On March 19, 2019, a Kuwaiti court sentenced reformist journalist ‘Abdallah Al-Hadlaq to three years in prison for offending the Shi’ites and “fanning controversies among the sectors of society,” i.e., between Sunnis and Shi’ites in Kuwait. Al-Hadlaq was prosecuted for two tweets he posted in August 2018, in which he wrote that Imam ‘Ali bin Abi Talib – considered by Shi’ites to be the rightful heir of the Prophet Muhammad – and his sons had caused the Sunni-Shi’ite divide in Islam and that ‘Ali bin Abi Talib had deliberately delayed swearing loyalty to the first caliph, Abu Bakr.[1]
20 years have passed since NATO bombed Yugoslavia for 78 days. The air campaign with at least 900 bombing sorties again announced imperialist power – destroy everything to loot. It was an act of aggression against Yugoslavia, deny the country’s sovereignty and integrity, and violently carve away Kosovo for creating an imperialist enclave.
During the period of 17 September to 11 December of 2016, the United States and its allies carried out a massive operation to move ISIS’s surviving jihadists who were in the oil-producing Iraqi region of Mosul, into the Syrian oil-producing region of Deir Ezzor and Palmyra.
Save for the conflict’s opening salvos in the middle of 2014, the Libyan Civil War has largely been contained to pockets of violence. Prolonged battles decimated cities such as Benghazi, Derna, and Sirte, but the majority of the country has been spared large-scale destruction.
The expression “academic prostitution” appears abusive. It either conveys an apparently arbitrary disrespect to certain academics by comparing them to prostitutes, or conversely appears to equate sexual prostitution, – an honorable, if hazardous, occupation – with intellectual prostitution, a definitely dishonorable one.
Ever since Egyptian President Abdel Fatah Al-Sisi came to power, the Egyptian regime has maintained a tough policy and an aggressive stance toward its opponents among social activists and journalists,[1] and mainly toward the Muslim Brotherhood (MB) organization. In line with this policy, the MB has been designated a terror organization and outlawed, and many of its members have been arrested on charges of planning and involvement in terror attacks. In September 2018, death sentences were handed down for 75 members of the organization convicted of planning terror attacks and participating in demonstrations adjacent to the Rabi’a Al-Adawiya Mosque.[2] Subsequently, in February 2019, official Egyptian media reported on the execution of 15 MB members for involvement in the 2015 assassination of public prosecutor Hisham Barakat, the 2014 murder of the son of a judge, and the 2013 murder of a high-ranking police official.
If you are one of the 3,400 mullahs who work as Friday Prayer Leader (Imam Jum’ah) in the Islamic Republic of Iran, you better start getting worried, very worried. The reason is that you may soon find yourself disembarked from the gravy train and your cushy seat given to a spring chicken novice.
Al-Shabaab continues to pose a threat to the stability of Somalia, and the group is linked to at least 55 percent of all recorded incidents in the country since 01 September 2018.
The group operates under and advances a strict interpretation of Islamic law in its areas of influence. Rural communities largely support al-Shabaab due to their ability to provide security and basic social services, providing the militant group with continuous recruitment opportunities.
Al-Shabaab uses guerrilla tactics and asymmetric warfare against its targets, with skirmishes and small arms fire (23%), assassination and murder (11%), and IED detonations (11%) being the group’s preferred modes of attack.
While al-Shabaab conducts operations across Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate its focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions with relative frequency.
In the Banaadir Region, the group primarily targets the Bondhere, Hodan, Howlwadag, and Warta Nabada districts due to the high foot and vehicle traffic, military and police presence, and government offices operating in these districts.
In the Lower Shabelle Region, Al-Shabaab uses Gandarshe as a staging area to launch attacks against military convoys traveling along the Afgoye-Mogadishu corridor and the Merca-Mogadishu corridor.
There is an increased risk of terrorist activity in the Bari Region as al-Shabaab and the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) compete for influence and control over the area.
While operations by the African Union Mission to Somalia (AMISOM), the United States Africa Command (AFRICOM), and the Somali National Armed Forces (SNA) have significantly degraded al-Shabaab’s military capabilities, the planned reduction in troops may lead to the resurgence of the militant group in urban areas.
Overview
A graph showing the Al-Shabaab operations by type
Al-Shabaab is linked to at least 349 of the 626 recorded incidents in Somalia between 01 September 2018 to 17 February 2019. The group largely operates out of rural areas due to the government’s inability to maintain constant security forces in these areas. While al-Shabaab conduct operations across 13 of the 18 administrative regions of Somalia, the group has a tendency to oscillate their focus between the Bay, Banaadir, and Lower Shabelle Regions depending on the month. Al-Shabaab has not conducted any recent operations within the five remaining administrative regions due to their locality within the autonomous region of Somaliland. However, the group uses the Galgala Mountains in the neighbouring Bari Region as a staging area to launch attacks (Ahmed, 2018). Moreover, the Islamic State of Somalia (ISS) also maintains an active presence in the Bari Region. Although the two groups are not ideologically aligned and frequently clash, their presence increases the chance that attacks will be carried out in Somaliland in the near future.
Turkish police recently raided the homes of, and detained, more than a dozen nationals suspected of “joining conflicts in Syria, providing logistics and money, and recruiting for [terrorist] organizations.”
