreement — a series of diplomatic talks about the future of Syria between Iran, Turkey, and Russia — TEV-DEM was excluded from the UN-sponsored Constitutional Committee while the KNC was allowed membership101 in the Turkey-backed alliance of opposition forces known as the Syrian National Coalition. Both groups, however, decried the lack of representation of Kurdish groups in the committee and again stressed the need for a united Syrian Kurdish front.
As a whole, pan-Kurdish coalitions have failed due to a lack of pressure on the PYD to offer concessions to the KNC. Power-sharing plans lacked a dedicated international guarantor that could provide meaningful concessions. U.S. diplomacy primarily concentrated on ensuring that the YPG had the means to combat ISIS. Beyond this, the administration failed to address long-term goals in northeast Syria and inclusive representation of opposition parties.
"President Trump’s announcement that the U.S. would withdraw its troops from Syria in December 2018 rekindled efforts to unify Kurdish forces."The new “Arab Belt” and the ripple effect
The next phase of Turkey’s plan for northeast Syria, an ambitious resettlement plan, would require displacing the current (primarily Kurdish) residents, many of whom are now fleeing the violence of Operation Peace Spring.102 This plan bears an uncanny resemblance to Assad’s construction of the so-called “Arab Belt” in the 1970s103 and attempted demographic engineering to push out Kurdish residents along the border.104 It is likely that the resettled refugees and civilians would pay the price for Turkey’s aggression in Syria. Cross-border shelling and mortars have already killed civilians in Turkish border towns and AANES territory alike. An estimated 450,000 civilians (including 90,000 IDPs) live within 3 miles of the Turkish-Syrian border.105 If the rise of the Wrath of Olives Operations Room is any indication of what a Turkish occupation could mean in former AANES territory, new and old residents alike could face fresh dangers as they form a human barrier between Kurdish forces and the Turkish border.
The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria will be felt beyond its extended borders. On top of the refugee crisis that is bound to ensue, and heightened tensions between the KRG and Turkey, the PKK and Kurdish activists will see the invasion as a greenlight to escalate. In Turkey, the invasion threatens to tear apart the opposition coalition. The HDP, viewed by many as the “Kurdish” party in Turkey, has been unshaking in its condemnation of Operation Peace Spring106 and its outspoken criticism has already been met with arrests of several HDP representatives.107 Their coalition partner the Republican People’s Party (CHP), however, voted in parliament in favor of extending the government’s permission to launch cross-border military operations for another year.108 CHP leader Kemal Kilicdaroglu tweeted, “Our prayers are for our heroic soldiers to return home safe and sound, after successful completion of Operation Stream of Peace. May God protect and lead our boys to glory.”109 According to Ahval, on Oct. 2, the nationalist opposition Good Party reportedly left the CHP-led opposition coalition after criticizing its relationship with the HDP.
"The Turkish refugee resettlement plan bears an uncanny resemblance to Assad’s construction of the so-called 'Arab Belt' in the 1970s and attempted demographic engineering to push out Kurdish residents along the border."KNC and SDF allies’ responses to the Turkish invasion
On Oct. 22 Turkey and Russia made a deal to recognize the land encompassed by Operation Peace Spring. Under this deal, on Oct. 23, Russian and regime forces would “facilitate the removal of YPG elements” in the land occupied by Turkey and Turkish-backed FSA forces.111 It is unclear how “YPG elements” will be defined. Many Kurds have viewed this as a further betrayal by Russia, as Russia had previously made statements sympathetic to representation for Syrian Kurds and offered to mediate on their behalf.112
As Turkey pushes its “safe zone” 20 miles into SDF territory (as opposed to the U.S. implemented 3- to 9-mile zone), Kurdish parties look toward an uncertain future.113 Civilians are fleeing to the remaining SDF territory around Hasakah as others attempt to enter Iraqi Kurdistan.
Before the invasion, PYD leader Salih Muslim and KNC member Kamran Hajo both expressed their anxiety at the inconclusive border zone diplomacy between Turkey, the U.S., and the SDF,114 but remained open to diplomatic measures endorsed by the U.S. to avoid escalation. In an interview with Rudaw, a KNC member stated that if the safe zone “is under the supervision of the coalition — America and other countries, not just Turkey — it is a good thing as the people of the region — especially Kurds — will be protected from attacks by Bashar al-Assad and Turkey.”115 Ilhan Ahmed, co-chair of the SDF’s executive committee, similarly regarded the safe zone as an acceptable phase of the diplomatic process, but said that more U.S. troops would be needed to implement the intended extended safe zone. As for Turkey’s proposed resettlement plan, Ahmed stated that only refugees originally from northeast Syria would be allowed to return.116
As Operation Peace Spring sends northeast Syria into chaos, the KNC will look to the KRG for support — although it does not seem to be receiving any militarily — while the PYD has turned once again to Assad. In the process of condemning the Turkish invasion, allegations of the KNC’s pro-Turkey stance have further frayed pan-Kurdish coalitions. As such, when confronted with a Turkish invasion and the possibility of a new power-sharing agreement with the regime, the PYD and the KNC have responded independently.
TEV-DEM has made a desperate deal with the regime, which despite its statements otherwise threatens to end the “Rojava project” as a whole. While the future of the AANES is unclear, it seems that the experiment with autonomy is winding down. The alleged “ceasefire” struck between President Erdogan and Vice President Mike Pence portions out the 20 miles of northeast Syria to Turkey that it originally wanted. As for the KNC, which is a self-designated anti-regime movement, the party seems to have gone quiet as the regime steps back into SDF territory. Some residents, primarily in Arab majority cities in the east, have already begun protesting the return of the regime, while others have fled to the KRG border.117
While the KNC looks toward the KRG for support, the latter has so far only released carefully worded diplomatic denouncements118 of Operation Peace Spring and requested that Russia negotiate with Turkey to ensure the safety of the Syrian Kurds. Yet as U.S. forces withdrew across the border to Iraq, they were met with obscenities and curses from civilians.119 The international response, which the KNC has often pushed for, has been limited beyond the threat of sanctions and international condemnation. On Oct. 10 in an emergency meeting of the UN Security Council, both Russia and the U.S. failed to condemn Turkey’s military operation.120 The KNC’s plea for international diplomacy seems, for now, to be falling on deaf ears.
"As Operation Peace Spring sends northeast Syria into chaos, the KNC will look to the KRG for support — although it does not seem to be receiving any militarily — while the PYD has turned once again to Assad.""The Turkish invasion of northeast Syria will be felt beyond its extended borders. On top of the refugee crisis that is bound to ensue, and heightened tensions between the KRG and Turkey, the PKK and Kurdish activists will see the invasion as a greenlight to escalate."