Author: M Barbu

Qassem hinted at a possible shift in Hezbollah policy that would allow a Lebanon ceasefire to be separated from Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. The new secretary general was less absolute regarding a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip than Nasrallah had been before his death. Nasrallah had previously said that a ceasefire in Lebanon would have to be contingent on halting Israeli operations in the Gaza Strip. Qassem appeared less resolute by saying that Hezbollah would accept “appropriate” ceasefire conditions but insisted that “the basis for any negotiations is a ceasefire first.”[10] Qassem indicated on October 8 that the group may be open to a ceasefire that is not linked to the Gaza Strip.[11] Nasrallah had previously been very explicit that Hezbollah would not stop indirect fire attacks into Israel until the IDF withdrew from the Gaza Strip.[12] Nasrallah held this unambiguous position before Israel began ground operations in southern Lebanon, however. The shift in Hezbollah’s position may be a result of both new Hezbollah leadership and the escalation of a war that has temporarily degraded Hezbollah’s command, control, and logistical networks. Qassem said he believes that Hezbollah, not an international resolution, expelled Israel from Lebanon in 2006 and 2000, suggesting his reluctance to enter into a ceasefire agreement.[13]

Naim Qassem, newly appointed as Hezbollah’s secretary-general, has become the centerpiece of the group’s narrative efforts. On October 15, as then-deputy secretary-general, he gave his third speech after Secretary-General Hassan Nasrallah’s assassination, amidst rumors he had fled Lebanon to Iran.

Against a dark and nondescript backdrop—perhaps to signify Hezbollah mourning its fallen leaders, particularly Nasrallah—and flanked by a Hezbollah flag and, unusually, a Lebanese flag on his right and a picture of Nasrallah to his left, Qassem delivered his most defiant speech yet. As with Nasrallah’s speeches, the themes and tropes raised by Qassem were then echoed and amplified by the group’s officials and media apparatuses.

The assassination of Sinwar places Hamas at a crossroads at various organizational, political and military levels, especially in the context of the course of the war in the Gaza Strip and Lebanon, and the movement’s role on the day after the war, which may affect its alliances and relations internally and externally.

Over the past decade, Iran’s regime has been involved in collaborations with criminal actors across the world, seeking to assassinate critics and adversaries, procure materials to advance its nuclear programme, circumvent international sanctions and money-laundering controls, and fund armed groups and terrorist organizations that have carried out horrific attacks.