Author: M Barbu

Turkish-backed Syrian opposition factions have reportedly received instructions to deploy in Idlib soon, amid reports that a merger with Hayat Tahrir al-Sham is imminent.

Syrian opposition media sources are reporting that the Syrian National Army (SNA) affiliated with the Turkish-backed Free Syrian Army (FSA) will be widely deployed in the city of Idlib, in northwestern Syria, which is under the control of Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS).

Talks on the sale of Turkish armed drones and combat helicopters to Iraq have hit snags amid Iraqi efforts to extract concessions on contentious issues in bilateral ties.

Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan has been eager to boost military sales to foreign buyers, but his foreign policy often snags his ambitions. International interest in Turkey’s flourishing defense industry has risen since the Azerbaijani-Armenian war over Nagorno-Karabakh last year, in which the Turkish Bayraktar TB2 armed drones were widely touted as key to Azerbaijan’s military success. Most recently, Iraq has expressed interest in buying TB2 drones and attack helicopters from Turkey, but Baghdad’s efforts to attach strings to the deal has thrown a spanner in the works.

Turkey appears to be maneuvering to expand an Islamic state in Syria and Iraq.

The same Turkish government that claims to counter “terrorism” through its fight against the Kurdish PKK has supported ISIS in the region for years.

“The ability of ISIS to become a functioning state so quickly is largely due to its relationship with President Erdoğan in Turkey.” — Dr. Mordechai Kedar, BESA Center, October 11, 2020.

A leading Syrian Kurdish politician said on Thursday the United States will stay on in Syria to destroy Islamic State, build infrastructure and remain a player in the search for a political settlement after more than 10 years of civil war.

The Kurds, who live in the mountainous region straddling the borders of Syria, Armenia, Iraq, Iran and Turkey, carved out self-rule across northeast Syria during the civil war that began in 2011.

What can help allay perceptions of marginalization and tension in the district?

Iraq is a country beset by a host of political, security, economic and social challenges, including addressing the human legacy of the Islamic State’s (ISIS) rampage through the country just a few years ago. Almost four years after the liberation of Nineveh’s Tal Afar district from ISIS control, feelings of marginalization, neglect and exclusion persist among communities in the region, epitomizing how such feelings have driven ethnic and sectarian tensions and conflict in post-2003 Iraq. Recognition of these sentiments and an understanding of the factors underpinning them, can help communities in the district allay these drivers of tension and move forward together.

Despite new electoral system and process, elections may deliver far more modest outcomes than the people demand and need.

On October 10, Iraq will hold national parliamentary elections, the fifth national elections since Iraq adopted its 2005 constitution. And despite waning expectations about what these elections might accomplish, they remain an important avenue for pursuing change through peaceful means. Once the new parliament is elected, it will have the task of choosing a new speaker of parliament, president, prime minister and cabinet in what is usually a protracted, months-long process.

Iraqi parliamentary elections are scheduled for October 10, 2021. The elections were moved forward from May 2022, following a popular protest that erupted in 2019, which led to the resignation of the government of Adel Abdul-Mahdi.

In these elections, for the first time, a “rights movement” party will run for power. Known as Harakat Huqouq (Rights Movement), it is headed by Hussein Muanis Faraj Al-Muhammadawi, a former senior member of the Hizbullah Brigades, a Shi’ite militia with close ties to Iran which has perpetrated many terror attacks against the American forces in Iraq. It is not unlikely that this party was established at the behest of Iran, in an attempt to further strengthen its influence in the Iraqi corridors of power.