Author: M Barbu

After the death of Josip Broz Tito on May 4, 1980, the Yugoslav Empire lost the main link uniting the empire. In the further history of Yugoslavia, there were no longer any high statesmen who would pursue the line of so-called Tithonism.

Over the course of the last two years, the Islamic State in Libya has gradually re-emerged as a formidable insurgent force. Following its territorial loss of Sirte in late 2016 to a U.S.-backed, anti-Islamic State coalition, the group has adopted new approaches to recruitment and financing. These reveal that the group has become more reliant on sub-Saharan African personnel in its post-territorial phase and has simultaneously deepened its connections with Libya’s desert smuggling networks, which connect North Africa to the Sahel. Moreover, as will be outlined in this article, its organizational structure appears to have shifted from ‘state-like’ to ‘guerrilla insurgency-like.’

On the evening of 16 September, Government of National Accord (GNA)/ and Presidential Council (PC) head Fayez al-Serraj announced on live television that he would ‘hand over’ his duties ‘to the next executive authority no later than the end of October.’ Serraj reportedly arrived in Tripoli from Turkey the day of his announcement and urged negotiators to quickly name ‘a new administration’ to ‘secure a peaceful and smooth transition’

On 17 September, details emerged of a Russian-brokered deal negotiated in Sochi between the Presidential Council (PC)/Government of National Accord (GNA) Deputy Prime Minister Ahmed Maiteeq (representing himself) and Khalid Haftar, the son of the head of the Libyan National Army (LNA), Khalifa Haftar. Neither the GNA/PC nor the National Oil Corporation (NOC) participated in or were signatories to the deal, and as such the deal could not be said to be binding on them. The following day, LNA Commander Khalifa Haftar gave a speech on television in which he announced that Libya’s oil ports would reopen, based on the agreement reached with Maiteeq. At this point, the NOC had the legal right to not restart production, but did not want to be seen to be blocking progress. On 19 September, the NOC announced the lifting of force majeure on ‘safe’ oil fields and ports. In its statement, the NOC added that it had instructed relevant companies to restart productions, but that ‘force majeure continues on the oil fields and ports that confirmed the presence of elements of Wagner and other armed groups that impede the activities and operations’ of the NOC.