Tunisia’s largest party has held the entire political class responsible for crisis, while President Kais Saied says ‘no dialogue except with the honest’
Tunisia’s President Kais Saied said on Thursday there was “no turning back” from his decision to freeze parliament and assume executive power, moves his opponents have branded a coup.
The Iron Dome missile defense system intercepted 10 rockets, with six falling in open areas; the others fell inside Lebanon.
A heavy barrage of close to 20 rockets was fired from Lebanon into northern Israel on Friday, activating the Iron Dome and setting off sirens throughout the area.
The spotters with their binoculars on the clifftops tracked the overcrowded boat with increasing nervousness as it appeared to be heading for disaster on the rocks off the south-eastern tip of England.
Their frantic waves appeared to work and the orange inflatable edged towards the safety of the shore as the spotters abandoned their post and ran to the stony beach. As they arrived, the 20 or so migrants started to jump into the sea, threatening to overturn the small boat with some of the most vulnerable passengers still inside.
Sur les réseaux sociaux, les représentants de la nouvelle génération soutiennent les mesures chocs annoncées par le chef de l’État tunisien. Mais leur appui n’est pas inconditionnel.
Fort de son slogan « le peuple veut », le président tunisien, Kaïs Saïed, avait largement été porté à Carthage par des groupes de jeunes mobilisés autour de sa campagne de 2019. L’ex-assistant universitaire en droit constitutionnel s’était en effet attaché le soutien de nombreux étudiants, mais aussi de jeunes actifs et de chômeurs, en assurant que « les jeunes ont leur programme ». Une partie de cette base électorale avait beau être dépourvue de bagage politique, elle a pour point commun de s’être construite dans le sillage d’une révolution dont elle a hérité, bon gré mal gré.
Recently there has been an increase in operations against the U.S. military presence in Syria. Within only two weeks there were six incidents of rocket and mortar fire against two bases of the U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS in northeastern Syria: the Al-Omar oil field east of Deir Al-Zor, which is the largest coalition base in Syria and houses U.S., French and British troops, and the base at the Conoco gas field in the same region.[1] While the attacks did not result in casualties, they no doubt reflect a shift in the struggle against the U.S. forces in Syria, which has until now mainly involved local villagers throwing stones at military vehicles and blocking military patrols, as well as clashes with regime forces at checkpoints manned by the latter.[2]
On July 27, 2021, an Al-Qaeda supporter calling himself Haydarah Al-Qandahari posted an article on Telegram titled “A Call to the Lions of Monotheism in the Syrian Arena”. In this article, written in Arabic, Al-Qandahari urges Al-Qaeda-aligned mujahideen in Syria to form small, independent groups consisting of three to five fighters, and to focus on targeting U.S. and Russian forces. It appears from the article that Al-Qandahari is located in Syria and his pen name probably indicates that he is a veteran of the Afghan jihad who spent time in the Kandahar area before coming to Syria.
The dynamics fostered by the wars and revolutions plaguing many Arab states today represent the most consequential national transformations since World War I, culminating in a period of civilian defiance and resistance that was especially distinct between 2010 – 2020. Despite being pauperized by predatory governments, citizens have challenged their heavily militarized states, emerging to fight battles that have been brewing for decades. Both the protesting citizens in the streets and the hardline governments that try to blunt their momentum are highly motivated. The outcome of these historic confrontations remains unclear. Yet, it is already possible to identify the causes, actors, motivations, and tactics on both sides that have fueled the waves of rebellion and repression over the past decade. Since the start of the 2010 – 2011 uprisings across the Arab world – the so-called “Arab Spring” – long-term transformations in the mindsets and actions of citizens have emerged that have the potential to catalyze political change across the region for decades to come, shaping political relationships between the governed and governors.
Any discussion of a Biden administration strategy on Iran must begin with an analysis of how previous U.S. administrations have approached the threat posed by Iran. From the very start of the Islamic Republic forty-one years ago, U.S.-Iran relations have been fraught with mistrust, animosity, threats, and occasional active hostilities, but interspersed with periods of negotiation and even tacit cooperation in selected circumstances. Yet, none of the Iran strategies pursued by seven U.S. administrations since the Islamic Revolution in 1979 has succeeded in neutralizing the wide range of threats Iran still poses to U.S. interests and allies.
In their study De-radicalising the Western Balkans, Tatyana Dronzina and Sulejman Muça (two researchers from Bulgaria) point out that „out of a total of 4000 Europeans who have joined the so-called Islamic State, or ISIS, 900 (approximately one-quarter) originate from the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kosovo and Macedonia)”[1]. In addition, it is estimated that “in Albania, Bosnia, and Kosovo alone, extremists control more than 150 mosques and prayer rooms”.[2] These numbers are alarming and indicate an increasing security threat in the Balkans. Although jihadism is rooted in the Balkans since the 1990s, Balkan states have initiated a process of democratization and Europeanization, thought of as pacifiers of the region, and its religious-ethnic conflicts. The recent resurgence of jihadism in more radical and transnational forms reveals the uncertainties of the Balkans, which have led previously to large scale wars and conflicts.