Author: M Barbu

The West Is Letting Libya Tear Itself Apart

Calling for elections in the absence of stable institutions while competing for diplomatic and economic influence won’t rebuild the country — it will destroy it.

For the ninth time since 2011, rival Libyan factions are slugging it out to control the country’s strategic “oil crescent,” a coastal strip which begins 100 miles south of Benghazi and arcs westward 250 miles toward Sirte. Located at the center of this crescent are the oil terminals of Sidra and Ras Lanuf. These rusting crown jewels of Libya’s oil infrastructure were blockaded by the federalist warlord Ibrahim Jadhran from 2014 to 2016 and attacked twice by the Islamic State.

Mapping Libya Conflict

In Libya there are very few truly national actors. The vast majority are local players, some of whom are relevant at the national level while representing the interests of their region, or in most cases, their city. Many important actors, particularly outside of the largest cities, also have tribal allegiances.

Since the summer of 2014, political power has been split between two rival governments in Tripoli and in Tobruk, with the latter having been recognised by the international community before the creation of the Presidency Council (PC) – the body that acts collectively as head of state and supreme commander of the armed forces – in December 2015. Several types of actor scramble for power in today’s Libya: armed groups; “city-states”, particularly in western and southern Libya; and tribes, which are particularly relevant in eastern and southern Libya.

Her Majesty’s Jihadists

He was a dreamer, with Che Guevara looks — a jet-black beard and eyes — who built a new persona online, as a Muslim warrior riding into battle in the back of an open-bed truck, dressed in black, his long hair blowing in the breeze, with an AK-47 hanging from his shoulder, strapped to his back. He had just turned 22 — the product of British private schools, a computer aficionado working in customer service at Sky News — when he decided to turn his dream into reality.

The Islamic State in Africa: Estimating Fighter Numbers in Cells Across the Continent

Abstract: To date, little work has been undertaken to analyze the Islamic State’s presence in Africa from a comparative perspective. In an effort to begin to understand the broader landscape of the Islamic State’s existence in Africa, this article presents the first overview of the approximate number of fighters in various Islamic State cells in Africa as of July 2018. Leveraging a compilation of best available open-source data along with interviews with subject matter experts, the authors’ best estimates suggest the presence of approximately 6,000 Islamic State fighters in Africa today, spread over a total of nine Islamic State ‘cells.’

Albanian Jihadi Fighters In Syria Document The Life Of Their Sniper Team

On August 4, 2018, a group of Albanian jihadis fighting in Syria alongside rebel factions released a 33-minute, slickly produced video about their small sniper unit. The video, filmed in documentary style, was distributed on the Albanian fighters’ Telegram channel.[1] The video is entirely in Albanian with English subtitles.

This video confirms previous reports that a small group of Albanian fighters is currently engaged in the Syrian conflict alongside other jihadi factions.[2] To conceal their identities, all the fighters in the video are shown masked or with blurred faces. Beyond the demonstration of the military capability of these Albanian fighters, the video is meant to serve as a recruitment tool, to persuade more Muslims, and particularly Albanians, to mobilize and join their jihad. The growing military pressure on rebel factions in the only remaining area under their control may explain why outreach is underway, particularly in those units comprised of foreign fighters, in an effort to garner support and potentially recruit more fighters in anticipation of the impending battle in which the regime will attempt to regain total sovereignty.

Spain: New Gateway to Europe for Mass-Migration

Spain’s socialist government, under Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez, has promised free healthcare to migrants and says it will investigate every asylum claim individually.

“[A] majority of irregular migrants rescued in the Central Mediterranean are most likely not refugees in the sense of the Geneva Convention, given that some 70 % come from countries or regions not suffering from violent conflicts or oppressive regimes.” — From a 2017 report by the European Commission.

“We have created refugee shelters for tens of thousands of people, but there are hundreds of thousands of illegal migrants in our country. This has heavily impaired the security situation. They include terrorists, criminals, and human traffickers who do not care about human rights. It’s horrible.” — Libyan leader Fayez al-Sarraj.

Mass Migration: “The Fatal Solvent of the EU”

Today, 510 million Europeans live in the European Union with 1.3 billion Africans facing them. If the Africans follow the example of other parts of the developing world, such as the Mexicans in the US, “in thirty years… Europe will have between 150 and 200 million Afro-Europeans, compared with 9 million today”. Smith calls this scenario “Eurafrique”.

The controversial quota system for migrants has already failed. The European Court of Human Rights condemned Hungary for detaining migrants. European governments cannot stop, deport, arrest or repatriate the migrants. What do the authorities in Brussels suggest? Bring everyone to Europe?

French Jews have fallen victim to a form of ethnic cleansing, according to a manifesto signed by, among others, former French President Nicholas Sarkozy and former French Prime Minister Manuel Valls.

Reports: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees

On October 24, The Soufan Center and The Global Strategy Network released the collaborative report “Beyond the Caliphate: Foreign Fighters and the Threat of Returnees” on the global threat posed by Islamic State foreign fighters returning from Iraq and Syria. According to the report, at least 5,600 men, women and children from 33 countries have already returned home. Returnees have varying reasons for going home, but all represent a major security concern for countries of origin, residence, and even third-countries. Globally, states have yet to find adequate ways to address the threat of returnees, the report says. Women and children represent a more difficult subset for states.

The Beyond the Caliphate report also draws on a manual, Responses to returnees: Foreign terrorist fighters and their families, issued by the Radicalisation Awareness Network (RAN) in July 2017. The manual outlines practical responses for states to address foreign fighters and their families returning from conflict zones in Iraq and Syria. The following are excerpts from both the reports.

Balkan foreign fighters: from Syria to Ukraine

Although the phenomenon of foreign fighters is certainly not new, recent developments in Syria and Iraq have put this issue back on the European Union’s security agenda. The Western Balkan region is not an exception to this trend. Violent extremism in the region is generally perceived through the lens of Islamist radicalisation and foreign fighters who joined Daesh or Al-Nusra in Syria and Iraq. Other forms of extrem- ism, such as right-wing nationalism, if acknowledged at all, are regarded as a secondary concern.

Although national legislations recognise foreign fighting as a criminal act regardless of the destina- tion, returnees from the Middle East face a robust security-based response in their countries of origin, whereas those returning from Ukraine usually remain exempt from prosecution and severe sanctions. This highlights the question of perception and treatment of foreign fighters by Western Balkan governments, particularly after an alleged coup attempt was foiled during Montenegro’s general elections in late 2016, revealing the role of former Western Balkan combatants fighting alongside pro-Russian separatists in the Ukrainian conflict.

Balkan Foreign Fighters Are Coming Back: What Should Be Done?

Recommendations

• Put an emphasis on reintegration instead of criminalization;
• Tailor responses to the returnees based on their motivations to join IS, motivations
to return and gender/age dynamics;
• Engage local religious, family and school communities in the process of
reintegration;
• Address push factors such as poverty, inequality, and economic insecurity.

Executive summary

The Islamic State (IS) will remain a threat in 2018, experts say. Thousands of
foreign fighters are now coming back to their home countries following the collapse of
the so-called “caliphate”. From the around 900 people from the Western Balkans who
have travelled to Syria and Iraq between 2011 and 2016, 250 have already returned.

Despite the different reasons for doing so, returnees raise security concerns, to which
local governments should respond.