Author: M Barbu

More, Please

As we provide Ukraine with increasingly powerful weapons systems, we are mindful of how they will be used. According to the BBC, the High Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS) we have sent to Ukraine has a maximum effective range of approximately 50 miles. They have been used to good effect to destroy enemy command and control centers and supply depots. This cuts off the Russians from what they need to move forward with an attack. It’s a good strategy and has worked well so far for the Ukrainians.

Executive summary
The number of cyber operations launched from Russia over the last few years is astounding, ranging from the NotPetya malware attack that cost the global economy billions, to the SolarWinds espionage campaign against dozens of US government agencies and thousands of companies. Broad characterizations of these operations, such as “Russian cyberattack,” obscure the very real and entangled web of cyber actors within Russia that receive varying degrees of support from, approval by, and involvement with the Russian government. This issue brief describes the large, complex, and often opaque network of cyber actors in Russia, from front companies to patriotic hackers to cybercriminals. It analyzes the range and ambiguity of the Russian government’s involvement with the different actors in this cyber web, as well as the risks and benefits the Kremlin perceives or gets from leveraging actors in this group. The issue brief concludes with three takeaways and actions for policymakers in the United States, as well as in allied and partner countries: focus on understanding the incentive structure for the different actors in Russia’s cyber web; specify the relationship any given Russian actor has or does not have with the state, and calibrate their responses accordingly; and examine these actors and activities from Moscow’s perspective when designing policies and predicting the Kremlin’s responses.