Author: M Barbu

Even with a Deal, the Mullahs Will Pursue Nukes

It is important to expect that whatever the deal, the Iranian regime will continue to pursue its nuclear ambitions and clandestine nuclear activities: there are historical precedents for it.

Tehran claimed that the “secret atomic warehouse,” located in a village of Turquz Abad in the suburbs of Tehran, was a place where carpets were cleaned.

The IAEA at first ignored the reports. This should not come as a surprise: the IAEA has a long history of misreporting the Islamic Republic’s compliance with the deal and declining to follow up on credible reports about Iran’s illicit nuclear activities.

African Youth Engaging in Peace and Security

Despite challenges of unemployment, corruption, entrenched political leadership, and political violence, many African youth have found constructive avenues to promote peace, effective governance, and reform.

Africa remains the world’s youngest continent with a median age of 19.7 years. By 2050, one in three young people will live in Sub-Saharan Africa. Still, 80-90 percent of African workers are still engaged in the informal sector. Each year, 10-12 million African youth enter the labor market but only three million formal jobs are created annually. Meanwhile, nearly half of all African countries rank in the bottom quartile of Transparency International’s Corruption Perceptions Index. These trends underscore mounting social pressures.

Chad’s Ongoing Instability, the Legacy of Idriss Déby

Idriss Déby’s death is an outcome of the ongoing instability perpetuated by his regime. The subsequent military coup d’état led by the late president’s son risks deepening political violence in this geographically strategic country.

Chadian President Idriss Déby died on April 20 from wounds he sustained on the frontlines of fighting against the rebel group le Front pour l’alternance et la concorde au Tchad (FACT). While widely characterized as opening the door to instability, Déby’s death in battle vividly punctuates the outcome of instability wrought under his regime. Instability in Chad has simmered for decades, disrupted by periodic explosions of violence. Corruption, political exclusion, growing disparity, and repression of dissent have long been trademarks of Déby’s rule in Chad, which not coincidentally ranks 187th out of 189 countries on UNDP’s Human Development Index.

Sahara occidental : le chef du Polisario hors “de danger”

Le chef des indépendantistes du Front Polisario, Brahim Ghali, hospitalisé en Espagne après avoir contracté le coronavirus, est “en convalescence” et “loin de tout danger”, a indiqué dimanche à l’AFP un haut responsable sahraoui.

“Les médecins confirment qu’il a dépassé l’état critique et qu’il est loin de tout danger”, a déclaré ce haut responsable ayant requis l’anonymat, ajoutant qu’il “récupérait bien et que son état évoluait positivement”.

Mali: le journaliste Olivier Dubois otage d’un groupe jihadiste, confirme Paris

La France considère que le journaliste français Olivier Dubois, disparu début avril au Mali et réapparu depuis dans une vidéo, est otage d’un groupe jidahiste, a déclaré dimanche le chef de la diplomatie française Jean-Yves Le Drian.

“On peut penser que ce journaliste est aujourd’hui un nouvel otage (…) Tout nous laisse à penser qu’il est otage d’un groupe jihadiste”, a-t-il déclaré au Grand Jury RTL/Le Figaro/LCI.

Nigerian Terrorist Abubakar Shekau: Dead or Alive—and Does it Matter?

Multiple Nigerian media outlets reported last week that Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau has died or been mortally wounded in a confrontation with fighters from the Islamic State in West Africa (ISWA), a group that separated from Shekau’s Boko Haram in 2016. The Nigerian government has not confirmed the reports and is investigating. The caution is well-placed: Shekau has been reported dead at least four times since he became the leader of Boko Haram in 2009 following the police killing of founder Mohammed Yusuf.

Leaving Boko Haram Behind

Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa have terrorized parts of Nigeria for over a decade, provoking national, regional and international responses. Operation Safe Corridor (OSC), Nigeria’s national rehabilitation and reintegration program for members of Boko Haram and ISIS-West Africa who have surrendered, defected or were repentant, remains among the most mature and large-scale disengagement programs that currently exist. After several years, hundreds of participants have undergone rehabilitation in transition centers — with many being reintegrated back into communities.

Afghan refugees find difficult life in Turkey

As the security situation in Afghanistan deteriorates, an increasing number of Afghans are making their way to Turkey along dangerous migration routes. Most enter the country by crossing Turkey’s eastern border with Iran, a journey that carries the risk of injury or death. According to NGOs, the number of Afghan refugees in Turkey has grown to 600,000 over the last five years, many living undocumented.

In 2018, just over 100,000 Afghans entered Turkey without permission, according to the Migration Management Directorate, a figure that doubled in 2019. There is no official data available for 2020 and 2021.

What next for Afghanistan?

The book on post-9/11 U.S. involvement in Afghanistan is still being written; though, previous chapters are now familiar to most observers. Chapter 1: How the U.S. quickly routed the Taliban, but watched the group reemerge from neighboring sanctuary through a mix of intimidation and appeal to local grievances; Chapter 2: How the U.S. made significant investments in developing Afghan institutions of governance and rule of law, but undermined said efforts by empowering unaccountable local power brokers (in Afghan parlance, “warlords”) for short-term, tactical objectives; Chapter 3: How Afghan officials were regularly cited for corruption and financial mismanagement, but how the U.S. fueled a gold-rush-like situation in a country that had known nothing but conflict and depredation for over a quarter century; and so on. This is the story of the past two decades, or at least a part of it.

The Saudi-Iran Détente and the Israel-Hamas War

In April 2018, Saudi Arabia’s crown prince and de facto ruler, Mohammed bin Salman, said in an interview with The Atlantic that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, “makes Hitler look good.” MBS, as the crown prince is widely known, also dismissed the possibility of any talks between the two regional rivals.