Author: M Barbu

The turbulent year since Hamas’s brutal attack on Israel draws to a close, marked by a sharp escalation in conflict between Israel and Iran and its proxies. Four CFR experts assess the changes since the attacks.

One year after Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel, Elliott Abrams examines the extraordinary response of Israel’s government and society; Linda Robinson catalogues the wrenching toll on Palestinians in Gaza; Ray Takeyh surveys Iran’s newly challenged network of regional allies; and Steven Cook explores how much expanding conflict has tested U.S.-Israeli ties.

Against the backdrop of the tension between Israel and Iran, and following Iran’s October 1, 2024 missile attack on Israel, Qatar has aligned itself with Iran. A delegation of Iranian ministers and officials headed by President Masoud Pezeshkian arrived in Qatar to participate in the Asia Cooperation Dialogue Forum, held in Doha. During the visit the two countries promoted cooperation in various fields, including economy, energy, culture and education. In addition, according to President Pezeshkian, “significant progress was made on $6bn in Iranian assets held in Qatar.”

On October 4, the US military said it attacked Iran-backed Houthi military facilities in Yemen.

“U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM) forces conducted strikes on 15 Houthi targets in Iranian-backed Houthi-controlled areas of Yemen today at about 5 p.m. (Sanaa time). These targets included Houthi offensive military capabilities. These actions were taken to protect freedom of navigation and make international waters safer and more secure for U.S., coalition, and merchant vessels,” stated CENTCOM.

To protect its ally, Britain’s military is refusing to give details about its coaching of Israeli troops.

The UK Ministry of Defence (MoD) has rejected a freedom of information request that would shed light on training it is providing to Israeli armed forces personnel in Britain.

Paul Salem
Vice President for International Engagement
Paul Salem

While Israel is winning on the battlefield, it does not have a sustainable vision for any of the days — or months or years — after in Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, or the region; for the Palestinians, the last year has been an unmitigated disaster, causing devastation and displacement comparable with that of the Nakba of 1948.

In the past three weeks, Israel has dealt a near-knock-out blow to Hezbollah; for the immediate future, Tehran’s primary strategic asset cannot deter Israeli or American attacks on Iran, leaving the Islamic Republic vulnerable.

Many of the investigative reports examining October 7 focus intensely on the intelligence, ignoring the failures on the strategic and political levels.

Indeed, the intelligence, tactical, and operational failures that led to the disaster were many, but these will be discussed in a separate article. This document will focus solely on the political and strategic levels.

Abstract: The Iran-backed Houthi movement has delivered a strong military performance in the year of anti-Israel and anti-shipping warfare since October 2023. They seem to be aiming to be the ‘first in, last out,’ meaning the first to cross key thresholds during the war (for instance, attack Israel’s major cities) and the last to stop fighting (refusing to be deterred by Israeli or Anglo-American strikes inside Yemen). Facing weak domestic opposition and arguably strengthening their maritime line of supply to Iran, the Houthis are stronger, more technically proficient, and more prominent members of the Axis of Resistance than they were at the war’s outset. The Houthis can now exploit new opportunities by cooperating with other Axis of Resistance players in Iraq as well as with Russia, and they could offer Yemen as a platform from which Iran can deploy advanced weapons against Israel and the West without drawing direct retaliation.

In the initial sales pitch to Hezbollah two years ago, the new line of Apollo pagers seemed precisely suited to the needs of a militia group with a sprawling network of fighters and a hard-earned reputation for paranoia.

The AR924 pager was slightly bulky but rugged, built to survive battlefield conditions. It boasted a waterproof Taiwanese design and an oversized battery that could operate for months without charging. Best of all, there was no risk that the pagers could ever be tracked by Israel’s intelligence services. Hezbollah’s leaders were so impressed they bought 5,000 of them and began handing them out to mid-level fighters and support personnel in February.

[O]ne thing is certain: his [Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s] 30-year-long policy of using costly proxies to keep war away from Iran has failed. Now he may be forced into doing his own fighting.

Depending on how far this goes, Khamenei’s latest move could put the very fate of his regime in the bargain.