Special Analysises

The Anti-ISIS coalition

On 3 September, the Presidential Council (PC) of the Government of National Accord (GNA) announced that the GNA’s Minister of Interior (MoI), Fathi Bashaagha, had been re-instated in his role after being suspended the previous week. The announcement came after a five-hour hearing concerning the recent protests in the western region and the response and role of the security forces. On 7 September, the GNA’s Operation Volcano of Rage (VoR) announced through its spokesperson, Mohammed Gununu, that it had taken down a helicopter belonging to the Libyan National Army (LNA) near the Sirte-Jufra frontlines. However, other reports suggest that the helicopter undertook an emergency landing south of Abu Grein. On 2 September, Gununu accused LNA forces of violating a declared ceasefire for the second time in 3 days. Gununu said the LNA fired six grad rockets at the positions of the GNA armed forces west of Sirte. He added that the GNA armed forces were waiting for instructions from the supreme commander on how to respond. On 4 September, the spokesperson for the Government of National Accord (GNA) Sirte-Jufra Operations Room, Abdelhadi Drah, denied reports that mercenaries from the Russian Private Military Contractor (PMC) Wagner Group had pulled out of Sirte and Jufra to Ras Lanuf that day. Drah added that the pro-Haftar Central Backup Force, positioned west of Sirte, had left to an unknown destination.

Western Response

On 6 September, delegations representing the eastern-based House of Representatives (HoR), the High Council of State (HCS), and three advisors from the eastern region began discussions under the auspices of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya (UNSMIL) and Moroccan Foreign Minister, Nasser Bourita, in the town of Bouznika in Morocco. Dialogue participants will explore ways toward a political solution to the Libyan crisis and the connected mechanisms to replace the heads of several of the current Libyan semi-sovereign institutions. On 7 September, head of the Government of National Accord (GNA), Serraj was received by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan in Istanbul for a closed-door meeting. Serraj’s visit followed meetings between other senior Libyan officials and Turkish authorities regarding the GNA’s ceasefire announcement of 21 August. On 2 September, the acting head of the UNSMIL, Stephanie Williams, said to the UN Security Council (UNSC) that foreign supporters in Libya were helping stockpile weapons in breach of an arms embargo as coronavirus ‘spirals out control’ in the country. Williams, citing a confidential report, told the Security Council that 70 resupply flights had landed in eastern Libya since 8 July, and 30 flights and nine cargo ships had carried material to western Libya to assist the GNA in Tripoli. The report attributed these and other violations of the embargo to the Russian Private Military Contractor (PMC) Wagner Group along with Turkey, the UAE, Jordan and Qatar, as well as Russia itself. On 1 September, the High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy/Vice President of the European Union (EU), Joseph Borrel, met with head of the GNA, Serraj and head of the Turbruq-based House of Representatives (HoR) Saleh to help advance the dialogue process in the country. During the meeting, Borrel reiterated the EU’s support for an inclusive Libyan-led and Libyan-owned dialogue, and conveyed the EU’s ‘strong and unwavering commitment to preserving Libya’s territorial integrity, sovereignty and national unity.’ On 1 September, Italian Foreign Minister Luigi di Maio made an unannounced visit to Libya, where he met separately with Serraj and Saleh to discuss recent ceasefire initiatives. Serraj’s office issued a statement following the meeting that he and Di Maio had discussed ‘points of agreement’ with Saleh on implementing a permanent ceasefire and demilitarisation of Sirte and Jufra.

Isis in Action

No relevant developments.

Other Jihadi Actors

No relevant developments.

Special Analysises

Why is there a war in Syria?

A peaceful uprising against the president of Syria almost eight years ago turned into a full-scale civil war. The conflict has left more than 360,000 people dead, devastated cities and drawn in other countries. Even before the conflict began, many Syrians were complaining about high unemployment, corruption and a lack of political freedom under President Bashar al-Assad, who succeeded his father, Hafez, after he died in 2001. In March 2012, pro-democracy demonstrations erupted in the southern city of Deraa, inspired by the “Arab Spring” in neighbouring countries. When the government used deadly force to crush the dissent, protests demanding the president’s resignation erupted nationwide. The unrest spread and the crackdown intensified. Opposition supporters took up arms, first to defend themselves and later to rid their areas of security forces. Mr Assad vowed to crush what he called “foreign-backed terrorism”. The violence rapidly escalated and the country descended into civil war.

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Kevin Rudd on ‘an Infinitely More Assertive China’ Under Xi Jinping

“What we’ve seen is an infinitely more assertive China,” says Kevin Rudd, president of the Asia Society Policy Institute and former prime minister of Australia, in assessing the country’s evolution under Xi Jinping. As a result, Mr. Rudd is not surprised by how rapidly the consensus view of China has shifted, with strategic competition having replaced win-win cooperation as the buzzword in the capitals of Western and Asian democracies.

După modelul lui Putin, Erdogan şi-a făcut armată privată de mercenari pentru a reînvia gloria apusă a Imperiului Otoman şi pentru a se menţine la putere

Grupul militar privat Sadat, compus din mercenari şi format după modelul armatei private a liderului de la Kremlin, Wagner, este folosit de preşedintele Turciei în războaiele din Siria şi Libia, duse spun unii pentru restabilirea gloriei de altă dată a Imperilului Otoman.

Mali: vers une transition de deux ans sous la conduite des militaires?

La question est posée après l’avis donné par des experts nommés par les colonels. Leur proposition de deux ans figurerait dans la « charte de la transition » actuellement en discussion.

Qui va diriger la transition ? Cette question est au centre de la réflexion d’une centaine de responsables réunis à Bamako. La proposition qui leur a été faite ? Une transition de deux ans sous la conduite d’un président désigné par la junte, avant un retour des civils au pouvoir.

Le Mali est-il notre Afghanistan ?

En 2013, Paris intervenait militairement dans ce pays ébranlé par un putsch, en partie occupé par des djihadistes et miné par la corruption. Sept ans plus tard, un coup d’Etat vient de renverser le président, les terroristes sont encore actifs, et la corruption règne toujours en maître.

La France peut-elle quitter le Mali?

Quarante-cinq soldats ont été tués dans le cadre des opérations militaires françaises au Mali depuis 2013. Lourd bilan. Après le coup d’Etat du 18 août, l’armée française doit-elle rester ? Dans quelles conditions ?

Emergencies Make Awful Law: Why are Casinos Treated More Favorably than Churches During a Pandemic?

[T]he government may not discriminate against religion in general or any particular religion in particular. It need not exempt religious institutions or practitioners from rules that are generally applicable to similarly situated institutions or citizens, but it may not impose especially onerous rules on religion that limit its free exercise.