Author: M Barbu

Zelenskyy’s ‘Victory Plan’ for Ukraine Makes Sense. It Has Little Chance of Being Implemented

The Ukrainian president formally presented his plan calling for ramped-up Western military firepower and economic aid and at least a promise of NATO membership to help accelerate the war’s end. The country’s supporters should heed his calls for fortifying Ukraine’s defenses.

With the Russian-Ukrainian war approaching its third anniversary, many Ukrainians and their supporters are feeling dejected because there is no end in sight. More than 300,000 Ukrainians have been killed or wounded (according to U.S. intelligence estimates) and Ukraine is facing painful electricity blackouts during the winter. Far more Russian troops have been killed or wounded—more than 600,000—yet Russian forces keep attacking. They are slowly making gains, at great cost, in the Donbas region of eastern Ukraine. Ukrainian morale is starting to sag and support for Ukraine in the West could start to decline as well, especially if former President Donald Trump wins the White House again in November.

Russia’s Balancing Act in the Levant

Russia’s military intervention in Syria reflected a more assertive foreign policy. However, its ability to expand its influence to Lebanon and beyond has been restricted.

Russia’s role in the Levant and its involvement in the region’s power politics have undergone a significant shift over the past decade, mainly because of opportunities created by geopolitical and regional developments, including, most critically, the pivoting of U.S. foreign policy away from the Middle East and forever wars. These developments opened the door in 2015 to a more active Russian role in reshaping a region that was in the throes of societal upheavals and expanding conflicts. The United States’ growing disengagement became especially evident following the failure of U.S. former president Barack Obama’s famous red line in preventing Syrian President Bashar al-Assad from launching chemical weapons attacks against Syrian citizens in 2013. This created an opportune moment for Russia to launch a new strategic and somewhat pragmatic foreign policy in the Levant, through which it sought to carve out a space for itself in a changing order. Since then, Moscow has acted as a broker of sorts between different actors involved in the Syrian conflict, while balancing out its relationship with each actor in favor of its own national interests. In the process, it has sought to redefine a regional security architecture more amenable to these interests.

A Mixed Balance Sheet: Russia’s Uneven Influence in the Maghreb

Russia’s outreach to the region has successfully exploited regimes’ frustrations with the West. Yet it has encountered difficulties in navigating the complex interrelations and rivalries.

The Arab-majority states of the Maghreb—Algeria, Libya, Morocco, and Tunisia—have become an increasing focus of Russian engagement and influence. Moscow is demonstrating a growing appreciation of their strategic value, especially in the domains of arms sales, energy, and, since the 2022 invasion of Ukraine, trade (largely to compensate for market shares lost to Western sanctions). Geographically, these countries are part of Africa and are members of the African Union and therefore serve as important elements in Russia’s growing power projection on the African continent. They are also situated on the Mediterranean basin, offering Moscow potential points of leverage on the flow of oil and natural gas and irregular migration into the southern flank of NATO-dominated Europe, as well as potential warm water ports for its navy. Further, linguistically, culturally, and politically, the Maghreb is part of the Arab world and plays a role in Russia’s broader “return” to the Middle East and its increased strategic focus on issues such as counterterrorism, the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, the Iranian nuclear issue, and Syria.

Civilian Militias in Mali, Niger, and Mozambique

Introduction

For more than a decade, the Sahel has been subject to a protracted insurgency carried out by affiliates of the global terror networks of al-Qaeda and the Islamic State. As the first country affected by this insurgency, Mali has responded by drastically modifying its response to violent extremism. The regional spillover of violent extremism has elicited similar counterterrorism responses from Bamako’s neighbors, with Niger most recently adopting a counterinsurgency model shaped by Mali’s and Burkina Faso’s policies. Although not in the Sahel, Mozambique has faced similar struggles in containing violent extremism and, like Mali and Niger, has implemented multiple counterterrorism programs to curtail the expansion and public support of jihadist groups. Conventional responses to violent extremism—such as the deployment of national military forces and the enlistment of international counterterrorism support—have not been successful and instead have resulted in each state adopting more localized approaches to eliminating the jihadist threat. This increasingly localized approach is often conducted through the deployment of civilian counterterrorism militias—also known as community-led self-defense groups, local militias, local forces, or simply civilian militias. Sometimes sponsored by the state, these local militias are intended to operate independently of national defense forces. However, tangential state status has not only afforded these groups funding and equipment, but it has also justified illicit behavior and discriminatory practices that have added additional threats to national counterterrorism agendas.

365 days of care with Doctors Without Borders

Throughout 2024, as the world was shaken by ongoing violent conflicts and other crises, Doctors Without Borders/Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) teams continued to provide essential medical services and humanitarian aid—because when our patients need us, we are there.

Rappels sur le conflit israélo-palestinien (1/5) : au commencement était le terrorisme sioniste

Cet article a pour but d’informer le public francophone que le terrorisme est souvent utilisé pour diaboliser la lutte d’autodétermination palestinienne et minimiser la souffrance du peuple palestinien, que le terrorisme a été initié par les sionistes. Loin d’être châtiés, ils ont été récompensés par l’octroi d’un État (55% de la Palestine pour 20% de la population). Les palestiniens désabusés n’ont fait que suivre l’exemple de leurs «grands frères» dans le métier. Si un sioniste vous accuse de soutenir le Hamas parce que vous dénoncez les crimes d’Israël, rappelez-lui que les sionistes aussi ont été des terroristes.

War in Ukraine may only intensify under Trump, says Dmytro Kuleba

The country’s former foreign minister explains the powderkeg that is three leaders in a cannot-lose standoff

BETWEEN 2016 AND 2022, Western diplomats and journalists frequently asked Ukrainian officials what Ukraine was prepared to concede to Russia for peace. This was more than mere curiosity. It was the tip of a policy iceberg submersed in the belief that peace could be achieved by sacrificing Ukrainian interests to Russia. Look at the headlines since February 2022 to see where this approach has led.

Iran Update, November 17, 2024

The IDF killed the head of Hezbollah’s media office, Mohammad Afif, in central Beirut on November 17.[i] The IDF conducted a strike targeting Afif in a residential building in Ras al Nabaa, a neighborhood in central Beirut.[ii] Hezbollah confirmed Afif’s death.[iii] Afif was reportedly visiting a Syrian Ba’ath Party in Lebanon branch office at the time of the strike, according to the office’s head.[iv] The Lebanese Health Ministry reported the strike killed one and injured three others.[v]

Afif’s killing is a continuation of the IDF’s campaign to target senior Hezbollah leadership to further degrade Hezbollah’s command-and-control. The IDF said that Afif worked with senior Hezbollah officials to direct military operations, particularly after Israeli operations seriously disrupted Hezbollah‘s strategic- and operational-level military leadership.[vi] Afif had served as Hezbollah’s spokesperson since 2014 and facilitated Hezbollah’s news coverage and media relations.[vii] Afif managed Hezbollah’s attack claims and documentation related to attack claims and coordinated Hezbollah‘s messaging with Lebanese media.[viii] Afif played a role in Hezbollah’s October 19 drone attack on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s house in Caesarea.[ix] He was a close adviser to Nasrallah and had become the highest-ranking Hezbollah official to hold public conferences in Beirut over the past month.[x] Afif’s killing is likely intended to further disrupt Hezbollah’s command-and-control structures and its attempts to rehabilitate those structures by having other officials step into previous commanders’ roles.

Iran Update, November 16, 2024

Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei reportedly called on Lebanese Hezbollah to accept a ceasefire agreement that would require Hezbollah to remain north of the Litani River per UN Security Council Resolution 1701.[i] Two individuals affiliated with the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) told the New York Times on November 16 that senior Supreme Leader adviser Ali Larijani conveyed this message to Hezbollah during his recent visit to Beirut.[ii] The message emphasized that Khamenei supports “ending the war with Israel” and that Iran will help Hezbollah recover from the war.[iii] It is in Iran’s interest to end the fighting between Israel and Hezbollah to prevent Israel from further weakening Hezbollah.[iv] Iran could also calculate that it could help rearm and reconstitute Hezbollah in southern Lebanon after a ceasefire takes effect. Iran has historically transferred weapons to Hezbollah in Lebanon via Syria, which means that preventing this rearmament and reconstitution process would require some form of interdiction effort against Iran.[v] This report, assuming it is accurate, highlights the extent to which Iran lacks the capability or willingness to defend the Axis of Resistance against Israel. Iran failed to prevent Israel from defeating or severely degrading Hamas units across the Gaza Strip, and it now similarly appears opposed to helping Hezbollah fight Israel.[vi]

Hegel vs Heidegger: can we uncover reality?

Reason, reality, and the fate of philosophy

For most of its history, Western philosophy tried to use pure reason to know reality. But, argues Robert Pippin, Heidegger showed that this entire philosophical tradition was doomed, due to its mistaken assumption that what it is to be a feature of reality is to be available to rational thought. This assumption, which culminated in Hegel, led philosophy to forget the meaningfulness of reality for humans, and so left us lost. Only by recognising that we encounter reality not primarily through reason, but through the ways in which it matters for us, can philosophy recover the world as something meaningful for humans.