Fourteen months after he launched an assault on the Libyan capital of Tripoli, Libyan National Army Field Marshal Khalifa Haftar stood on a podium on Saturday in Cairo next to President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi and Libyan House of Representatives Speaker Aguila Saleh to announce that he would be accepting an Egyptian-sponsored ceasefire and a initiative to restart political talks in the factional conflict.
President Donald Trump‘s tweet that he would designate the group Antifa as a domestic terrorism organization is drawing criticism as unconstitutional and risking the diversion of resources from known terrorism threats.
On Sunday afternoon, President Donald Trump tweeted that, “The United States of America will be designating ANTIFA as a Terrorist Organization.” The declaration, via social media, comes on the heels of Attorney General William Barr blaming the violence from the protests that have erupted across the country in response to the murder of George Floyd on “far-left extremist groups.”
Islamist militants are making further inroads into Tillabery, a region on Niger’s border with Mali. To fend off the threat, Niamey should supplement its counter-insurgency campaign with initiatives aimed at soothing communal tensions along the frontier and starting dialogue with locals in the jihadists’ orbit.
Les insurgés islamistes progressent dans la région nigérienne de Tillabéri, à la frontière avec le Mali. Face à cette menace, Niamey devrait accompagner ses opérations militaires d’initiatives politiques visant à apaiser les tensions entre les communautés frontalières et à entamer un dialogue avec les Nigériens ayant rejoint l’Etat islamique.
These Russian claims have not yet been adjudicated by international law courts, the United Nations, or by any bilateral or multilateral treaty.
Russia’s blanket claims of territorial sovereignty pose a direct challenge to “Law of the Sea” conventions such as the “Freedom of Navigation” (FON) principle, championed by the U.S. and other Free World navies.
The satellite images published on May 26 by U.S. African Command (AFRICOM) appear to confirm reports that Russian MiG-29 jet fighters had flown to Libya. At least one of the aircraft, never before deployed to the country, was spotted at the al-Jufra air base. It may well be that, as some reports suggest, the aircraft were acquired from Belarus and operated by Belarussian and Serbian pilots, not Russians. Having said that, however, Russia can no longer deny it knows about the deployment of military equipment to Libya and argue, as it did, that the hardware was procured through dummy firms in Serbia without Moscow’s knowledge. In fact, the MiG-29s travelled to Libya via Russia’s Hemeimeem air base in Syria, by way of Iran’s Hamadan air base and Russia’s Privolzhsky airfield, and were accompanied by a Tu-154M military aircraft. As this latest episode makes clear, Hemeimeem air base plays a central role in Russia’s growing involvement in both the Mediterranean and Africa.
Introduction
‘Every reporter knows the first rule of journalism: never betray your source. But what if your source turns out to be unworthy of your silence? What if it’s your source who betrays you?’
Abstract: The Islamic State has recovered from its territorial defeats since 2017 to mount a strong and sustained resurgence as an insurgent force inside Iraq. A new analysis of attack metrics from the past 18 months paints a picture of an Islamic State insurgency that has regained its balance, spread out across many more areas, and reclaimed significant tactical proficiency. Now operating at the same levels it achieved in 2012, a number of factors suggest that the Islamic State could further ramp up its rural insurgency in 2020 and 2021. An input of experienced cadres from Syria, a downturn in Iraqi and coalition effectiveness, and now the disruption of a combined COVID and economic crisis will likely all feed into an escalating campaign of attrition against the Iraqi state, military, and tribes.
Not long ago, it was plausible to believe the Sahel region of Africa might be spared the internecine fighting that has characterized relations between the Islamic State and al Qaeda in Afghanistan, Syria, Somalia, and Yemen. For years, jihadis linked to al Qaeda operating in the Sahel tried hard to maintain jihadi unity, keeping open lines of communication with Islamic State franchise groups operating in North and West Africa, even while disavowing the Islamic State’s more extreme ideology. Some reports from the Mali-Niger-Burkina Faso tri-border area have gone beyond describing tolerance between the Islamic State in the Greater Sahara (ISGS), and al Qaeda’s affiliate, Jamaat Nasr al-Islam wal Muslimin (JNIM), and spoken instead of more concrete forms of collaboration, including the coordination of attacks.