Author: M Barbu

In the gathering war of attrition in Ukraine, Russia has the upper hand – and Ukraine’s only hope is for international support to now be stepped up.

The Russian war in Ukraine is entering its third stage and is finally becoming a war of attrition. This requires readiness not only on the part of Ukraine, but also its international partners. The short initial race is over, and now the winner will be the one who has not only the will to win, but also enough resources to continue to maintain the current dynamics of the confrontation. It is obvious that despite international sanctions, the Russian economy is in a much better condition than the destroyed Ukrainian economy. Wars of attrition are won by the rear, and the only rear left in Ukraine is the international coalition in support of Ukraine, which was formed in April 2022 in Rammstein, Germany.

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The war in Ukraine has proven that the age of industrial warfare is still here. The massive consumption of equipment, vehicles and ammunition requires a large-scale industrial base for resupply – quantity still has a quality of its own. The mass scale combat has pitted 250,000 Ukrainian soldiers, together with 450,000 recently mobilised citizen soldiers against about 200,000 Russian and separatist troops. The effort to arm, feed and supply these armies is a monumental task. Ammunition resupply is particularly onerous. For Ukraine, compounding this task are Russian deep fires capabilities, which target Ukrainian military industry and transportation networks throughout the depth of the country. The Russian army has also suffered from Ukrainian cross-border attacks and acts of sabotage, but at a smaller scale. The rate of ammunition and equipment consumption in Ukraine can only be sustained by a large-scale industrial base.

At the June summit of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, maintenance of support to Ukraine, the applications for NATO membership by Finland and Sweden, and the rollout of the new Strategic Concept will appropriately be front and center. But, if NATO is to maintain its long-term capacity for deterrence and defense, it will be equally important to take actions to implement four key operational priorities, each derived from initial lessons underscored by the Russia-Ukraine war. Specifically, effective deterrence and defense requires: upgraded force capabilities immediately focused on readiness and sustainability, and supported by the requisite funding; additional forward force deployments, including a substantial European component; enhanced cybersecurity resilience based on zero-trust architectures for critical infrastructures necessary for defense mission assurance; and long-term limitations on trade with Russia to limit its capacity to modernize its armed forces.