“All we seek is a safe place, but unfortunately we found ourselves in another war.”
Thousands of Eritrean and Sudanese refugees are demanding to be relocated from unsafe camps in Ethiopia’s conflict-hit Amhara region, where they say they lack basic services and are subject to almost daily attacks from local militiamen and armed bandits.
The African continent saw a significant increase in coups in the last three years, with military figures carrying out takeovers in Gabon, Niger, Burkina Faso, Sudan, Guinea, Chad and Mali.
After Niger’s coup in July, the regional Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) said it would not tolerate another takeover, and implemented tough sanctions and threatened military action to restore that country’s democratically elected government.
For almost a decade, US troops have been on the ground in Syria to assist Kurdish-led forces in the defeat of the infamous Islamic State. These forces tamp down on the ISIS remnants in the northern and eastern regions they presently control, where tens of thousands of captured ISIS fighters, their families and suspected affiliates remain in open-air camps and prisons.
Abstract: Since 2018, the United States has been trying to figure out what counterterrorism looks like during an era of strategic competition, and how it can maximize and optimize returns from its counterterrorism investments. There are important differences between these two national security priorities—strategic competition and counterterrorism—but if the United States wants to gain resource efficiencies, it should look across the gray space at how and where these two priorities interplay and converge. This is because a key part of the pathway to CT optimization lies in realizing how counterterrorism has evolved as a form of influence. This article introduces a conceptual framework to help the counterterrorism community situate the returns from CT investments, especially deployed CT force activity. It recommends that those returns be understood through two lenses: 1) those that are direct and oriented around threat mitigation and 2) those that are intersectional and oriented around influence. Interviews with three experts provide context to elements of the framework and highlight the interplay between counterterrorism and strategic competition in different regional areas.
Abstract: When it comes to counterterrorism, the United States has been living through an inflection point. It wants to focus less on terrorism so it can place more emphasis on strategic competition, but key terrorist adversaries remain committed. The terrorism landscape and the approaches used by key terror adversaries have also been evolving. The United States and its partners have been placing various forms of pressure against priority networks such as the Islamic State and al-Qa`ida in key locations to keep the threats these groups pose degraded, and to restrict their ability to conduct external operations and other impactful acts of terror. But over the past two years, there have been growing signs that the Islamic State is evolving around the pressure that has been placed against it, developments that highlight the limits of existing CT pressure approaches and the need for those approaches to evolve. This article introduces two frameworks: 1) a framework to help conceptualize non-state VEO power and CT pressure efforts to degrade those elements of power and 2) a defense and degradation in depth framework that can be used to help strategically guide future CT pressure campaigns. It is hoped that these frameworks provoke debate within the counterterrorism community and that they help the United States and its allies adjust their CT approaches so they can evolve to stay ahead of the threat.
À quoi ressemblera le mouvement de masse du futur proche ?
Cinq hypothèses, mais aucune d’elles n’est passionnante
L’idée d’une « fabrication de la politique » est une invention de l’époque contemporaine.
L’idée que le peuple en tant que tel est en charge du destin du monde est en effet l’enfant de l’avènement de la bourgeoisie, de l’urbanisation et, enfin, de la société de masse et/ou de consommation.
Devlet Bahceli also suggested that the conditions of the militant leader’s life sentence without parole be reconsidered if he agrees to make such a call.
In a U-turn that came as a bombshell for Turkish politics, Devlet Bahceli, a top ally of Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), suggested that the conditions of Abdullah Ocalan’s life sentence without parole be reconsidered if the Kurdish militant leader accepts to declare the dissolution of his outlawed armed group.
Iranian-backed militias in Iraq continue to launch drone and missile attacks against Israel in a show of solidarity with their allies in Gaza and Lebanon. Although many claims remain unverified, some attacks have targeted Israeli military personnel. On Monday, Israeli Foreign Minister Gideon Sa’ar urged the UN Security Council to pressure Iraq to curtail the activities of Iran’s proxies, emphasizing Israel’s right to self-defense under the UN Charter.
“Polycrisis” is a word that has recently come into use to characterize the way crises in many different spheres – ranging from geopolitics and economics to climate and pandemic – are aggravating each other and even converging. Trump and Trumpism, like similar leaders and movements around the world, took off in the era of polycrisis and reflect many of its themes. They are also likely to severely aggravate the dynamics of the polycrisis.
Abstract: It is critical for the counterterrorism community to have a sophisticated understanding of the components of external operations and the indicators that help to signal that a network’s interest, capabilities, or attack planning are advancing. It is even more critical to be able to effectively provide warning when an external operations terror attack is imminent. To help enhance and validate existing indicators and warning approaches, the authors conducted a survey of 30 practitioners, academics, and private sector specialists to acquire unique and varied insights on this important issue. This article provides a summary of key indicators that could indicate a change in a group’s intent and capability to conduct an external operations attack. It then examines existing shortfalls and offers potential solutions in the areas of artificial intelligence, data prioritization, and information sharing, before concluding with some unique models to consider from other fields that can help existing I&W approaches to evolve.